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Abstract
Power imbalance in dispute resolution processes affects both the legitimacy of the process 
and the ability o f the parties to articulate and achieve their interests. In cases where power 
imbalance is both the subject matter o f the dispute and a procedural issue, the management 
of power is even more material. In the common law tradition, judicial processes provide 
precedents and a structure for allocating power between the parties. In an alternative process 
that does not involve the participation o f a third party adjudicator, the parties themselves are 
responsible for developing power to assert their interests. The higher degree o f responsibility 
in alternative processes brings with it greater possibilities for the parties to change their 
power relationship. If no attention is given to the responsibilities and the possibilities that 
accompany empowerment, then alternative processes may result in a reaffirmation of the 
original power imbalance.
The author examines three aspects o f dispute resolution involving cases of physical and 
sexual abuse in institutions and other environments. She focuses on judicial and alternative 
processes that deal with identity formation, empowerment and monetary compensation. She 
argues that sexual abuse and physical abuse create specific harms to the identity and power 
of abused persons. These harms should be addressed through a process that can allow for 
identity-formation and re-configuration of the power relationship between the parties. The 
author concludes that judicial processes recognize identity formation that occurs outside the 
legal arena, and are capable of recognizing the power o f the testimony o f abused persons. 
However, judicial processes depend upon the approval of status quo experts before 
acknowledgment of identity and empowerment occurs. The author explores the capacity of 
non-judicial processes to allow abused persons to develop identity and to bring their 
subjective understanding o f abusive experiences to the broader world. She concludes that 
non-judicial processes have a greater capacity to allow identity-formation and empowerment 
that is unmediated by objectifying discourses. However energy and attention must be given 
to maintaining the integrity o f abused persons’ subjective experiences throughout the process 
in order to avoid having their interests defined by pre-existing understandings of abuse. The 
author explores judicial and non-judicial treatments of monetary compensation. She 
concludes that judges have ready access to a forum for expressing the non-commodifiable 
aspects of compensation. Alternative methods have the capacity to recognize subjective 
harm, but they must articulate such recognition in order to avoid the hegemonic 
objectification that can accompany the distribution of monetary compensation.
vii
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION
When Gamini finished surgery in the middle o f the night, he walked through 
the compound into the east buildings, where the sick children were. The 
mothers were always there. Sitting on stools, they rested their upper torso 
and head on their child’s bed and slept holding the small hands. There were 
not too many fathers around then. He watched the children, who were 
unaware o f their parents’ arms. Fifty yards away in Emergency he had heard 
grown men scream for their mothers as they were dying. ‘ Wait fo r  meV *7 
know you are hereV This was when he stopped believing in man’s rule on 
earth. He turned away from every person who stood up for a war. Or the 
principle o f one’s land, or pride o f ownership, or even personal rights. All 
o f those motives ended up somehow in the arms of careless power. One was 
no worse and no better than the enemy. He believed only in the mothers 
sleeping against their children, the great sexuality of spirit in them, the 
sexuality o f care, so the children would be confident and safe during the 
night.1
The spectre o f institutionalized children from decades past, sexually and physically abused 
by those in institutions2 responsible for their care and custody, is one which has haunted 
Canadian society for at least the past ten years. Thousands of claims for damages arising 
from historic institutional abuse in Indian residential schools have emerged.3 Adults who
excerpt from M. Ondaatje, Anil's Ghost (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 2000) at 119. 
This book is a fictional story set during the ongoing civil war in Sri Lanka.
2Three distinct types of institutional abuse have been identified: physical, sexual or 
emotional; program abuse; and system abuse. Program abuse occur when a program 
operates below standards or relies upon harsh techniques and system abuse occurs when the 
system improperly assesses, diagnoses, defines the length or treatment or removes a child 
because of inadequate resources: See, Law Commission o f Canada, Review o f  the Needs o f  
Victims o f  Institutional Child Abuse (Background Paper) by the Institute for Human 
Resource Development (Ottawa: Law Commission o f Canada, 2000) at Appendix II, p. 5. 
In this thesis I will only focus on sexual and physical abuse although I recognize that 
program and system abuse may contribute to the likelihood of the other two forms o f abuse.
3R. Mofina, “Truth commission could probe residential-school abuse cases” The 
Ottawa Citizen (6 June 2000): This article states that as of June 6, 2000, the federal 
government was facing lawsuits from 5,900 individuals; if seven (then) pending class-action
1
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were residents in provincial institutions as children have commenced actions across the 
country. Some of these cases have been processed through the court system. However, 
partially because of the high numbers o f plaintiffs associated with the various institutions, 
as well as the high monetary and non-monetary transaction costs4 associated with litigation, 
provincial governments and parties have sought to design non-court processes and remedies 
that can better address the needs of the parties.5
A. Context
In the late 1980's and early 1990's there was growing awareness of the vulnerability of 
children who were placed in total institutions6. In 1989 the media reported that there were
suits were to be accepted by the courts, the number could jump to 8,900.
S. Simmie, “Churches reap harvest of residential school abuse” The Toronto Star (26 
August 2000): In this article officials from the Department o f Indian and Northern Affairs 
project that the number o f lawsuits concerning residential school abuse could reach 15,000 
over the next decade.
4High transaction costs include the actual fee for retaining lawyers, court and judicial 
services and other related items, but it also includes the high psychological costs associated 
with proceeding through the legal system. Adult plaintiffs making claims for child sexual 
abuse are often in fragile emotional health and not likely to proceed with potentially 
legitimate claims if the psychological barriers of the process are too high. For example, 
having to publicly describe intimate details of sexual abuse in an open courtroom and then 
cross-examined on those details may prevent a legitimate plaintiff from engaging a process. 
Only those who are emotionally capable of facing challenges to their testimony are able to 
sue.
sLaw Commission of Canada, Institutional Child Abuse in Canada (Background 
Paper) by Ronda Bessner (Ottawa: Law Commission of Canada, 2000) at 126-8.
6E. Goffinan, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation o f  Mental Patients and Other 
Inmates (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1961). On page 4 Goffinan defines total
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allegations o f abuse against Christian Brothers at the Mount Cashel Orphanage.7 Subsequent 
criminal convictions of the various Christian Brothers were reported in the national media8 
and triggered widespread recognition o f  institutional abuse. In 1990 the RCMP commenced 
an investigation into allegations o f abuse at the New Brunswick Training School at 
Kingsclear. In 1991 Karl Toft was arrested and charged with committing numerous criminal 
offences relating to abusive acts in that institution.9 In 1992, the Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples received testimonials about treatment in Indian residential schools. 
These testimonials described the destructive effects on individuals and communities arising 
from the following: forceful separation o f children from their families; prohibitions on 
speaking Aboriginal languages; prohibitions on exercising their spiritual and cultural 
customs; and physical and sexual brutality.10
institutions in the following way:
Their encompassing or total character is symbolized by the barrier to social 
intercourse with the outside and to departure that is often built right into the 
physical plant, such as locked doors, high walls, barbed wire, cliffs, water, 
forest, or moors.
7K . C o x , “Teacher ousted over sex charges back at Mount Cashel in 2  years” The 
Globe and Mail (28 September 1989) A4.
“Man suing over alleged Mount Cashel Abuse” The Chronicle Herald (29 November 
1989) A4.
8“Jury convicts ex-Cashel teacher” The Globe and Mail (18 May 1991) A5.
“Former Brother convicted in Mount Cashel abuse case” The Globe and Mail (2 May
1991) A4.
9Supra note 5 at 26-28.
10Law Commission of Canada, Needs and Expectations fo r  Redress o f  Victims o f  
Abuse (background paper) by SAGE (Ottawa: Law Commission of Canada, 2000) at
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While the Mount Cashel cases were going through the criminal courts, investigations of 
alleged incidents at the Nova Scotia School for Girls11 and the Shelburne School for Boys 
were underway. In 1992 George Moss, a former counselor at the Nova Scotia School for 
Girls, was convicted of indecent assault upon a resident o f the School and sentenced to one 
year imprisonment.12 Soon after, Douglas Hollett, another former counselor at the Nova 
Scotia School for Girls, was convicted o f having intercourse with a female between the ages 
o f 14 and 16.13 In 1993 Patrick MacDougall was convicted o f 11 counts o f sexual 
misconduct while he was a counselor at the Shelburne School for Boys.14
Soon after the convictions, complainants from the criminal trials brought civil claims against 
the abusers and the Nova Scotia government. In the first and only case to go through the 
entire litigation process before the commencement of the Compensation Program, the 
defendant Hollett was found to have enticed the plaintiff to run away from the school on his 
last day of employment and to live with him. He subsequently kept the plaintiff hidden at
Appendix 3.
1 ‘in 1985 the name o f  the school was changed to the Nova Scotia Residential Centre. 
The facility is now a co-educational treatment centre for emotionally and behaviourally 
disturbed children aged 10-16 years. See Department of Justice Nova Scotia, Report o f  an 
Independent Investigation in respect o f  Incidents and Allegations o f  Sexual and other 
Physical Abuse at Five Nova Scotia Residential Institutions by the Hon. Stuart Stratton, Q.C. 
(Halifax: Nova Scotia Department o f Justice, 1995) at 38.
l2R. v. Moss, (9 October 1992), Colchester 296219 (N.S. Prov. Ct.).
13R. v. Hollett (5 February 1993), Halifax N.S.J. no. 76 (N.S.Prov. Ct.).
14J?. v. MacDougal (6 July 1993), Shelburne 372598, 372600, 372602, 372604, 
400582 (N.S.S.C.);R. v. MacDougal (17 February 1993), Shelburne 330201 (N.S.Prov.Ct.).
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his home and sexually and physically abused her from October 1976 until she was 
apprehended and returned to the School in May 1978. The trial judge found the government 
o f Nova Scotia liable in negligence for failing to terminate the abusive employee when 
complaints initially arose about his conduct with the girls.15 The plaintiff appealed the trial 
judge’s decision to not award punitive damages. The government of Nova Scotia cross­
appealed on the issue of liability and on the award of aggravated damages. On appeal, the 
Court upheld the findings o f liability and a $50,000 award for general damages. However, 
the Court o f Appeal overturned the trial judge’s award o f $25,000 for aggravated damages 
and found that punitive damages o f $35,000 were warranted.16
Roose v. Hollett et al. was the first case that the government litigated concerning the 
existence and extent of government liability for the actions o f employees17. The Court of 
Appeal upheld the trial judge’s finding of liability in negligence for the damages to the 
appellant, even though the abuse started after he had been terminated and even though Roose 
had run away from the institution. Further, in awarding punitive damages, Pugsley J.A. 
found that the employer’s failure to terminate Hollett’s employment was “inexcusable, 
outrageous, callous and reprehensible”18. Therefore punitive damages were required to
lsRoose v. Hollett et al. (1995), 143 N.S.R. (2d) 38 (N.S.S.C).
l6Roose v. Hollett et al. (1996), 154 N.S.R. (2d)161 (N.S.C.A.).
xlIbid. at 189. The Crown brought a cross-appeal on the issue of liability. Crown 
counsel argued that there is no substantial connection between the failure to dismiss Hollett 
and the appellant’s injuries; Roose’s act o f running away and taking up residence is enough 
to sever any connection that might exist.
nIbid. at 211.
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indicate condemnation. Flinn J. A. agreed that punitive damages were warranted but on the 
narrower grounds that the conduct o f the employer was reckless and blameworthy.19 On 
November 1, 1996, the Attorney-General of Nova Scotia filed an application for leave to 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada on the issue of punitive damages, pre-judgement 
interest and costs. This application was denied.20 Around the time the case was concluded, 
the government of Nova Scotia opted to explore the possibility o f setting up a non-judicial 
process for dealing with claims of abuse.
The Nova Scotia government decided on a three-pronged approach to deal with the emerging 
claims of abuse. Viki Samuels-Stewart was commissioned to investigate existing residential 
institutions to ensure that abuse was not currently occurring and that there were proper 
safeguards in place to protect residents from abuse.21 The former Chief Justice of New 
Brunswick, Stuart Stratton, was asked to investigate allegations of physical and sexual abuse, 
practices and procedures for detecting abuse, and employee action or inaction in dealing with 
any abuse that occurred.22 The government indicated that if  Stratton found that there was
19Ibid. at 212-3.
20G.B.R. v. Hollett, [1996] S.C.C.A. No. 541.
21Department of Justice Nova Scotia, 'In Our Care: Abuse and Young Offenders in 
Custody - An Audit o f the Shelburne Youth Centre and the Nova Scotia Youth Centre - 
Waterville by Viki Samuels-Stewart (Halifax: Department o f Justice of Nova Scotia, 1995).
22The terms of reference o f the Stratton Report are as follows:
“investigate the incidents o f sexual and other physical abuse of residents that occurred or are 
alleged to have occurred at the institutions;
investigate and determine the practices and procedures in place at the institutions that either
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7
abuse in the institutions, it was prepared to follow Stratton’s recommendations to en%2§e in 
an Alternative Dispute Resolution [hereinafter “ADR”] process to deal with claims of abuse.
On June 30, 1995 Stratton released his report. In it he concluded that there were 89 vjctims 
of sexual and physical abuse at three o f the five institutions investigated.23 He recommended 
that the government engage in an ADR process with the survivors of abuse for the pufbose 
of compensating them.
The idea of an alternative process and remedy was not new; the Ontario government had 
announced its intention to compensate victims o f abuse with relation to the St. Joseph’s 
Training School for Boys and the St. John’s Training School for Boys.24 In 1992 the Ontario 
government had authorized the use o f an ADR process to address abuse claimed by fctrrier 
residents o f the Grandview Training School for Girls.25 In 1995 the New Bruti^tyick 
government had approved ADR as a way to deal with claims of former residents of the hjew
permitted or hindered the detection o f abuse o f residents;
investigate and determine whether any employees in the institutions or any public officials 
were aware of abusive behaviour o f staff toward residents; and
investigate and determine what steps, if any, were taken by employees or o ff ice s  in 
reference to any such abuse.” Supra note 11 at iv-v.
“ Department o f Justice - Nova Scotia, News Release “Justice - Province Needs More 
Time” (1 November 1996).
24D. Downey, “Victims o f  abuse to be compensated” The Globe and Mail (14 August
1992) Al l .
25Supra note 5 at 129.
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Brunswick Training School at Kingsclear.26 The Nova Scotia government took the 
opportunity to initiate a non-judicial process to deal with claims o f historic child abuse.27
The Nova Scotia government responded quickly to the Stratton Report and announced that 
it would negotiate with the group or groups o f survivors of abuse via their chosen lawyer 
whose fees would be paid by the government.28 Negotiations occurred in early 1996 and an 
agreement was reached between the parties in mid-1996. The negotiations did not end up 
being between the government and one lawyer who represented a group of survivors29; 
rather, the claimants were each represented by a lawyer o f choice and these lawyers together 
negotiated with the government.
The meetings between the Nova Scotia government and the lawyers for individual claimants
26fbid. at 142.
27I use to term historic child abuse to refer to abuse that happened when the adult 
claimant or plaintiff was a child.
28Department o f Justice - Nova Scotia, News Release, “Justice - Progress Report - 
Stratton Report Response” (17 October 1995).
29The reader may note that I use the term “survivor” and “claimant” to describe a 
person who has suffered from abuse and who is involved in a non-judicial dispute resolution 
process. The term “survivor” has entered the lexicon of terminology to counteract the 
passivity of the word word “victim”. Both refer to people whose experiences of abuse are 
not doubted. The term “claimant” describes a person who is making an allegation of abuse 
for the purpose o f  qualifying for compensation. I use the word “claimant” when referring 
to persons within the Nova Scotia process as there is currently some controversy about the 
degree of abuse that occurred in Nova Scotia institutions. When speaking o f court processes, 
I will use the terminology used by the court. When I am speaking o f a person outside of any 
process I will refer to her as an “abused person”, “victim” or “survivor”. For an explanation 
o f my use of gendered pronouns, see note 42.
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resulted in a Memorandum of Understanding30 [hereinafter “MOU”] which outlined the 
process for compensating abuse claimants.31 Among the provisions in the MOU were the 
following:
AND WHEREAS the Province has agreed to compensate Survivors of 
Physical and Sexual Abuse through a compensation process that is principled, 
respectful, timely and consistent with the following principles:
THAT the physical and sexual abuse o f children by adults in 
positions of power and trust is a fundamental betrayal that 
operates to deny a child’s dignity and autonomy;
THAT the fundamental purposes o f this compensation 
process are:
• to acknowledge moral responsibility for the Physical 
and Sexual Abuse experienced by the Survivors which 
was perpetrated, condoned, or directed by employees 
of the Province during the time the Survivors were 
resident in the Institutions;
30“Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Compensation for Survivors of 
Institutional Abuse”: see Appendix ‘A’.
31This Memorandum ofUnderstanding was subsequently changed by the government 
following a suspension of the Compensation Program on November 1, 1996. As stated in 
the December 6,1996 press release, the Minister o f Justice suspended the Program because 
of the large number of claimants who came forward and also because old records providing 
historic information had just been discovered. The Compensation Program resumed on 
December 16,1996 with the following changes, among others: the government has 120 days 
instead o f 45 days to assess the claims; internal investigation is not only o f government 
employees for disciplinary purposes but also of the claims themselves; and the statements 
taken from the claimants will now be used for investigative purposes (criminal, disciplinary) 
and for the Child Abuse Registry : see Department o f Justice - Nova Scotia, News Release, 
“Justice Compensation Program Moves Ahead”(6 December 1996).
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• to affirm the essential worth and dignity o f all o f the
Survivors, who were residents o f the Institutions;
• to assist the Survivors, in a tangible way, with the
healing process;
• to affirm to the Survivors that they were not
responsible in any way for the Physical and Sexual 
Abuse perpetrated, condoned, or directed by 
employees o f the Province while the Survivors were 
resident in the Institutions; and
• to implement financial compensation and other
benefits to Survivors in a principled, respectful and 
timely fashion.
These provisions outline worthy goals and purposes. Yet to this day, there is controversy 
surrounding the Compensation Program. One o f the sources of controversy is the fact that 
former and current employees o f the institutions were not included in the negotiation process. 
The government opted for a process that could provide compensation quickly, without first 
conducting an extensive investigation into the conduct of the employees. Instead of having 
the employees respond to allegations o f abuse, management level government officials 
negotiated the MOU and a separate internal process was set up to investigate current 
employees. As the numbers o f claimants grew and the stories o f abuse came out in the 
media, past and current employees32 protested that the claims were exaggerated or false. 
They claimed that it was unfair that they were not able to face the accusations made against
32Current and past employees have distinct interests in this situation and belong to 
two separate advocacy groups. In 1997 and 1998 the current employees were represented 
by their Union in a policy grievance against the government. As a result o f  the grievance a 
Memorandum of Agreement was developed to address the employment and human resources 
problems facing current employees as a result o f the Compensation Program.
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them; even if  they faced no monetary loss, they were facing loss o f  reputation and dignity.33 
As noted in the Globe and Mail newspaper, former employees found themselves accused of 
abuse but had no forum to challenge the claims.34 They contended that the Compensation 
Program was set up in such a way as to muddy the distinction between true claims of abuse 
and false ones.35
Throughout the process and to the present day, lawyers and representatives of the employees 
have stated in the media that the majority of claims were exaggerated or false36. The lawyers 
for the claimants and the claimants themselves have asserted that the abuse did happen and
33K. C ox , “Workers in Nova Scotia feel vindicated as inquiry says lure of 
compensation led to many false charges at Shelburne” 77ie Globe and Mail (16 September 
2000) A ll. In this article Cameron MacKinnon, a lawyer representing some of the 
employees, is quoted as saying that “(t)heir lives have been ruined by the way the 
government cast them as perverts and pedophiles. The insidious nature o f this has left them 
ruined spiritually, physically and psychologically”.
D. Jobb, “Ex-Shelbume worker’s family ‘tom apart’ by allegations” The Halifax 
Herald (28 September 2000).
34K. C ox , supra note 33, para. 10. In cases where allegations of sexual and physical 
abuse are made, it may be argued that the nature of the wrong is so serious and so public that 
any allegations should have been dealt with by way of criminal proceedings. That way, 
persons named in allegations can access procedural protections more readily than is possible 
within employment law processes. For more on the criminalization of wrongs, see: S. E. 
Marshall & R. A. Duff, “Criminalization and Sharing Wrongs” (1998) 11 Can. J. L. & Jur. 
7.
35D. Jobb, “Hamm refuses inquiry into payouts of abuse victims” The Halifax Herald 
(27 October 2000).
36D. Jobb, “Compensation triggered false abuse claims - report” The Halifax Herald 
(12 September 2000).
R. Boomer, “Keating wants details of his alleged abuse: Ex-School for Boys 
supervisor asks for info to clear name” The Daily News (30 January 2001).
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the majority o f claims were true37. There are various possible reasons why this process upset 
past and current employees whose interests were affected by the claims. One can speculate 
that the lack o f legitimacy was in part related to the absence o f a validation method that was 
satisfactory to all parties affected by the claims of abuse.
The newly elected government pledged to address the various concerns expressed about the 
Compensation Program. On November 30, 1999, the Minister o f Justice appointed former 
Quebec Court of Appeal Judge Kaufman38 to do the following: determine whether the 
process upheld the rights of both the claimants and the accused; determine if the response 
to institutional abuse has been appropriate, fair and reasonable; document and describe the 
government’s response to allegations of abuse; assess the appropriateness of the response in 
light o f the interests of claimants, the public interest, the interests of staff and former staff 
o f the institutions; and assess the implementation o f each element of the government's 
response to allegations of abuse in provincial institutions.39
Until the Kaufman Review completes its research and analysis, the public will not have a
37D. Jobb, “Claimants’ lawyer insulted by abuse report” The Halifax Herald (27 
October 2000).
C. Nicoll, “Report diminishes victims’ suffering - ex-Shelbume resident” The Daily 
News (13 September 2000).
38I am currently assisting the Institutional Abuse Response Inquiry with its work. 
However, the views throughout this thesis are entirely my own and do not reflect the 
position, work, or opinions of the Institutional Abuse Response Inquiry.
39Department of Justice - Nova Scotia, News Release, “Retired Judge to Conduct 
Independent Review” (30 November 1999).
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global description o f the government of Nova Scotia’s response to allegations of historic 
child abuse. However with the information that is publicly available about this Program and 
with the use of other instances of abuse, I will explore the capacity of judicial and non­
judicial processes to achieve the specific remedies required to deal with the particular forms 
of damage that result from institutional abuse.
B. Thesis inquiry
Through the MOU the parties expressed recognition that abuse “is a fundamental betrayal 
that operates to deny a child’s dignity and autonomy”40. The Minister o f Justice further 
stated that the “ADR process. . . empowers survivors by giving them control--an essential 
component of the healing process—by giving them an opportunity for input into the 
negotiation of the framework agreement”.41
The provisions the MOU and the Minister’s statement assume two things: that abuse goes 
to the core of a person’s identity by denying dignity, and it affects the ability of the person 
to exercise autonomous power. In my thesis I will examine the impact that abuse has upon 
identity and empowerment. I will examine the possibility that abuse involves a process 
whereby the abuser either reinforces or imposes the sense that a person’s body is for the use 
of another. The consequent loss of integrity or wholeness diminishes the abused person’s
■^MOU, supra note 30.
4IDepartment o f Justice, supra note 28.
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sense of his42 ability to assert his own idea o f what is meaningful in the discursive arena. I 
will argue that if  the parties want to remedy the core harms to abused persons, they must 
focus upon damages to identity and damages to power that are inflicted through the abusive 
relationship. In this thesis I explore the possibility that this fundamental form o f damage can 
be addressed through a dispute resolution mechanism. Further, I will explore the possibility 
that the parties’ ability to control the design o f  a dispute resolution process may provide 
some remedial effects for the parties. Although addressing these damages through various 
substantive remedies is vitally important, I would like to explore the capacity o f the parties 
to achieve a healing or transformative result through participation in the design o f the process 
itself.43
One o f the key problems that arises when parties attempt to design a process is that they rely 
on the idea that ADR processes contain ‘free spaces’ wherein the parties can exercise agency 
to create a process ex nihilo. This idea may be somewhat illusory. Discourse exists within
42Throughout the thesis I will alternate between masculine and feminine personal 
pronouns when speaking o f abused persons. However as 95% of abusers are male, I will use 
the masculine pronoun to refer to individual abusers: see J. Neeb & S. Harper Civil Liability 
fo r  Childhood Sexual Abuse (Toronto: Butterworth, 1994) at 22.
43In recognizing the potential o f the process to address substantive concerns, I 
acknowledge the questions put by Bruce Feldthusen in his article “The Civil Action for 
Sexual Battery: Therapeutic Jurisprudence” (1993) 25 Ottawa L. Rev. 204. Feldthusen 
examines the possibility that civil actions for sexual battery cases are therapeutic for the 
victims of sexual assault. He concludes that although a tort action may have many 
therapeutic benefits, costs and other barriers to litigation will likely be prohibitive. Further 
he states that it is worth considering whether legitimate therapeutic needs might be addressed 
more efficiently to the benefit o f  more victims outside the tort system. In this thesis, I am 
not only exploring whether or not a conflict resolution process has therapeutic potential, I 
am exploring the possibility that the process can effect a re-configuration of power 
relationships between a disenfranchised group and a group in authority or dominance.
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ADR spaces also, although they are perhaps not o f the same nature as the discourses that 
exist in the legal arena. If the space for agency to operate in ADR is possibly illusory, is 
agency itself an illusion perpetuated by discourses? This question will also be examined in 
the body o f the thesis.
In much o f the negotiation literature and in the discourse of dispute resolution, power is 
conceived alternately as the ability to inflict damage or the ability to influence the decision 
of others.44 The latter view, which is promoted by advocates for the Harvard model of 
principled negotiation, focuses the analysis of power upon the discrete manifestations of 
power in the microcosm o f the negotiation itself. The model does not address issues of 
systemic power imbalance.45 In mediation, power is perceived as a problematic variable that 
must be re-distributed or controlled by an intervenor such as a mediator.46 Power is 
something that can be re-distributed by the mediator, with the agreement of the parties. Self- 
empowerment is not as important as an equitable distribution of power.
44B. Mayer, “The Dynamics o f Power in Mediation and Negotiation” in J. 
Macfarlane, ed., Rethinking Disputes: the Mediation Alternative (Toronto: Emond 
Montgomery, 1997) at 77.
45R. Fisher, W. Ury & B. Patton, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without 
Giving In, 2nd ed. (New York: Penguin, 1991).
46M. Coyle, “Defending the weak and fighting unfairness: can mediators respond to 
the challenge?” (1998) 36 Osgoode Hall L. J. 625.
G. A. Chomenki, “Mediating commercial disputes: exchanging ‘power over’ for 
power with’” in J. Macfarlane, ed., Rethinking Disputes: the Mediation Alternative (Toronto: 
Emond Montgomery, 1997) at 159.
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Existing alternative dispute resolution literature focuses heavily upon the ability of the 
parties to exercise their autonomy to control the process and the outcome o f the process.47 
These are the key features that distinguish alternative dispute resolution processes from 
judicial processes, which rely upon the authority o f a third party who acts within the bounds 
of an existing process.
In relying upon autonomy, negotiation and alternative dispute resolution theorists are 
assuming that people exercise power autonomously in a relatively fluid power environment. 
Although a party may not have as much negotiating power as the other party in the 
negotiation arena, there are ways to increase power through the manipulation of various 
aspects of one’s situation.48 This perception o f power relies upon a liberal conception of 
personhood that tends to maximize autonomy and freedom. However, it may minimize the 
richness of the relationship and power dynamics that may limit the degree to which 
negotiating parties can exercise power.
In my thesis I will locate the actual possibilities for self-actualization that exist in alternative 
dispute resolution processes as opposed to assuming an automatic license for the exercise of 
autonomy. My analysis focuses on the benefits and potential pitfalls o f a bilateral, non­
judicial process where the parties may have a degree of control over process design and 
outcome, and the benefits and pitfalls of a judicial process where the process and outcome
47Supra note 46 at 626.
4SSupra note 45 at 97-106, 177-89.
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are controlled by a third party official.49
Before determining whether a process that requires agency has more remedial capacity for 
abused persons than a more structured judicial process, I will first examine the capacity for 
the self to exist subjectively and with volition. If a person is simply an effect of power and 
is completely socially constructed such that the subjective self is illusory, then the agency 
o f such a person is severely limited, or in fact is non-existent, vis-a-vis the constructs of 
knowledge and power the exist in dispute resolution processes. In this view, as pointed out 
by Benhabib, knowledge is power and it generates access to knowledge thus creating a self- 
perpetuating basis for legitimacy.50 On the other hand, if  knowledge is, as Benhabib states, 
“in the service o f the subject; its g o a l. . . not the legitimation of power but the enabling 
of empowerment”51, then there is greater potential for agency and manifestation o f potency 
in a dispute resolution process that is in the control o f the parties. In chapter two I will 
explore some o f the issues surrounding liberal, post-modernist, and relational conceptions 
of the self for the purpose o f locating a conception o f the self that accurately reflects the 
situation o f abused persons.
Throughout my thesis, I want to recognize the embodied nature of the experience of abuse.
49J. Thibaut & L. Walker, Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis (Toronto: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc., 1975) at 7.
50S. Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Post-Modernism in 
Contemporary Ethics (New York: Routledge, 1992) at 204.
51 Ibid. at 205.
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In an article about judicial decision-making, Nedelsky explores the importance o f the body 
and emotion in the process o f arriving at a judgement.52 I would like to recognize the 
importance of bodily and emotive experience to the recovery process of an abused person, 
injudicial and non-judicial processes. In focusing upon the abuse survivor’s description of 
their physical and emotional reactions, the foundational nature o f physical experience is not 
neglected in the examination of aspects of abuse and recovery.
The tension between a conception o f selfhood that is objectified by discourse and one that 
is self-actualizing manifests itself in other ways throughout my thesis. In my work, I will 
rely upon theory but also upon the actual experiences o f abused persons, as articulated in 
various literature, in order to illustrate my argument. Although I recognize the importance 
for reflection and theoretical knowledge, I am concerned about the potential for expert 
theoretical knowledge to overwhelm the physical knowledge that abused persons have of 
their experiences. Both this tension, and the earlier problem of agency existing within a 
discursive world, have at their source concern about the subjugation of the self. In exploring 
various facets of processes that deal with institutional abuse, I hope to illuminate some 
approaches to these issues.
Another area o f tension within my thesis is the stress between dominant and dominating 
discourses. The source o f the stress is the degree to which a person is capable of exercising 
agency to benefit from discourse and yet be able to resist being subj ugated by it. Throughout
52J. Nedelsky, “Embodied Diversity and the Challenges to Law” (1997) 42 McGill 
L. J. 91.
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the analysis, it will become apparent that dominant discourse can have a liberating effect for 
those close enough to be captured and named by it, but it can also dominate and prevent the 
emergence o f meaning for those whose experiences are not yet named. Dominant discourses 
and forms o f knowledge do not necessarily have a negative impact upon those who are trying 
to assert power from a position of subjugation. In many instances, both in the court system 
and elsewhere, the ability o f a subjugated person to locate some aspect of dominant existence 
that resonates with their experience provides that person with an access point for expression.
The prime concern that I raise is the tendency of dominant discourses to over-master and 
suppress new meaning that may arise from the experiences o f the subjugated person. When 
this occurs, dominant discourses become dominating and oppressive to the new and 
emerging knowledge form. The carriers of dominant discourses are experts who are 
recognized as understanding the structure and meaning of the particular discourses of their 
expertise. Experts themselves are not necessarily oppressive. However, in exercising their 
expertise to provide meaning for a particular phenomenon, they should not invalidate the 
knowledge of the person who has experienced the phenomenon. Thus, in my paper, I am 
concerned with the boundaries of discourse and the capacity o f the subject to assert her own 
meaning in the discursive arena.
C. Location of analysis
My thesis inquiry is primarily targeted at the areas around the process itself. I am concerned 
with the ability of a disenfranchised party to form and assert his interests. Consequently,
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I am primarily concerned with the development that must occur after there is willingness to 
engage in a non-judicial remedy of some sort, but before that engagement actually takes 
place. In chapter 2 the analysis is located in the space before the parties must articulate their 
interests, even their interests in determining the type o f process for resolving their dispute. 
In chapter 3, I am interested in examining the events around interest formation before 
engagement in a non-adjudicated process that is designed by the parties. The rest o f my 
analysis is concerned with preserving identity formation in the conceptualization o f one 
substantive remedy - monetary compensation.
I am interested in the transformative potential that exists for disenfranchised parties who are 
considering engaging in an non-judicial dispute resolution process. If the abused person is 
able to develop into someone who can know her own experiences and express her will in 
the world, there is greater possibility for the expression o f new knowledge, the exercise of 
negotiation power, and the achievement o f effective remedies when the parties engage in a 
dispute resolution process.
D. Outline
Before developing a method for maximizing the ability of a disenfranchised party to assert 
negotiation power, it is important to describe the nature of the self and its capacity to 
exercise power. In chapter 2 I will examine the nature of identity, especially as it pertains 
to the experience of abuse. I will assert that the common law legal system relies upon a 
particular conception of identity and corresponding procedures to achieve the goal o f justice.
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Once the parties step outside the procedures of the legal system, there is the possibility that 
other conceptions of identity can be asserted. When parties in conflict agree to attempt 
resolution outside traditional legal processes, they have greater potential to assert a 
conception o f identity, and corresponding processes, that emphasizes what they find 
important. Although a disenfranchised party may favour a conception o f identity that exists 
within another powerful discourse in order to advance their interests, this strategy may fail 
to acknowledge the full significance o f the abusive act. Consequently, the more disruptive 
aspects of the experience will remain unknown in discourse and in the dispute resolution 
environment.
In order to truly address the core harms o f abuse - namely the imposition o f identity, 
disenfranchisement, and harmful privacy - a party must be able to assert her own meaning 
for the abusive experiences. An abused person must know herself apart from the meanings 
provided by the abuser, in order to be able to assert the power to advance her interests. A 
person may find that they require validation of their experience of abuse through 
psychotherapeutic discourse. This discourse, however, may still not capture the full 
significance o f the experience of abuse for the abused person. Her ability to convey the 
meaning o f her experiences may still be limited by non-legal discourses.
In chapter 3 I will examine the conditions that are likely to maximize the potential for new 
meaning to survive in the public arena. Assuming that the abused person has broken the 
false privacy imposed by the abuser and has established his own identity apart from the one 
imposed by the abuser, how does the abused person establish the legitimacy of his testimony
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such that it has the strength to resist pressure from discourses that are potentially dominating 
in nature?
I will argue that public speech falls into different categories o f testimony depending upon the 
purpose o f the speaker and the purpose of the listener. Legal testimony demands a fairly 
high level o f external validation as does historic testimony; both are for the purpose of 
establishing a level o f truth for the parties affected by the claims. Therapeutic testimony 
requires much less external validation for it to be legitimate as it is primarily concerned with 
the subjective aspect o f the speech. I will examine the forms of testimony given injudicial 
and non-judicial processes. I will argue that in order to retain the subjective aspect of 
speech, survivors should establish their own group that can internally validate their speech. 
Political testimony is the speech asserted in the public realm by a representative of a group. 
Political groups have the responsibility for ensuring that the speech o f its representatives 
reflects the true experiences o f group members. In doing so, survivors can assert the 
legitimacy of their previously subjugated knowledge and resist the pressure from dominating 
discourses. I will argue that political organization is instrumental in establishing the 
negotiation power of the parties and for enabling the parties to assert their interests.
The way in which political testimony is asserted affects whether the individual testimony of 
the claimants will survive once it is in the public realm. A political body, formed on the 
basis o f shared experiences and similar meaning, is required in order for the disruptive 
testimony o f the individual to resist the pressure o f dominating discourses. However, where 
the political group asserts further goals and interests that affect members of other groups,
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truth-claims will have to be validated to the satisfaction of the parties affected by the claims.
Finally, in chapter 4 I will discuss the necessity o f conceptualizing substantive remedies in 
the negotiation process such that they reflect and protect the subjective experience of the 
abuse survivor. I will focus on the benefits and limitations of purely monetary compensation 
that is provided as a remedy to abuse survivors through a non-judicial compensation 
program. I will argue that it is easy to conceptualize monetary compensation as a remedy 
for a commodified injury. In order to prevent the objectification of the survivor’s injury, 
compensation must recognize the subjective aspect o f the harm. I will examine judicial 
monetary compensation remedies to evaluate whether they recognize the subjective aspect 
of harm. In examining non-judicial remedies, I will evaluate whether subjective harm is 
recognized where a grid is used to administer monetary awards. I will suggest that in order 
to resist this dominant and hegemonic conception o f monetary compensation, it is necessary 
to explicitly articulate the symbolic nature o f the remedy such that the abuse survivor is not 
objectified and fragmented at the end of a process that was initially designed to promote the 
self-actualization o f the abuse survivor.
E. Methodology
In order to better understand the issues o f identity and power in a non-judicial process, I 
examine some aspects of these issues as they arise injudicial decisions. As the parties can 
resort to court processes instead of an alternative process, it is important to understand which 
process can best address their needs. In speaking generally about processes, I do not define
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which type of dispute resolution mechanism will be engaged by the parties. My analysis 
focuses on the pre-negotiation preparation that will help the parties negotiate the non-judicial 
process and the meaning o f a particular form o f redress that may arise from the process. My 
analysis also refers to other situations besides institutional abuse where other forms of abuse 
o f power have resulted in physical or sexual harm. For example, I refer to incest survivors, 
oppression in Guatamala, Holocaust survivor testimony, and adult sexual assault survivors 
among others. I examine certain legal decisions that demonstrate the capacity within judicial 
processes to deal with the issues at hand.
Throughout my thesis the main purpose is to examine the situation where there are large 
numbers o f abused persons who have disputes with institutional authorities such as the 
government or churches. I am not suggesting re-configuration of the power relationship or 
identity through re-engagement between an individual abused person and his abuser. In 
individual cases, there are strong arguments to be made for a severance o f  the abusive 
relationship instead o f  an attempt to heal the relationship. I will not deal with those 
considerations in this thesis.
This thesis is the beginning of an inquiry into theoretical aspects o f alternative dispute 
resolution practices. In law, the movement toward alternative processes that may involve 
non-justice goals has not been adequately explored, especially with respect to the power held 
by the parties. In all disputes there will be power differentials. In examining a situation 
where the power differential is both the subject matter of the dispute and a matter of 
procedural fairness, I hope to illustrate some o f  the mechanisms available in a non­
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adjudicated and non-judicial process that may not be available where there is a third-party 
decision-maker. I also hope to point out some of the pitfalls inherent in a process which is 
developed anew by the parties in each dispute. In comparing the relative rigidity of the 
judicial process to a party-controlled process, I may find that the structure o f the judicial 
process provides some safeguards against the influence of potentially dominating discourses. 
Although my thesis topic touches upon a fairly broad range of disciplines53, philosophical 
areas, and legal issues, in the interests o f developing recommendations for parties who wish 
to design a process that can recognize significant power imbalances I have tried to keep to 
a fairly narrow analytical path. Although I would like to explore all the various trails leading 
from my main argument, I will not be able to do so in this thesis.
53In this thesis I deal with legal, economic, political, and psychotherapeutic discourse 
although I recognize that there are many other disciplines that are relevant.
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 2 - IDENTITY
The individual is not to be conceived as a sort o f elementary nucleus, a 
primitive atom, a multiple and inert material on which power comes to fasten 
or against which it happens to strike, and in so doing subdues or crushes 
individuals. In fact, it is already one of the prime effects o f power that 
certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to 
be identified and constituted as individuals. The individual, that is, is not the 
vis-a-vis o f power; it is, I believe, one o f its prime effects. The individual is 
an effect of power, and at the same time, or precisely to the extent to which 
it is that effect, it is the element of its articulation.54
Why didn’t my uncle just stay away? I wish he were dead . . . She’s not 
family and that makes a difference. I can talk to her and she listens. She 
doesn’t try to change the truth like some of the family try to do. Why do I 
keep coming up with locked doors that need to be opened before I can be 
Pauline?55
A. Introduction
Abuse affects a person’s identity on at least two different levels. On the physical level56, 
abuse breaches a persons’s sense o f wholeness or integrity through the use of coercion or 
outright force. In “Standing for Something”, Cheshire Calhoun defines loss of integrity as
54Michel Foucault, “Two Lectures” in Power/Knowledge, ed. by C. Gordon, trans. 
C. Gordon, L. Marshall, J. Mephan & K. Soper (New York: Pantheon Books,1980) at 98.
55P. Mantley with Marjorie Willison, Silent Cries (Lockport: Community Books, 
1999) at 95. Mantley’s courageous account of her childhood sexual and physical abuse at 
the hands of uncle and her journey through the legal system is described in this book. Her 
description of what occurred to her creates a visceral emotional impact on the reader that is 
beyond intellectual understanding.
56I use the term physical instead of individual in order to focus the reader on the 
centrality of physical existence as the primary site for individual experiences.
26
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the “failure to regard one’s own judgment as one that should matter to others”57. Calhoun 
also examines the view that “integrity . . .  is intimately tied to protecting the boundaries 
o f the self - to protecting it against disintegration, against loss o f  self-identity, and against 
pollution by evil.”58 Abuse breaks down the integrity of the abused person such that they 
cannot protect their boundaries against disintegration and they fail to recognize that their 
judgment should matter. On a collective level, abusers prey on the pre-existing social 
powerlessness of the abused person which exists by virtue of their identity as a member of 
a disenfranchised group and create a new subgroup of disenfranchised persons. Abusers also 
impose a false privacy around the abusive relationship. This privacy precludes the abused 
person from identifying with other abused persons for the purpose o f acting in concert to end 
the abuse. The abusive act has an insidious effect upon the abused person’s ability to act in 
the world. Chapter 3 will focus on addressing the problem of asserting identity and interests 
that are not defined by the abuser in the public arena. In this chapter I will concern myself 
with the establishment o f identity and interests that are defined by the abused person and not 
by the abuser.
Before determining how to remedy damages to identity, it is necessary to examine the nature 
of identity and how it is affected by abuse. In this chapter I will argue for a conception of 
identity that is neither entirely constructed by relations o f power, nor entirely autonomous 
or individuated as conceived by liberal philosophy. I will assert that one o f the prime effects
57(1993) 92 J. o f Phil. 235 at 258.
5*Ibid. at 254.
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of abuse on identity is the inability for the abused person to attribute her own meaning to her 
own physical experiences. In order to remedy the violence inflicted upon the abused 
person’s identity, I will argue that it is necessary to provide a space in a dispute resolution 
process for the emergence o f new meaning for the abusive experiences that is created by the 
abused person.
In this chapter I will analyze the capacity o f the traditional common law litigation system to 
accommodate new meaning within its parameters. I will examine the capacity of an 
alternative dispute resolution process to accomplish the same purpose. I will conclude with 
recommendations on how to promote identity formation that does not rely upon dominating 
discourses.
B. The Nature of identity
Identity formation at any particular moment is the act o f finding a particular experience or 
set o f experiences meaningful.59 This definition presupposes some ability o f the person to 
exercise agency or volition in the determination o f what is meaningful. In post-modernist 
understandings of the individual self, however, there is not much room for the exercise of 
agency among the operation o f social discourses.
59I have come to this definition o f identity after years o f pondering what it means to 
be a member o f a visible minority in Canada. I am aware that I am often identified on the 
basis of several personal features, and yet I am also aware that my own sense o f identity is 
not confined to those identities attributed to me and they are not always as meaningful as 
other aspects o f my selfhood. Consequently, I see self-conscious identity as derived from 
those experiences that I find meaningful at any given moment.
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
29
In the quote at the beginning o f the chapter, Foucault asserts that the individual is one of the 
prime effects o f power and is also the point of its articulation. In his conception, the 
individual is not the source o f a substantive form o f power as is suggested by many 
contemporary ADR proponents. Rather, as he states:
(I)n any society, there are manifold relations o f  power which permeate, 
characterize and constitute the social body, and these relations of power 
cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented without the 
production, accumulation, circulation and functioning o f a discourse. There 
can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses 
o f truth which operate through and on the basis o f  this association.60
Power is a fluid force that operates throughout the social network and sets the conditions for 
establishing what is to count as truth and knowledge.61 Discourses provide the medium for 
the operation o f power and at the same time provide constructions o f social meaning that 
allow for the manifestation o f the individual self. Although Foucault’s analysis of 
knowledge and power provides a rich understanding o f the importance of social 
constructions in the formation o f identities, there is little room for recognition of the subject 
as a source of resistance from discursive constructions o f the self.62 As stated by one of
60Supra note 54 at 93.
6IA. Schrift, “Reconfiguring the Subject: Foucault’s Analytics of Power” in R. 
Miguel-Alfonso & S. Caporale-Bizzini, eds., Reconstructing Foucault: Essays in the Wake 
o f  the 80's (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1994) at 190.
“ There is some debate over whether Foucault’s later work recognizes agency in the 
subject’s interaction with surrounding discourses. For discussion of this issue, see H. 
Dreyfus, “Heidegger and Foucault on the Subject, Agency and Practices”,online: H. Dreyfus 
Homepage <http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~hdreyfiis/Heidegger_Foucault2.html> (date 
accessed: 17 March 2001). Further see R. Warfield, “Considering an Exercise of Self and 
Justice in the Later Foucault” (1999) 18 Carleton Univ. Student J. o f Phil., online: Foucault 
Site <http://rideau.carleton.ca/philosophy/cusjp/vl8/nl/warfield.html> (date accessed: 17
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Foucault’s critics,
Foucault’s claim that subjects are constructed by power (is fallacious 
because) in fact there would be no power, no relation o f authority, force, or 
discipline, if there were no subjects whose acts o f subordination or 
insubordination in regard to each other produce or elicit power.63
In effect, Foucault ‘vanishes’ the subject and neglects to recognize the provocative or 
dangerous aspect o f resistance to the positivity o f discourse. If Foucault’s characterization 
o f the subject self is fallacious, then what is its nature? Is it fully autonomous and operating 
within a void or do Foucault’s discourses provide some basis for understanding selfhood?
Liberal conceptions of the self provide a much fuller sense of individuality. A liberal person 
has the power to act autonomously for the purpose of self-actualization in an arena with 
other, equally self-actualizing agents.64 In various iterations of the liberal model, autonomy 
is a key feature that allows individuals to achieve actualization. But autonomy indicates an 
a priori ability to exist separately and free from the interference o f others. This assumption 
fails to recognize the level o f inter-dependence that exists for all humans, both on a social 
level and on a physical level. The individual does not act in a void but rather from within
March 2001).
63M. Ryan, “Foucault’s Fallacy”in R. Miguel-Alfonso & S. Caporale-Bizzini, eds., 
Reconstructing Foucault: Essays in the Wake o f  the 80's (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1994) at 159- 
60.
MC. Koggel, Perspectives on Equality: Constructing a Relational Theory (Lanham: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 1998) at 73-4.
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a relational matrix65 that supports physical and social existence. I would assert that the 
individual cannot physically survive without the support of physical relationships66 and 
cannot construct meaning independently from relationships with others.67 As outlined by 
Ryan in his critique o f Foucault, post-Structuralist schools o f psychology describe the self 
in the following way:
Relations to others shape the self through care or abuse in childhood, as well 
as through the social processes o f aggression, shaming, friendship, eroticism, 
and the like in adult life. . .  . Relations assume different configurations and
there is no identity outside such relations The self, in other words, is made
up o f image surfaces that demarcates identity from alterity and are the
6SThe concept of a relational matrix must be distinguished from the more impersonal 
and less interactive concepts o f external environments or social constructs. It is not simply 
that an external agent acts upon a person, but rather that a person dynamically interacts with 
other people to produce and internalize “worlds” (as Lugones would say)of meaning: infra 
note 72.
66In a recent book, three psychiatrists argue that emotional existence is fundamental 
to human existence. Emotions cause us to inter-relate from the moment we are bom and thus 
ensures a child-mother bond thatl serves to teach the child physical survival. From the 
beginning, our physical existence is predicated on a relationship of expressiveness. The 
authors quote the results from studies o f children who were raised in sterile environments 
away from their mothers. Psychoanalyst Rene Spitz reported that 75 to 100 percent of the 
children, who were physically cared for but not emotionally nurtured, died.: See T. Lewis, 
M.D., F. Amini, M.D. & R. Lannon, M.D., A General Theory o f Love (Toronto: Random 
House o f Canada Ltd., 2000) at 69-70.
67In chapter IV of Interpreting the Personal: Expression and the Formation o f  
Identity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), Professor Campbell develops a model for 
understanding how meaning is attributed to emotional affect. Although her project deals 
primarily with non-linguistic, emotive expression, it provides an interesting philosophical 
discussion that is relevant to this paper. At page 133 Professor Campbell states that “the 
expression o f feeling is the attempt to form the personal meaning or significance o f some 
experience or occasion”. Finding meaning requires an interaction or attempted 
communication between two persons. Professor Campbell also explores the political 
consequences o f her theory. Although relevant, I am not able to do justice to her work by 
providing an in-depth analysis o f  the philosophical issues that she raises within the scope of 
this thesis.
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synapses o f the self’s constitutive social relations.68
And so, as between a Foucaultian conception o f discursive power that seems to prelude the 
existence o f a subject that has agency, and the liberal conception of the autonomous 
individual who is relatively independent of the influence of others, is there a conception of 
selfhood that can capture agency within a relational existence?
(a) Relational identity
In outlining a relational understanding of rights, Jennifer Nedelsky argues that to 
conceptualize autonomy as freedom from intrusion is deeply misguided; instead dependence 
upon others should be understood as a pre-condition to the exercise o f autonomy.69 This 
view o f autonomy recognizes that self-actualization cannot occur in a vacuum but requires 
a social and relational context within which to operate. Nedelsky’s analytical project is to re- 
frame concepts used within our legal system in terms of a relational as opposed to a liberal 
understanding. In doing so, she injects relational theory into rights discourse. This serves 
her purpose of overcoming the problem of individualism without discarding the existing 
legal tradition, but it does not adequately theorize the nature of conflict resolution that occurs 
outside the arena o f rights-based litigation. Nedelsky’s re-conceptualization of rights and 
autonomy does not sufficiently acknowledge the importance of relationships in identity
68Supra note 63 at 164-5.
69J. Nedelsky, “Reconceiving Rights as Relationship” (1993) 1 Rev. of Constit. 
Studies 1 at 7-8.
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formation. For an analysis that embraces the significance o f social existence, it is tempting 
to return to Foucault’s description of knowledge and the role o f discourse in the construction 
o f social matrices. However to do so would be to cede the subjective self as an agent for 
identity formation.
Maria Lugones provides a description of identity that is rich in its recognition of our location 
within various relational matrices and modest in its conception o f agency. Lugones gives 
up the idea o f a unified subject in favour of an understanding o f personhood that is 
pluralistic. As she states:
. . . the cases of bicultural people . . . provide(s) me with examples of
people who are very familiar with experiencing themselves as more than one; 
having desires, character, and personality traits that are different in one reality 
than in the other, and acting, enacting, animating their bodies, having 
thoughts, feeling the emotions, etc., in ways that are different in one reality 
than in the other.70
Though a person is plurally constituted, in her conception there is the possibility of 
exercising some liberatory function or agency. As Lugones states:
the liberatory experience lies in this memory, on these many people one is 
who have intentions one understands because one is fluent in several 
‘cultures,’ ‘worlds’, realities. One understands herself in every world in 
which one remembers herself. . . All oppressive control is violent because 
it attempts to erase selves that we are that are dangerous to the maintenance 
of domination over us.71
7(>M. Lugones, “Structure/Antistructure and Agency under Oppression” (1990) 87 J. 
o f Phil. 500 at 503.
71 Ibid. at 504-5.
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A person’s awareness of her various selves contributes to a liberatory understanding of 
oppression in the worlds that she inhabits. Further, a subject exercises agency through 
traveling to aplace between realities, called the ‘limen’, where it is possible to become aware 
on one’s multiplicity and to form intentions not contained within oppressive worlds.
In another illuminating essay, Lugones explores the concept of loving world-travel or the 
ability to move within the world of another subject and “witness her own sense of herself 
from within her world”72. World-traveling is the “experience of being a different person in 
different ‘worlds’ or cultures and yet of having memory o f oneself as different without quite 
having the sense of there being an underlying ‘I’ .”73 Lugones sees a world-traveler as having 
authenticity, in that they are not pretending to be another person: “one is someone who has 
that personality or character or uses space and language in that particular way”74. Lugones 
states that we do not have to be completely aware of the act of traveling but she states that 
the traveling can be done willingly. With Lugones’ understanding of identity, there is the 
possibility o f inter-subjectivity that is non-dominating and also loving in nature. Later in this 
chapter, a similar understanding of inter-relatedness will form the basis for the movement 
o f an abused person from injury to recovery.
Lugones’ term ‘worlds’ seems similar to the discursive areas described by Foucault.
72M. Lugones, “Playfulness, ‘World-Traveling’, and Loving Perception” in A. Garry 
& M. Pearsall, eds., Women, Knowledge & Reality : Explorations in Feminist Philosophy 
(Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989) at 280.
13Ibid. at 283.
14Ibid.
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Lugones defines ‘worlds’ as possibly “an actual society given its dominant culture’s 
description and construction of life, including a construction o f the relationships of 
production, of gender, race etc.”.75 But she also provides for the possibility o f non-dominant 
worlds and worlds that are constructed negatively, in contradistinction to other worlds. This 
conception is perhaps paralleled to some extent by Foucault’s understanding of subjugated 
knowledges, except that Foucault’s definition of these non-dominant areas is more negatively 
defined vis-a-vis dominant knowledges. Foucault describes subjugated knowledges as forms 
o f knowledge that are “beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity”76.
Although Lugones recognizes the fixative nature o f oppressive worlds, she also refuses to 
negate the power potential within an oppressed existence. In fact, her description allows for 
a level of richness and plurality in the identity o f those who exist outside the mainstream that 
is lacking in Foucault’s description of knowledge, power and discourse. Foucault’s 
geneology o f knowledge, however, does provide useful descriptions o f the dynamics of 
power and knowledge for the purposes of describing abuse. As an example, Foucault states 
that undifferentiated knowledge, perhaps what Lugones would call an incomplete or negative 
world of existence, “owes its force only to the harshness with which it is opposed by 
everything surrounding it”77. The speech of institutional abuse survivors is perhaps such a 
form o f subjugated knowledge that is disruptive to the existing knowledge structures that
75Supra note 72 at 281.
16Supra note 54 at 82.
11 Ibid.
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surround it.
Throughout this analysis, I will use a conception of personhood that closely relates to 
Lugones’ description of the ‘world-traveler’ or a person who has identities depending upon 
their orientation within their relational worlds. I will also rely upon Foucault’s 
understanding o f the dynamics o f power and knowledge through the operation o f discourse. 
These two theoretical conceptions provide the most useful tools for understanding the 
dynamics o f an abusive relationship and the potential for recovery in dispute resolution 
processes.
To return to my initial definition o f identity with the benefit o f  Lugonesian terminology, 
conscious78 identity formation is the act o f finding meaning within particular experiences 
within socially constructed ‘worlds’79. These worlds consist o f relational matrices that to 
some degree fix the person in certain positions of power. These positions are not fixed, they
78This definition refers to conscious or active identity formation and not acts of 
survival which although necessary for the self to exist, are not necessarily exercises of the 
conscious will. Psychotherapists who deal with historic child abuse survivors witness 
patients who have used unconscious mechanisms for survival. In his book, Soul Murder: 
The Effects o f  Childhood Abuse and Deprivation (New Haven: Y ale University Press, 1989), 
L. Shengold, states on page 26 that to maintain the overwhelming stimulation and bad 
parental image - means annihilation o f identity, of the feeling o f the self. So the bad has to 
be registered with the good. This is a mind splitting or mind-fragmenting operation. To 
survive, such children must keep in some compartment o f their minds the delusion o f good 
parents and the delusive promise that all the terror, pain, and hate will be transformed into 
love.”
79Lugones recognizes that we are not always aware o f the worlds which we inhabit 
through the perceptions o f others. Nor are worlds always completely defined, understood, 
or accepted by the traveller. In my definition I am concerned with the ability to actively 
locate meaning among worlds for the purpose of identity formation.
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are capable of fluctuation. The relationships o f power can be both restrictive and expansive 
for the individual. As we shall see in the next chapter, the fluctuation in these power 
relationships is not sustained by the individual but rather by the political group that can 
protect assertions of disruptive meaning in the dominant discourse. The individual, however, 
is not completely passively governed by the variety of constructs and relationships within 
which she operates. Rather, as proposed by Maria Lugones, individuals participate in world- 
traveling and can move among various socially constructed worlds.
As stated by Susan Brison, the self is “related to and constructed by others in an ongoing 
way, not only because others continue to shape and define us throughout our lifetimes but 
also because our own sense o f self is couched in descriptions whose meanings are social 
phenomena.”80 Christine Koggel, in asserting a relational theory o f  equality states that 
“persons give meaning to and shape their lives only in relationships with others in social 
contexts” .81
I would suggest that we feel some experiences have personal significance; the meaning of 
that significance can only be articulated through interaction with others. An inchoate feeling 
that something important has happened can only be capable of expression once the concept 
is articulated in linguistic terms. At the point when a concept exists in language a person 
might exclaim, “Aha! That’s exactly what happened to me and I know what you are
80S. Brison, “Outliving Oneself: Trauma, Memory, and Personal Identity” in D. 
Meyers, Feminists Rethink the Self (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997).
81 Supra note 64 at 84.
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saying!”82 The concept captures the previously inchoate experience and resonates with the 
subjective person.
But how does one convey the physical experience of what has previously been left 
unexpressed? How can a person explain a new experience that has not been imagined and 
has thus not been reflected back, even from a loving matrix o f relationships?
(b) The problem o f  conveying new meaning
A person may speak but be effectively isolated either because his words cannot be 
recognized within the dominant discursive arena or because his trauma is too disruptive to 
the status quo. As noted by Alcoff and Gray, to the extent that survivor discourse cannot be 
subsumed within a given discourse, it will be disruptive and will at least point out the
82As a example, psychological syndromes are developed in order to describe a series 
o f phenomena experienced by individuals. The source or etiology of these symptoms may 
be unknown but scientists name the malady, thus enabling the patient to attribute some 
meaning to their problem. In other words, the patient can identify their experience o f pain 
or ill-health. Where this is not possible, people often feel that they do not have a legitimate 
experience or they do not characterize their experience entirely within the four squares o f the 
syndrome named by the expert. This may lead to a distortion and repression o f the 
experience as the person strives to attach a societal meaning to experiences that cannot be 
entirely captured by the negative definition provided by the expert. Disruptive speech is 
necessary to dislodge inaccurate understandings o f  patients’ experiences. There is a question 
raised by pain psychologists about whether or not social constructs in the form o f pain 
syndromes actually stimulate physical pain phenomena. Although I am very interested in 
pursuing the question o f whether physical pain has a social etiology, I will not be able to 
pursue that question in depth in this thesis. To read an interesting article on this issue see: 
Atul Gawande, “The Pain Perplex” The New Yorker (21 September 1998) 86. For further 
information on pain phenomena, see: R. Melzack and P. Wall, The Challenge o f  Pain (New 
York: Penguin Books, 1991) and R. Melzack and P. Wall, Textbook o f  Pain (New York: 
Churchill Livingston, 1999).
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possibility o f a different set o f formation rules.83 The barrier that must be overcome is the 
imposed privacy of marginalization. One way to escape a marginalized existence is to bear 
witness, both to one’s own life experiences and to the experiences of others who have been 
the victims o f acts of oppression. Bearing witness and testifying seem to be crucial acts that 
have the potential to create new discursive terms for abuse. In moving from the act of 
testifying towards developing new meaning, the potential exists for manifestations of 
political power.84
In breaking into the dominant discourse, the speaker faces the difficulty o f trying to translate 
experiences into existing language. As noted by Lea Fridman Hamaoui in an article about 
testimony and the Holocaust:
(e)xtremity strains beliefs and exceeds the experience, expectation and 
capability of the reader to re-imagine the event told. Such events are without 
analogy, in the sense that we lack the mental construct and reference points 
to make sense o f them. In a certain sense, they cannot ‘exist’ for us because 
they lack a lexicon o f words and forms into which they might be translated.85
83 L. Alcoff and L. Gray, “Survivor Discourse: Transgression or Recuperation?” 
(Winter 1993) Signs 260 at 268.
84 As noted by Alcoff and Gray, “(s)peaking out serves to educate the society at large 
about the dimensions of sexual violence and misogyny, to reposition the problem from the 
individual psyche to the social sphere where it rightfully belongs, and to empower victims 
to act constructively on our own behalf and thus to make the transition from passive victim 
to active survivor”. They also note that survivor disclosure of trauma and testifying is the 
principle tactic used by the survivors’ movement. Ibid. at 261-2.
85L. Fridman Hamoui, “Art and Testimony: The Representation of Historical Horror 
in Literary Works by Piotr Rawicz and Charlotte Delbo” (1991) Cardozo J. o f  L. & Lit. 243 
at 243.
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Events such as the Holocaust o f World War II gave rise to witness accounts that are difficult 
to fathom through direct language. We need to have our parameters o f understanding 
reconfigured in some dramatic, emotional way so that new meaning can be stretched and 
pulled out of the experiences into language. Symbolic acts, art, literature and other 
demonstrative media help to establish the room for a new discourse to emerge.86 Again, the
86The necessity of using symbolic, emotional acts to create the space for bearing 
witness and collecting political power has manifested itself in interesting ways in different 
countries. In Argentina, the mothers o f the ‘disappeared’ demanded information about the 
whereabouts of their children. They demonstrated in silence on a weekly basis with the 
names and date of disappearance of their loved ones embroidered on kerchiefs that they wore 
around their heads. Their silent insistence was a symbol o f resistance to fascism; their cause 
was o f such universal and immediate concern to all parents that the significance of the 
physical representation o f their loss could not be readily ignored: Law Commission of 
Canada, An International Perspective: A Review and Analysis ofApproaches to Addressing 
Past Institutional or Systemic Abuse in Selected Countries (Background Paper) by M. 
Gannage (Ottawa: Law Commission o f Canada, 2000) at 79-80.
In Guatamala, the widows o f disappeared persons insisted that the government find mass 
graves and provide genuine burials for victims. By forcing the government to focus on the 
bodies o f the victims, the widows provided a visceral, real, and emotional focus for their 
audience. A demand for a burial is in some ways a politically humble demand; it is not a call 
for reform or revolution. It does, however, create a significant political impact because of 
its emotional weight and relation to physicality and core human relationships. This allows 
for the development of a solid foundation for political empowerment: See Rigoberta 
Menchu, Crossing Borders (New York: Verso, 1998) at 163-4.
Both examples involve speaking or demonstrating the effects o f a violent breach of close 
emotional and physical bonds. The universality of the physical bond and the emotion that 
accompanies the breach provides a perfect vehicle for communication. There is no third 
party description o f the pain and no objectification of the loss. These women lost parts of 
themselves in the disappearances, massacres, and acts of oppression; their testimony reflects 
that very immediate impact. Although the act of expressing themselves may not have been 
intended to be part o f a broader political movement when each individual first spoke of their 
loss, the collective act of expression in itself is a very active political gesture. Instead of 
choosing the silence of oppression, where the importance of their loved ones would remain 
guarded within themselves, these women were choosing to bring their experiences into the 
open - in some cases despite great danger of reprisals from the perpetrators of the original
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body and the immediacy of physical needs act as the source of these communications. 
Hamoui examines the literature o f two Holocaust survivors and the account o f their 
experiences. She notes that “description (of extremity) thus continually moves in the 
direction of the body since human awareness, under acute physical threat, is continually 
forced back to the threatened and tenuous existence o f that body”.37 The body becomes the 
focus o f description, perhaps because o f the fundamental relevance of physical survival, and 
the reader in able to ground some understanding o f the extreme experience in a corporal 
existence that we all share in common. The physicality o f the extreme experience becomes 
immediate and relevant when described in the language o f the body. The visceral impact of 
such communications creates a link based on our common physicality.
The links that emerge from such types of communication provide for the emergence of new 
meaning and some recognition in discursive arenas of new types of experiences, and new 
types o f people. Koggel explains that certain categories o f people only come into being 
when the category itself is being developed socially.88 In the case o f institutional abuse, the 
term itself was put forward as a social problem by David Gil in 1975. He noted that 
inadequate definitions and guidelines regarding abuse lead to inadequate reporting of abuse.89
crimes. They used their genuine and unassailable experiences to carry their claims forward 
into the political arena. Once spoken o f and repeated by others, the murders, disappearances 
and massacres began to enter a new space in the discourse and create a new history o f events.
87Supra note 85 at 257.
88Supra note 64 at 31.
89Supra note 2 at Appendix II, p. 5.
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Only when the rules that guided meaning within the discourse o f the social sciences failed 
to correspond to a physical experience did the new term emerge. With new terminology came 
an expressive tool for those who experienced abuse. Where there had been no previous 
understanding that persons in institutions were capable ofbeing abused, there was now a new 
kind o f person - an institutional abuse victim or survivor. This does not mean, o f course, that 
the experience of abuse did not happen previous to the concept emerging in discourse. The 
experience was always there and may have had personal significance but there was no readily 
available meaning that could communicate the personal significance within the discursive 
arena until the social concept o f institutional abuse was developed within a disciplinary 
context.
As asserted above, although disciplines operate as carriers o f discourse and meaning,90 a 
person may assert agency in their own identity formation. A person may choose to find 
meaning and personal significance in the term “institutional abuse survivor” or she may not. 
As an example, a person who has suffered abuse in the past may know that abuse happened 
and that it was a significant event in her life. She may, however, choose to find no meaning 
in the acts perpetrated against her in the abusive relationship. She will not identify with those 
acts and will choose not re-enter the world of abuse. This act o f detachment91 resists against
90Supra note 54 at 106.
9IDetachment is a very effective tool for asserting one’s will against dominant 
discourse. In refusing to participate, a person or group deprives the other party the 
opportunity to engage in an oppressive relationship. Although I would like to explore the 
act o f detachment in identity formation and empowerment, this thesis is focused on situations 
where the parties are engaged in a relationship for the purpose o f resolving a dispute. My 
analysis is concerned with the re-configuration of the power relationship once the parties are
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identification as an abused person.
(c) Summary
I have thus far developed a definition o f identity that fixes a person in a flexible matrix or 
grid o f relationships. Within this grid, power is somewhat fixed but does fluctuate. The grid 
of relationships provides an individual with a variety of environments within which to 
operate. For example, by virtue o f the experiences that a person has undergone, he may exist 
in relationship to others who either have or have not shared those experiences. A person can 
exercise agency within this grid in two ways: he may select which clusters o f relationships 
produce concepts that have meaning for his experiences. A person can also travel among the 
worlds or clusters of relationships that have meaning for him. Thus, from within the matrix 
o f power-bound relationships, a person can exercise agency in order to form his identity.
Now that we have an understanding o f identity, the remaining questions that require answers 
in this chapter are as follows:
1) What is abuse?
2) What happens to a person’s identity when she has been abused?
3) What type o f remedy is needed to address the effects o f abuse upon identity?
4) How effective are the judicial and non-judicial dispute resolution mechanisms in
engaged and not with the accrual o f power through absence.
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
44
achieving this remedy?
5) What is required for a dispute resolution mechanism to be effective in achieving the 
remedy?
C. Definition of abuse
Dr. Shengold, a psychotherapist who deals primarily with child abuse victims, defines child 
abuse in contradistinction to deprivation. He states that “child abuse means that the child has 
felt too much to bear; child deprivation means that the child has been exposed to too little 
to meet his or her needs.”92 Dr. Shengold is describing child abuse primarily from the effects 
on the child. In the context of this chapter, I propose another definition of abuse that is more 
broadly about the abuse of power. Abuse is the imposition o f the abuser’s will or power over 
another being for the purpose of gaining or expanding the abuser’s sense of ego, power, or 
will, to the detriment o f the other person’s integrity and sense of self.93 This is an abusive 
act. The other side o f abuse is love. A loving act94 is having the power to impose one’s will 
but only exercising it with recognition, respect and even to the benefit of the other person’s
92Supra note 78 at I.
93In this definition, neglect could be seen as the exercise of the will of the abuser for 
the purpose of effecting detachment from the relationship for the purpose of depriving the 
other person o f their needs.
94A loving act need not be so overt and demonstrative as making love to someone; 
it is quite simply knowing one’s power in relationships but not acting for one’s own benefit 
to the detriment o f the less powerful person. This type o f loving act may be as mild as 
knowing that I have the capability to have someone disciplined for negligent behaviour but 
not exercising that power in the interests of allowing the person to remedy their behaviour.
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sense o f self and integrity.95
Dr. Shengold asserts that there are combinations o f  overstimulation and neglect in 
everyone’s development but abuse and deprivation only exist if  intensity, and duration cause 
enough psychic damage to result in “soul murder”. Shengold defines soul murder as follows:
(soul murder) is neither a diagnosis nor a condition. It is a dramatic term for 
circumstances that eventuate in crime - the deliberate attempt to eradicate or 
compromise the separate identity of another person .. . . (I)t depriv(es) the 
victim of the ability to feel joy and love as a separate person.96
In the definition that I propose, there should also be recognition that although abuse of power 
occurs in everyday transactions, not all of these result in damage to the object of the act. 
Although the intent of the action may be to gain power at the expense o f others, the actual 
expense or damage does not always manifest itself.97 When damage does occur from the 
abuse o f power such that there is attempted “soul murder”, what are these effects?
D. Effects of abuse
95In her description o f  her relationship with her mother, Lugones uses a similar 
love/abuse dichotomy. Supra note 72 at 276-81.
96Supra note 78 at 2.
97Repression or dissociation, and non-reporting o f abuse should not, however, be 
mistake for lack of damage. Many people who suffer psychological damage do not report 
abuse. In “Victims of Sexual Assault: Psychiatric Profiles” in The Canadian Institute, Civil 
Liability fo r  Sexual Assault in an Institutional Setting (Toronto: The Canadian Institute, 
1993) at Tab VI, Dr. H. Armstrong cites a study where 28% of those surveyed did not report 
sexual abuse prior to the survey.
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(a) Abuse
Clinical observations of the effects o f child abuse list the following psychological impacts: 
depression, increased fears, sexual problems, feelings of isolation, anxiety, guilt, distrust, 
anger, low self-esteem, self-destructive behaviours, nightmares, sleep difficulties, 
nervousness, tendency to be revictimized, phobias, substance abuse, becoming easily 
startled, re-enactment of trauma, and aggression.98 Other more general terms such as “re- 
experiencing”, “avoidance”, and “arousal” describe physical memories forcing their way 
through into consciousness, the tendency to develop coping strategies to avoid stimulus, and 
the symptoms whereby a person is hyper-alert, respectively. These last three terms refer 
generally to the psychological syndrome known as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.99
These clinical observations and diagnoses depend upon recognition o f behaviour by 
experts.100 They are useful for understanding which experiences have been recognized and 
given meaning within disciplinary and common discourse. They also allow for the 
expression of the abusive experience to a caring listener. What are the specific effects of 
abuse upon identity? The specific effects are best described by abuse survivors themselves
98A. Rowan & D. Foy, “Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in Child Sexual Abuse 
Survivors: A Literature Review” (1993) 6 Journal o f Traumatic Stress 3 at 4.
"D . Jehu, “Post-traumatic stress reactions among adults molested as children” (1991) 
6 Sexual and Marital Therapy 227 at 228-32. See also S. Burge, “Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder in Victims of Rape” (1988) 1 Journal o f Traumatic Stress 193 at 194-5.
IOOFor a comprehensive description o f the psychological effects of child abuse, see 
supra note 42 at 3-45.
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who, even though they may use the language o f the discourses around them, are still able to 
judge whether those discourses correspond to their subjective experiences101.
From the above observations of the effects o f abuse, it seems apparent that abuse affects the 
physical and psychological well-being of a person.102 The subjective description o f the 
survivor and the inter-subjective observations o f a psychoanalyst provide immediate 
descriptions of what happens to identity and self-hood after suffering from abuse. Although 
recognized by therapeutic discourse, these particular descriptions are not generalized to the 
point o f losing their connection to the bodily experience of abuse.
*  *  *
I just blocked out what my uncle had done, and thought it would never 
happen again. I remember a dream I had about that time. I dreamed I was 
dead in my coffin, looking at myself, but not knowing it was myself lying 
there. I now feel that I separated myself from my childhood then. I realized 
dead people didn’t hurt, so I feel that Pauline, the child, died at ten years of 
age . . .  I started to leave my body to cope with the pain he was putting me 
through.103
,01S. Madigan, “The Application of Michel Foucault’s Philosophy in the Problem 
Externalizing Discourse of Michael White” (1992) Journal of Family Therapy, online: 
Massey University Homepage<http://www.massey.ac.nz/~i75202/lectla/frev.htm> (date 
accessed: 17 March 2001). In this article, Madigan examines White’s therapeutic technique 
o f helping people to be free from totalizing descriptions of themselves so that they can 
construct alternative stories that make sense o f the unique outcomes o f their experiences.
I02J. Neeb & S. Harper, state that “sexual abuse affects the relationship adult survivors 
have with their own bodies. The sexual invasion of the child’s physical boundaries is a 
profound violation of her sense o f self. The child’s first sense of competency and trust has 
a physical base....Her body is used by the perpetrator as a vehicle for his sexual pleasure 
leaving the victim overwhelmed and betrayed by her body”: supra note 42 at 18.
l03Supra note 55 at 37-8.
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*  *  *
In Jehu’s article, the author quotes a patient’s description o f dissociative behaviour. The 
patient states the following:
though I was physically present during the abuse I remember feeling nothing 
other than the initial revulsion when I would first touch his penis and . . . 
he first touched me. In between, I felt or thought about nothing. I was 
gone.104
Further in the article he quotes another patient:
I also became aware o f the frequent tendency to separate myself and to 
become the observer. I really had to work at sticking with myself and to feel 
and to know what I was doing. I became aware that my head was separate 
from my body . . .  it was . . . some sort o f overseer making sure that 
everything was alright but not involved.105
Abuse forces a dissociative breach between the mind and body on an abused person. The 
inability to effect a physical escape from one’s tormentor triggers an internal escape from the 
body.
In her article “Outliving Oneself: Trauma, Memory and Personal Identity”106 Susan Brison 
explores the impact on identity o f trauma from the perspective o f a rape survivor and as a 
philosopher. Her analysis incorporates not only her personal and physical expertise as a
104Jehu, supra note 99 at 231.
105 Ibid.
l06Supra note 80.
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survivor of rape but also her theoretical knowledge o f the constructs o f identity. She 
describes the aforementioned phenomenon of re-enacting trauma as being a sensory memory 
as opposed to a narrative memory of what happened. Re-enactment involves remembering 
the smell of the abuser’s after-shave lotion, the texture of skin or hair, and other sensory 
stimuli associated with the act o f abuse. The assault on the body results in an intrusion into 
the physical memories that the body carries; it affects the abuse survivor’s subjective 
perception of the world around her.
After being raped, Brison became aware that she perceived that her body had betrayed her 
by being vulnerable to the rape. She found that her mind could not simply carry on 
independently of the new turmoil concerning her body. Her physiological reactions of 
hyper-vigilance and physical stress were not psychological insomuch as physical.107 Brison 
lost her sense of ease and safety in the world and her sense of her own power vis-a-vis others 
in her relational worlds diminished. Brison’s descriptions capture is the sense o f violence 
and contravention o f will that accompanies abuse. Her description o f her body as betraying 
her self gives a sense o f the separation between her will and her body’s ability to defend her 
against the imposition o f  will by the rapist. Her ability to identify with her body was 
compromised. Her sense o f physical identity has therefore been shifted as a result of the 
rape.
(b) Child abuse
l07Supra note 80 at 16-17.
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*  *  *
He killed the animals to show me how easy it would be for him to kill my 
younger brothers and sisters if I talked. I couldn’t live with the guilt, 
knowing it would be my fault if he killed my family because I told on him.108
*  *  *
Child abuse victims have the additional challenge o f going through abuse in their formative 
years. The psychoanalyst Shengold states that child abuse deprives the victim o f the ability 
to feel joy and love as a separate person.109 The victim’s knowledge of herself as capable of 
having emotional experiences as an individual distinct from the abuser is compromised. The 
abuser affects her basic ability to have experiences, over and above the control that the 
abuser has over the meaning ofthose experiences. Shengold later states, “victims o f attempts 
at soul murder...often cannot properly register what they want and what they feel, or what 
they have done and what has been done to them”110. An abused person cannot process or 
give meaning to what has been done to her. Shengold quotes psychoanalyst Ferenczi: 
“When the child recovers from [the adult’s sexual] attack, he feels enormously confused, in 
fact, split - innocent and culpable at the same time - and the confidence in the testimony of 
his own senses is broken”111. This confusion resulting from the violent act of abuse can even 
be filled with meaning by the abuser. The abuser may convince the abused person that she 
is being loved and therefore the abuse is okay. In some situations the abuser may convince
ws Supra note 55 at 40.
l09Supra note 78 at 2.
110Supra note 78 at 3.
111 Supra note 78 at 29.
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the abused person that she has special sexual skill that could be valuable to others who would 
pay for it. Thus the abuser may cause the abused person to over-identify with her sexual 
ability.
*  *  *
He would keep pounding me so hard that I would be in a daze and not know 
what the hell was going on. The scariest part of it all was not knowing what 
caused him to go off.112
*  *  *
But even where the abuser does not explain the abuse for the purpose or perpetrating the
abusive relationship, the lack of meaning for the abuse itself is damaging. Viktor Frankl, a
psychoanalyst who survived the Holocaust understood that the meaningless and arbitrariness
of physical abuse creates a situation where the ability to find some meaning either within or
beyond the abusive experience is what sustains the will to survive.113
*  *  *
He used various expressions and signs to make me go where he wanted, and 
to control what I said or did. For instance, he’d make a coughing sound, or 
clear his throat a certain way, to get my attention. Then he’d indicate with his 
eyes where I was to go...114
By this time in my life I had no friends. When I went to school, I couldn’t 
stop to talk to anybody because I had to get right home. My uncle timed
me I never went anywhere unless my uncle was with me. He also had
codes for me with his eyes, as to where to go in the house, to satisfy his
needs, so no one could see the goings on I became a very skillful liar for
him. There was so much terror, sadness, loneliness and isolation, but I acted
1 l2Supra note 55 at 48.
II3V. Frankl, M an’s Search fo r  Meaning (New York: Washington Square Press,
1985).
u*Supra note 55 at 28
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as if  things were fine and normal.115
*  *  *
On top o f the imposition of will upon the physical being o f another, the false privacy 
imposed by the abuser perpetuates the damage to the abused person. In order for the abuser 
to maintain the abusive relationship, he must create silence and privacy around the acts of 
abuse. This prevents the abused person from accessing relationships beyond the abusive one 
and thereby insulates the abused person from understanding what is going on and learning 
about loving relationships116. It also prevents the abused person from developing meaning 
for the abusive acts from other relationships. Because of the false privacy117, the abused
115Supra note 55 at 56.
ll6For an important description and analysis of the extreme privacy imposed by a 
batterer upon a spouse see: K. Fischer, Neil Vidmar and Rene Ellis “Procedural Justice 
Implications o f ADR in Specialized Contexts: The Culture o f Battering and the Role of 
Mediation in Domestic Violence Cases” (1993) 46 S.M.U. L. Rev. 2117. In this article the 
authors describe the relationship between batterers and their victims as involving 
idiosyncratic communications that only have meaning to the two parties. They call this the 
culture o f battering. This communication is a form of private language and private culture 
that insulates the victim o f abuse against intrusion. In this way, the abuser maintains control 
over the victim. This article provide an effective argument against the use o f mediation in 
situations where there is a culture o f  abuse. They argue that the culture o f abuse is 
incommensurable with the ideology o f  mediation, based as it is upon the re-establishment 
o f the relationship for the purpose o f  reaching agreement.
Il7By false privacy I mean the privacy imposed by the abuser for the purpose of 
protecting himself from outside censure and for the purpose of maintaining the abusive 
relationship. Professor Campbell distinguishes the private from the personal, and the public 
from the social in the following way:
“ 1. Public meaning: meaning accessible (knowable, interpretable) to others
2. Social meaning: meaning determined by shared rules, conventions, norms
and so on.
3. Private meaning: meaning inaccessible to others
4. Personal meaning: meaning not determined by shared rules, conventions,
norms and so on.” supra note 67 at 139.
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
53
person may feel to blame for the abuse or she may not understand that there is an alternative 
to the abusive relationship.
(c) Institutional child abuse
In an institutional setting, there is a further level o f privacy imposed upon the residents of 
the institution. In institutions such as the Nova Scotia School for Boys118, the physical 
isolation of the school from the familial homes of the residents meant that the boys did not 
have easy access to their pre-existing relationships. Even where there were some 
opportunities to communicate, speaking about abuse during brief visits would not have been 
easy. Some residents o f the Nova Scotia Youth Training Centre may have faced additional 
barriers to communication by virtue of being persons with disabilities.119 In addition,
118The Nova Scotia School for Boys (presently the Nova Scotia Youth Centre) was 
located in Shelburne, Nova Scotia which is a small community about 2 to 2 A  hours drive 
from Halifax. On page 4 o f his report, Justice Stratton notes that the isolated nature of the 
school made it difficult for parents to visit their sons: supra note 11 at 4.
119The Stratton Report describes the situation of a resident o f the Dartmouth 
Children’s Training Centre. The resident was a severely mentally and physically challenged 
woman who is completely blind and has limited cognitive and verbal skills. There was 
concern that this woman had been sexually abused. There was an extensive police 
investigation but it was eventually terminated. As set out in the Stratton Report, the police 
officer wrote:
Tracey Bartlett, unfortunately, is the perfect victim. If in fact she was 
sexually assaulted, she would be unable to in any way, shape or form be able 
to testify against any such person(s). Without the corroborating evidence of 
an eye witness, a prosecution in this matter would be impossible.: supra note 
11 at 67.
This quote indicates the difficulties associated with obtaining information and testimony 
from persons with severe disabilities. Note that in this case, it was not at all clear that Ms
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emotionally troubled children may have required educational resources not available at the 
institution. The resulting low level of literacy would have contributed to disenfranchisement 
both while a resident o f the school and in later life.120
On a broader systemic level, the concept of abuse in institutions may not have registered on 
the collective social psyche. In an institutional environment, the concept of abuse of 
authority is less easy to grasp than in an environment where control is not socially 
sanctioned. Institutional authorities are expected to have control over the residents in their 
care. Institutions are designed so that the authorities are able, and in fact are required, to 
impose their wills over the residents. In giving this power to authorities, there is already 
social acceptance of the imposition of the will o f authorities over the residents. In an 
institutional setting, part o f the privacy is imposed by the institution itself which controls the 
rules of conduct, communication, and fulfilment o f the physical needs o f the residents.121 
People who are abused in an institutional setting may feel doubly disenfranchised: they are 
isolated by the abuser who has authority over their well-being, and they are unlikely to be 
listened to by virtue of the stigma associated with institutionalization122. For someone to
Bartlett had been abused.
1 “ Complainants in the Stratton Report made various comments on their lack of 
education. For example “Y.T.C. 7 said that the only education she received was at the 
Centre and she ‘did not leam anything there’. She added that today she finds it ‘very 
difficult to read and write because of this’”: supra note 11 at 85. Stratton further notes that 
there was a failure of the residents to complain o f the abuse to the authorities. If there was 
a complaint, no corrective action was taken: supra note 11 at 86.
mSupra note 6 at 1-12.
l22Supra note 83 at 268.
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overcome abuse, they must break the privacy and reach out to speak o f their experiences.
(d) Summary o f  Injuries
From this analysis, the following core injuries result from abuse:
1. The violent imposition of will upon the physical body of another causes some 
objectification or fragmentation for the abused person. A person’s may dissociate 
from the physical experience of the abuse.
2. There is an intrusion into the physical, sensory memories o f the abused person. This 
affects their subjective perception o f the world around them.
3. There may be a sense o f betrayal and a corresponding loss of a sense of ease and 
safety in the world. The abused person has lost power vis a vis her relationships 
with others in her relational matrix.
4. The lack o f meaning may cause a feeling of personal vulnerability. The imposition 
of abusive meaning to the acts can distort a person’s sense o f  identity and 
relationships.
5. For children abused during their formative years, there is an inability to feel joy as 
a separate person. The child does not leam to identify their own experience of joy 
and love. Abusiveness supplants an understanding of love.
6. A child may not have the capacity to know or register what has happened. They 
may find it hard to be responsible for their mental pictures of themselves and the 
world around them.
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7. Especially in an institutional setting, the imposition of a false privacy to maintain the
abusive relationship diminishes the ability o f the abused person to establish 
empowering relationships.
What are the remedies for these types of damages?
E. Remedies for damage to identity
Damages to identity are difficult to address, partly because they occur deeply within the 
personal space of the abuse survivor. It is not easy for a third party such as a judge or a third 
party to access this space and to address the subjective nature of the harm. For this reason, 
a two-party process may be better suited to provide a remedy because the abuse survivor can 
potentially exercise greater authority over the process,. However, before being able to 
articulate her interests in shaping any process, the abused person needs to know herself.
(a) Identity formation
There are various substantive remedies that can contribute to the healing and well-being of 
survivors o f abuse. The prime effect of abuse is to compromise a person’s sense of separate 
identity from the abuser, and to effect a corresponding lack of empowerment. This damage 
is effected through a relationship with the abuser. In order to address these damages, a 
dispute resolution process must include some way to assist the abuse survivors in asserting 
a non-dominated identity in relation to the abuser with whom the survivor is dealing with,
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either directly or indirectly, in the negotiation. If  the process can address this issue, then it
might be possible for a previously isolated and identity-compromised abuse survivor to
articulate and assert interests in the public realm that are distinct from the abuser.
*  *  *
There was a social worker at the home who had suspicions about the abuse 
I had gone through and did something about it. Mrs. Muriel Baxter, God love 
her, worked on me for quite a while and gradually gained my trust.123
*  *  *
Involvement with counselors and close relationships with loving people can help to 
emotionally re-orient an abused person and teach them to be in loving relationships and to 
identify with loving experiences. It is these acts o f love and new relationships that enable 
an abused person to emerge from the silence and privacy of the abusive situation. The 
extension o f tendrils o f care from a loving person to an abused person provides the abused 
person with a relationship that has a context outside of the abusive relationship. Once a 
person emerges from the false privacy of the abusive experience, once he speaks to another 
who recognizes him in his own capacity, there is the nucleus for undertaking personal 
political action. Political action is the derivation of strength from sharing experiences with 
another person and manifesting inner reality by doing some act in the outer worlds.
The act itself can be minute in scope. An abused woman may, for the first time in her life, 
buy a book without getting previous consent from her abusive husband. An abused child may 
refuse to speak to the abuser. These are political acts o f resistance. This person has realized,
123Supra note 55 at 70.
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from watching or interacting or remembering a past loving relationship, that the abuse is not 
who they are and they do not have to identify with it or accept the meaning provided by the 
abuser. Although a person requires a relational existence to find meaning within collectively 
developed constructs, she can choose orientation to relationships that give meaning to her 
experiences. The act o f breaking out o f the status quo relationship with the abuser and 
establishing a connection with an outsider124 who can at least listen in a loving way, is an act 
o f power125 and a political act. It is the seed of political action.
If emotional re-orientation through involvement in loving relationships is the way to emerge 
from the imposed privacy of abuse, then a procedural remedy must provide the time and 
space to allow for the development of new, loving relationships. The emergence from the 
abusive relationship is the necessary condition to being able to assert interests in a dispute 
resolution environment. Without being able to define herself apart from the abuser, it would 
be difficult for an abused person to identify the substantive remedy that is necessary for her 
recovery. It would be difficult to assert power in the negotiation if she was still under the 
influence o f the abuser.
(b) Assertion o f  will
124The implications of bearing witness and giving testimony about one’s experiences 
is explored in a later chapter.
125“Power is always, as we would say, a power potential and not an unchangeable, 
measurable, and reliable entity like force or strength. While strength is a natural quality of 
an individual seen in isolation, power springs up between men when they act together and 
vanishes the moment they disperse.” H. Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University 
o f  Chicago Press, 1958) at 200-201.
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*  *  *
In 1964, it was out of the question to mention child sex abuse, let alone 
discuss it openly. I felt I had one good thing going for me - the fact that I 
would not allow anyone to feel they could ever take control o f m e.126
*  *  *
Abuse has the effect o f overcoming the will o f the abused person and leaving him with a 
sense that there is no longer a seamless link between his sense of self or will and his physical 
being. There is a degree of objectification and fragmentation that occurs when the abuser 
used the abused person’s body for the abuser’s purposes. The abused person becomes aware 
o f his body as an object for another person. A person whose power and control over their 
physical being has been taken away by force should be given an opportunity to recover that 
power in order to become whole again. If  there is recognition that persons who have been 
abused have had power taken away from them at a core physical level then personal self- 
actualization and re-integration may be one goal o f the process. Further, as they were often 
institutionalized initially because they were socially disenfranchised127, the development of 
social and political power within the broader web o f relationships may be another goal of 
the process.
As stated earlier, identity exists in a relational matrix; therefore re-orientation in this matrix 
is part o f the solution for identity formation. The relational matrix is constructed and 
maintained by relationships of power, on both inter-personal and broader societal levels.
126Supra note 55 at 74.
I27For a discussion of the relationship between disenfranchised minority groups and 
the institutionalization resulting from eugenics policies in Alberta, see infra note 215.
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In order for the abused person to re-configure identity on individual and societal levels, it is 
necessary to exercise will and power in the relationship with the abuser, and with the actors 
who maintain dominating discourses that re-enforce existing disenfranchising relationships.
(c) Survivor’s meaning fo r  abusive experiences
Once a sense o f self is developed independently from the actors who maintain the false 
privacy around the abuse survivor, she can find meaning for the experience o f abuse that 
does not give a sense o f  fragmentation. That is, if the meaning given to the experience of 
abuse can be integrated into the person’s whole sense o f self without objectifying some part 
o f being, then there is the possibility of recovering a sense of control over the self.
Meaning can best be developed among other people who have also experienced abuse. By 
situating herself in a matrix of people who can identify with her experience o f abuse, there 
is greater chance o f being understood and o f developing a conceptual framework that will 
make sense o f the experience. For example, if  I try to explain to someone who has never had 
a seizure, what it is like to have a seizure, I can only do so by trying to locate some 
experience o f his that can approximate the feelings of having a seizure. This attempt may 
be entirely unsatisfactory because I may not be able to locate such analogous occurrences and 
because the focus o f the meaning becomes more reliant on his experience than on mine. If 
I am speaking to someone who has had the same type o f seizure128, then he knows of what
128I recognize that this sounds somewhat circular as we will not know if we have the 
same type o f seizure before the communication. What I am describing is the discovery of
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
61
I speak because it corresponds to his bodily experience. Together we discover if our physical 
sensations are similar and we can find some meaning in the experience of having seizures.
For abuse survivors, it is preferable for meaning to be developed from among a group of 
survivors who can identify with each other. That is, they can find a common meaning from 
similar experiences of abuse that do not force them to describe the experiences in the terms 
of non-survivors. The survivors will therefore be able to define meaning based upon their 
subjective experiences as opposed to having meaning imposed by an objectifying discourse 
that may not correspond to their physical knowledge. In developing his own meaning among 
fellow survivors, the individual survivor will have greater potential for control over the 
meaning attributed to his experience of abuse and will not succumb at this early stage to 
objectification by non-survivors.
(d) A brief word about the truth
So far, the discussion has assumed the validity of the experience of abuse. There is, 
however, the possibility that the abuse did not happen. I submit that at the stage in the 
process when a person is first speaking about abuse but has not yet decided whether or not 
to speak publicly, there should be no judgement about whether or not he is truthful. I
similarity between sensations felt in two people. If there is no corresponding sensation in 
the other person, he will not know what I am describing. Thus I will have to wander farther 
from a direct description of my sensation and I will have to try to find an analogy closer to 
his experience.
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propose that the only relevant type o f truth determination that occurs before a party enters 
the dispute resolution arena, is the internal validation provided within the group of survivors. 
External validation o f truth claims may become relevant once the parties are actually 
engaged in speaking ‘publicly’ about their claims and when they are speaking for the purpose 
o f asserting their interests. Members o f the group should expect tests of the legitimacy of 
their claims once they speak in the public arena. The parties who are affected by the 
allegations o f abuse will likely assert their own understanding o f  the truth. Depending upon 
the remedy and the goals o f the process as defined by the parties, different levels of 
validation and truth-determination will be required. The issue o f validating public testimony 
will be explored further in the next chapter.
F. Identity in judicial processes
In a judicial process, the parties are limited in their ability to control the process by at least 
the following two things: 1) the existence of binding precedents and legislation ; and 2) the 
binding decision o f a third-party judge who interprets and applies these pre-existing doctrinal 
rules. In a judicial process, the parties are limited in the exercise o f self-actualization and 
recovery. If these activities occur, they happen outside the legal arena, and within other 
disciplinary frameworks.
Although substantive remedies may symbolize societal recognition o f the re-integration of 
selfhood, the negotiation process itself can be a vehicle for the recovery of self-actualization 
and self-determination. Where two parties are engaged in dispute resolution efforts outside
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the boundaries of a system o f pre-existing rules and authority, there is much greater 
possibility for them to exercise power and control over the process. This can allow for space 
for the development o f new meaning that is not captured by dominant discourses, thus 
promoting recovery.
However, if  the parties do not recognize the potential for allowing new meaning to emerge 
in this space, then there is the possibility that pre-existing dominant meaning will prevail, 
simply through lack o f attention in the design o f the process. Also, if  the subjugated party 
does not have the power to assert new meaning, then it will be difficult to maintain the 
subjective nature of their interests in the face o f the more powerful party.129
The legal system does not claim to promote identity formation. A person who wishes to 
enter the legal arena must be prepared and be able to face opposition and prove his claim. 
The legal system does, however, allow for procedural accommodation for psychological 
condition of a historic sexual abuse plaintiff.
In M. (K.) v. M. (H.)no, the issue was whether or not a victim of child sexual abuse could 
be statute barred from bringing her claim because the limitation period had expired. The 
appellant had been abused by her father at a young age. Initially he fondled her. When she 
turned 10 or 11, he initiated sexual intercourse with her. He used threats to maintain her
I29This point will be explored in more detail in chapter 4 where I discuss the 
hegemony of commodification with respect to monetary compensation.
i30[1992] 3 S.C.R. 6 [hereinafter “M  (K.)”].
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silence and rewarded her with treats in order to secure her cooperation. Like the patient in 
Jehu’s article, the appellant would dissociate while going through the abuse. As noted by 
the Supreme Court of Canada, she would imagine herself as an inanimate object.131 The 
appellant tried to break out of the silence o f the false privacy by obliquely mentioning an 
aspect of the abuse to her mother. Her mother did not pick up on her cues or chose not to 
pursue the matter. M. tried several other times to communicate about the abuse and finally, 
when she was 16 years old, told a counselor at school who sent her to a psychologist. 
M.stated at trial that she did not at that point know that abusive acts were wrong but only that 
she did not like it. She felt that the psychologist did not believe her. In any event, her father 
re-imposed his abusive privacy when he forced her to recant her story.
The appellant got married but soon experienced depression and sexual difficulties with her 
husband. She sought therapy for her psychological difficulties but the new psychologist did 
not encourage her to speak of her incest because it did not seem related to her current 
problems. She subsequently became engaged to a new man and told him about her abusive 
experiences. After this disclosure she joined an incest victim self-help group. Her 
involvement with this group enabled her to see that she was not responsible for the abuse and 
that her father was responsible. She continued therapy with a family therapist who later 
testified at trial that M. only became aware o f the connection between her psychological 
problems an the incest when she could recognize her father’s responsibility for his abusive 
acts.
m Ibid. at 21.
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The trial judge found that the plaintiff was able to prove the legal elements o f her case. 
However, she was barred from bringing her action because her claim was brought after the 
statutory limitation period had expired.132 The Court o f Appeal o f  Ontario dismissed her 
appeal and she therefore appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. The Court decided that 
limitations legislation does apply to sexual abuse cases but that the appellant’s claim only 
arose when she was reasonably capable o f discovering the wrongful nature of the abusive act 
and the connection between the act and the harm. The Supreme Court recognized the patent 
unfairness of allowing the defendant to escape responsibility by virtue o f  his own harmful 
acts. As stated by the Court, if  the claim were statute barred, “sexual abusers would be able 
to take advantage o f the failure to report which they themselves, in many cases, caused”133.
(a) Evaluation o f  judicial process regarding identity formation
132Note that since M. (K.), Nova Scotia has amended its limitations period legislation 
to recognize the application o f the discoverability rule for child sexual abuse. Section 2 (5) 
of the Limitations o f  Actions Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 258 as am. by S.N.S. 1993, c. 27, s. 1 
provides the following:
In any action for assault, menace, battery or wounding based on sexual abuse o f a person,
(a) for the purpose o f subsection (1), the cause o f action does not arise until 
the person becomes aware o f the injury or harm resulting from the sexual 
abuse and discovers the causal relationship between the injury or harm and 
the sexual abuse; and
(b) notwithstanding subsection (1), the limitation period referred to in clause 
(a) of subsection (1) does not begin to run while that person is not reasonably 
capable o f commencing a proceeding because o f that persons physical, 
mental or psychological condition resulting from the sexual abuse.
133Supra note 130 at 32.
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In this case the Supreme Court explicitly recognized that the appellant should be given the 
time to develop an understanding o f herself, o f the acts she endured, and o f the harm to 
herself, outside of the imposed privacy of the abuser. It would therefore seem that a rights- 
based judicial process can indeed recognize the need for historic child sexual abuse
survivors134 to form their own sense o f identity apart from the abuser.
This fact situation in M.’s case fits well with the description o f  abuse provided earlier in this 
chapter. M. was unable to know whether the abuse was wrong or not; nor was she able to 
register what had happened. She was coerced into privacy by her father with threats and 
rewards for her silence. Her abuser imposed a false privacy around the abusive relationship 
in order to perpetuate the abuse. M.testified that she would imagine herself as an inanimate 
object when the abuse occurred. Her sense of self was fragmented as she dissociated from 
her body. As she tried to express what had happened to her, social silence on the issue of 
child abuse either contributed to her mother not to understanding or not hearing her account 
o f what had happened to her. She did not as yet have access to a relationship matrix with 
those who could provide meaning from the context of empathetic or loving listeners. When 
she again tried to speak with the school-referred therapist, her father used his parental 
authority and abusive relationship to re-impose silence. A subsequent attempt by M. to 
speak to another therapist was again unfruitful. The new therapist decided that it was not
necessary to deal with the abuse that had occurred
134Although the ruling in M. (K.) referred specifically to incest survivors, it was 
successfully used at trial in G.B.R. v. Hollett (1995), 143 N.S.R. (2d) 38 to apply the 
discoverability rule to this institutional abuse case. Consequently, G.B.R.’s claim was not 
statute barred.
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Both therapists were entrenched in a disciplinary discourse that did not fully recognize the 
depth of M.’s experience and needs. Time after time, her knowledge of the abusive 
experience was not reflected in the discourse around her and she could therefore not find 
speech that meaningfully expressed her experience. Predominant conceptions of the 
legitimacy of male parental authority contributed to the school’s acceptance that her father 
was more credible than M and that his authority was more legitimate than her disruptive 
speech. The second therapist was also not able to recognize M.’s need to speak because he 
let his expert opinion override her needs. As outlined in the model earlier in the chapter, she 
was only able to be heard and develop the strength to form more loving relationships in her 
support group once she had a sympathetic or loving listener. It was only upon telling her 
fiance that she was able to begin to form supportive relationships with those who could help 
her find the meaning and words to express what had happened to her.
What is striking about this case is the degree to which it fits within the established 
understanding of abuse and recovery. Point by point, the fact situation outlined by the 
Supreme Court describes a classic situation o f historic child sexual abuse as defined by the 
contemporaneous dominant understandings o f abuse within psychotherapeutic discourse135. 
Prior to this case, incest was not easily recognized in society or by the courts. In M. (K.) 
LaForest J. states the following:
. . .  one cannot ignore the larger social context that has prevented the problem
of incest from coming to the fore. Until recently, powerful taboos
135The trial judge relied upon various child abuse experts in the psychotherapeutic 
fields to describe the damages caused by incest: supra note 131 at 26-28.
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surrounding sexual abuse have conspired with the perpetrators of incest to 
silence victims and maintain a veil of secrecy around the activity.136
Further, therapists’ understanding o f incest in earlier years did not accurately reflect the 
abused person’s experiences. When M. did speak, therapists were not willing to accept her 
account and they denied recognition of the significance o f her experiences. Their ability to 
recognize her experiences within their discourse was limited and the dominant understanding 
of abusive experiences prevailed over her account o f the abusive experiences. If the then 
dominant understanding of incest had been accurate for her case, M’s experiences would not 
have been minimized by the school authorities and therapists who failed to make the 
connection between the incest and her injuries.
This point illustrates how dominant understandings o f  abuse or other phenomena can enable 
empowerment if  one’s situation is reflected by discourse but can also be dominating if  it is 
not so reflected. Although the dominant knowledge o f experts was eventually able to 
recognize the situation of incest victims, the knowledge o f psychologists at the time when 
M. was seeking help did not capture her experiences. Therefore, it had the effect of 
suppressing or ignoring the importance to M. of her incestuous relationship with her father.
I would suggest that this form o f suppression may also exist with respect to current 
phenomena that have not yet been widely recognized. For example, inter-resident sexual and 
physical abuse in institutions is not widely recognized as compensable. Consequently, the
I36iSupra note 130 at 32.
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people affected remain excluded from the system. Though the abuse they suffered at the 
hands o f fellow residents may have significant meaning for them, the issues surrounding 
abusive acts perpetrated by persons who are themselves vulnerable137 have not been widely 
addressed in discursive arenas.
The court system relies upon experts from other disciplines to articulate existing knowledge 
within their disciplines.138 If existing knowledge does not accurately reflect a particular
l37Vulnerable people might include abuse victims, children, disenfranchised minority 
members, battered women or others who are themselves victims o f abuse o f power. It is 
difficult to deal with issues surrounding the responsibility and liability of abused persons 
who perpetrate abuse, partially because responsibility flows back to those who have 
contributed to the disenfranchised position o f  the vulnerable perpetrator. For example, white 
condemnation of violence in African-American culture is complicated by the fact that it may 
be that violent oppression by white Americans during the slave era and after contributed 
heavily to the existence o f violence in African-American communities, see: R. T. Takaki, 
Violence in the Black Imagination: Essays and Documents (New York: Capricorn Books, 
1972).
138T w o  Supreme Court o f Canada cases demonstrate a recent trend to limit the 
circumstances in which expert evidence in sexual abuse cases can be admitted. In R. v. D. 
D., [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9 [hereinafter “D. D .”] the Court considered the expert evidence o f a 
psychologist who testified that a child’s delay in alleging sexual abuse does not support an 
inference o f falsehood. The psychologist did not testify about the particular child in the case 
but rather provided evidence that delay is not determinative o f truth or falsehood. At trial 
the judge considered the test in R. v. Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9 for the admission o f expert 
evidence. The test provides that the party seeking to admit expert evidence must establish 
that the evidence is relevant, there is necessity for the evidence, there is a lack of any other 
exclusionary rule and that the expert be properly qualified. The trial judge determined that 
all four criteria were met in this case. The Court o f Appeal, however, found that the 
evidence of the psychologist was neither relevant or necessary. The Court o f Appeal held 
that the expert evidence was relevant to the complainant’s credibility and not to a fact in 
issue; therefore it could not be admitted as it would result in oath-helping. The Court of 
Appeal also found that the evidence was not necessary as it dealt with a matter within the 
ordinary knowledge of the juror. Although the whole panel of judges agreed that the appeal 
should be dismissed in D. D . , McLachlin, L ’Heureux-Dube and Gonthier JJ. dissented on 
the merits. Writing for the majority, Major J. examined closely the dangers associated with 
the admission of expert evidence. Primarily, his analysis focused on the dangers of
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phenomenon, then it will not be accepted by the courts. Thus, M.’s ability to overcome the 
limitations barrier was only possible after her experience of abuse was understood by 
experts. The experiences o f the appellant have been represented to the Court in terminology 
that is accepted in dominant discourse and convincing to the decision-makers by virtue of 
its congruence with dominant conceptions o f abuse survivors in psychotherapeutic discourse. 
Further M. needed to depend upon the Court to give her the right to assert her claim. Thus, 
the Court bestows power through rights only if  she has enough existing power to establish 
that her claim falls close to or within the bounds of doctrine.139 For example, the doctrine
introducing extra-legal knowledge in a forum where it is not possible to evaluate that 
knowledge. He noted that because experts have impressive credentials, the triers of fact may 
abdicate their role and attorn to the opinion o f the expert, despite the expert’s limitations. 
He further noted that expert evidence can distort the fact-finding process because terms of 
art and scientific language can create impressions that the evidence is infallible. Also, expert 
evidence is difficult to cross-examine; even if another expert cross-examines the first, the 
evidence is difficult for the trier o f fact to evaluate. The expert from another discipline may 
thus have inordinate influence on judicial proceedings than is actually warranted by their 
actual expertise. The Court determined that as the statement of principle given by the expert 
in this case reflected the current state o f Canadian law, the trial judge should have included 
it in the instruction to the jury. There was no need for the expert in this case.
In R. v. J.-L. J. (9 November 2000) file no. 26830 (S.C.C.) the Supreme Court of Canada 
found that a new application of an existing psychiatric tool is not a well-enough established 
scientific method and therefore will tend to distort the fact-finding exercise. In this case, the 
expert sought to use the penile plethysmograph, which is normally used for assessment, as 
a forensic tool for the purpose o f determining whether the offence in question was probably 
committed by the member o f a “distinctive group” of individuals - pedophiles and 
psychopaths. The expert evidence was not well-accepted as a matter for determining 
disposition and tended to be strongly exculpatory. Thus the evidence hindered the fact­
finding process more than it assisted. In this case, the Court was concerned that the 
unproven application of a scientific tool, wrapped in the cloak o f the discourse of another 
discipline, could result in a construction o f identity that distorts the fact-finding process.
l39Note that legal doctrine itself can preclude recognition o f particular phenomena. 
For example at one time, the rape o f a woman by her husband was not recognized because 
in law, a husband had the right to sexual access to his wife: supra note 83 at 268.
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of discoverability was expanded to apply to her case, only after experts on child abuse could 
establish that she could not be expected to discover the connection between her injuries and 
the abusive acts until well after they had been inflicted. In M. (K.) LaForest J. states the 
following:
in my view the only sensible application of the discoverability rule in a case 
such as this is one that establishes a prerequisite that the plaintiff have a 
substantial awareness of the harm and its likely cause before the limitation 
period begins to toll. It is at the moment when the incest victim discovers the 
connection between the harm she has suffered and her childhood history that 
her cause of action crystallizes . . . What is more, I am satisfied that the 
weight o f  scientific evidence establishes that in most cases the victim of 
incest only comes to an awareness o f the connection between fault and 
damage when she realizes who is truly responsible for her childhood abuse.140
Before the point when the effects o f abuse were recognized in scientific and 
psychotherapeutic circles, child sexual abuse survivors would not have been able to rely 
upon judicial authority to bring their claims forward years after the limitations period had 
expired.
M.(K.) is a good example o f  both the positive and negative aspects of expert discourse. On 
the one hand, M. (K.) was able to access a dominant understanding o f abuse within 
psychotherapeutic disciplines that reflected her experience. The Supreme Court recognized 
the legitimacy o f her claim and awarded her damages. On the other hand, several incest 
victims before her would not have been able to assert their claims because the state of 
dominant discourse was such that incest was unrecognized or the particular nature of their
l40Supra note 130 at 35. For further discussion on this topic see supra note 42 at 63-
70.
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injuries prevented them from bringing their claims forward in time141. In a judicial process 
there is little room for the assertion o f meaning by the abused person that is not supported 
or recognized by some type o f expert. This circular recognition of power that already exists 
does not allow for disenfranchised abused persons to contribute new meaning through 
discourse. If  M. had not been able to overcome the various barriers to her speech, then she 
would not have been able to assert her claim.
I would now like to examine if the barriers to identity formation and speech are as 
formidable in a non-judicial process where a disenfranchised group may initiate political 
power without relying upon the other side or a third-party bestower o f rights.
141Prior to 1992 the majority o f civil proceedings involving child sexual abuse had 
to do with custody and access, and child protection law. As stated by N. DesRosiers in 
“Limitation Periods and Civil Remedies for Childhood Sexual Abuse” (1992) 9 C.F.L.Q. 43 
at 43, “Few actions are brought by victims of childhood sexual abuse, and even fewer are 
met with success. In addition to the psychological and financial difficulties of bringing such 
an action, the most difficult legal obstacle preventing victims o f childhood sexual abuse from 
suing their aggressor is the limitation period.”
Leading up to M. (K.) which is the key authority recognizing the effects of child 
abuse on discoverability and reporting, there were few cases o f plaintiffs seeking damages 
for historic sexual abuse. It was only around 1991 and 1992 that courts started to recognize 
the specific nature o f child sexual abuse and the delays in reporting that are typical. In one 
case, Gray v. Reeves (1992), 64 B.C. L. R. 275 a plaintiffbrought an action for sexual abuse 
suffered at the hands of her uncle. In that pre- M.(K.) case, the court found that it was 
possible that the injuries suffered by the victim would not be recognized by the victim until 
well after the assault had taken place. In the criminal arena, courts had found that “lengthy 
delay in making accusations o f sexual abuse, while it may affect the likelihood of conviction, 
does not in itself lead to an unfair trial”: R. v. D. (E.) (1990), 73 O.R. (2d) 758 (C.A.) at 769- 
70. In R. v. L.(W. K.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 1091 the Supreme Court of Canada held that delay 
in reporting sexual abuse does not contravene the accused’s right to a fair trial under ss. 7 
and 11 (d) o f the Charter. The Court recognized that non-reporting, incomplete reporting and 
delay in reporting are common in sexual abuse cases.
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G. Identity in non-judicial processes
In a non-judicial process there is a need for personal space or time in order for the person to 
be able to establish her sense o f self and assert her interests. Once in the negotiations, it is 
assumed that the parties are able to assert their interests. In a  non-judicial process the need 
to participate in identity formation can be articulated either before pre-negotiation process 
discussions or during process discussions with the other side. The difference between a 
judicial and non-judicial process is that the parties in a non-judicial process need not depend 
upon a third party adjudicator for recognition o f their need to establish an identity. Further, 
the identity that is eventually formed can be expressed in the negotiation process without 
having been filtered through doctrine or disqualified by experts. The discounting o f new 
identity and the survivors’ account o f the abusive experiences may eventually happen in the 
negotiation arena. However in having the opportunity to develop a sense of what is 
meaningful at the outset, survivors will be better able to assert their interests in their 
negotiations with the other party. They will not be limited in their initial articulation of 
interests by a third party adjudicator or by the other party.
Negotiation has the potential for allowing identity formation by the parties and it has enough 
flexibility to allow for the recognition o f political power that is unmediated by doctrine or 
the approval of a decision-maker. In institutional abuse cases governments may wish to 
encourage the accurate articulation o f substantive interests in order to increase the political 
legitimacy o f the remedies for all parties and the public, and to encourage the development 
o f individual and collective remedies that cannot be obtained in a costly litigation process.
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Non-judicial processes do not operate within a legal vacuum. It could be said that the abuse 
claimants in the Nova Scotia Program were able to engage the Nova Scotia government in 
negotiations precisely because the ruling in M. (K.) established that historic sexual abuse 
cases are not necessarily statute-barred by virtue o f limitation periods. Although the 
negotiation process allows for the re-engagement in a relationship, it is situated within the 
parameters o f a rights-based system. The strength of the ability to assert one’s rights in a 
legal claim gives a party the ability to detach from the relationship. Thus, judicial and non­
judicial systems are not entirely distinct but interact with each other. It also means that the 
ability to assert identity in a negotiation process is dependent upon recognition within the 
legal system o f the needs of abused persons. Although a non-judicial process can encompass 
and recognize the importance of identity formation, the actual engagement in the dispute 
resolution relationship is dependent upon the same legitimated understanding of abused 
persons as exists within the court system. What is different, then, with a non-judicial 
process?
The difference is that although the government may choose to rely upon limitation periods 
that reinforce dominant conceptions o f identity, they do so at the risk of facing political 
opposition in and around the negotiation environment. A judicial process is to some degree 
protected from such influences and operates within a relatively fixed political environment. 
A non-judicial process create an opening for the development o f a new understanding of 
what occurred in institutions, based upon the direct assertions of the parties. In other words, 
a non-judicial process provides the fluidity in the relational matrix or ‘world’ of the parties
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Where there are allegations of institutional abuse in a particular jurisdiction, the use o f a 
technical limitations period by a government or institutional authority might be seen as 
morally and politically unacceptable. Consequently, institutional authorities may chose to 
develop a pro-active program that allows still-silent abused persons to emerge from their 
privacy. By not engaging in a civil litigation process, the government or other institutional 
authority can exercise some control o f the process and the remedies. On their part, claimants 
can assert the need for access to counseling as part o f the process in order to assist them with 
identity formation and with coping with the process itself.
Whereas the parties in a judicial process must rely on a third party to interpret doctrine, a 
process that need not rely upon authority can incorporate more pro-active mechanisms to 
respond to subjective experiences and conceptions o f identity. Courts are bound by doctrinal 
rules and procedures that embody existing dominant conceptions of identity, whilst the 
parties in a non-judicial process are not so bound. If the claimants had been able to 
effectively assert further aspects of institutional abuse that are not yet widely recognized in 
dominant discourse, then the parameters of the MOU might have captured these experiences.
(a) Evaluation o f  a non-judicial process regarding identity formation 
As briefly mentioned above, in the Nova Scotia Compensation Program, the MOU provided
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interim funds for counseling while the claimants’ cases were being assessed.142 In doing so, 
the government provided assistance in identity formation at the outset, as long as a person 
identified himself as abused. The government also provided assistance through the Family 
Services Association, an arm’s length organization that helped find appropriate counselors 
for the claimants.143 This aspect o f the Nova Scotia Program could be said to be well 
designed to meet the needs o f abused persons to access non-abusive, safe relationships.
Without this assistance and recognition, the process of finding a sympathetic listener can be 
discouraging and difficult. Recall that in M. (K.) the appellant did not receive the validation 
she needed either from her mother144 who could or would not understand her new speech or 
from expert therapists whose dominant conceptions of abuse victims crowded out her speech. 
If  the process is initially designed so that there is maximum opportunity for allowing 
testimony about all experiences related to abuse, then there is a much greater chance that a 
new understanding of abuse can be developed that challenges the discursive status quo. In 
M. (K). this new speech was only articulated when she encountered sympathetic non­
experts145 in her incest survivor self-help group.
]A2Supra note 30 at paras. 28, 29.
143Supra note 28.
I44For her mother, M.’s disclosure o f abuse may have been so disruptive to the status 
quo of her relationship with her husband that she could not listen or hear about the abuse. 
This is a microcosm o f the broader social inability to hear difficult, disruptive accounts of 
experiences.
145When I use the term “non-expert” to refer to self-help group members I am not 
intending to derogate from their basic expertise as survivors. I am only referring to the fact 
that the knowledge they carry is what Foucault would refer to as “low-ranking knowledge”
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H. Conclusions
In this chapter I have asserted that a person forms a sense of identity by finding meaning and 
significance for certain experiences. I argued that identity itself is relational in nature. 
Although the person can choose meaning, meaning and thus identity is only available from 
within the matrices of relationships or ‘worlds’ in which the person exists. Based on 
evidence provided by abused persons both on their own behalf and through psychoanalysts 
and therapists,146 I have outlined various effects that abuse has on identity. The abused 
person may not be able to process what is happening to him. As a consequence he may 
dissociate or become fragmented from his bodies. Meaning for the abusive acts may be 
imposed by the abuser. Further, the abuser will impose a false privacy around the abusive 
relationship so that the abused person cannot derive meaning from a context outside the 
abusive relationship. In order to overcome the effects on identity, I have argued that a person 
must be able to derive meaning from relationships outside the abusive one. I suggest that 
exposure to a listener in a loving relationship may enable an abused person to break the 
silence o f abuse. Forming new relationships with other survivors of abuse will allow for the 
development of an identity separate from the abuser. Identity would be formed among others 
who, having experienced abuse, would be best able to help the abused person find accurate 
meaning for his experiences.
or “popular knowledge” that is subjugated by the dominant discourse: supra note 54 at 82.
146These experts may derive their theoretical understanding from a dominant 
discourse but in conveying the effects of abuse in the words of the survivor, they are not 
dominating and subjugating the knowledge of the abused persons.
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I have argued that both judicial and non-judicial dispute resolution processes may 
acknowledge the need o f an abused person to develop identity separate from the abuser. In 
M. (K.), the Supreme Court acknowledged that it would have been impossible for the 
appellant to have brought her claim before knowing that the abuser and not she was 
responsible for the abuse. The difference between the two processes is the fact that judicial 
processes require a third party to affirm the meaning o f the abused person’s experiences, and 
in so doing, may possibly exclude facets o f the abusive experience that are significant to the 
abused person. A two-party process can allow for the emergence o f meaning based upon the 
fullest understanding that the abused person has of her experience. In a non-judicial process 
involving several individual claimants and the government, the claimants may either undergo 
identity formation in the personal space that they devise, or once the commitment to 
negotiate is made they can assert the need for time and space for identity formation before 
negotiations commence. If  the government wants to be able to respond to the needs of abuse 
claimants, it will either acknowledge or initiate this creation o f space so that the claims may 
be dealt with comprehensively.
To recap, judicial processes allow abuse survivors to assert the required space and time 
necessary to establish an identity apart from the abuser. This space, however, is only won 
if the survivor can establish legitimacy within an existing discourse and can convince a third 
party adjudicator who is bound by disciplinary rules that reinforce dominant discourse, of 
the legitimacy of her claims. A claimant in a non-judicial process also requires a certain 
amount of legal power in order to engage the abusive party in the negotiation process. The 
difference is that the players in a non-judicial process are not bound by existing rules and
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concepts o f identity. Parties can assert the significance of experiences in an arena where the 
disruptive force o f new speech can lead to the establishment o f political and negotiating 
power. Further, in the interests o f dealing with all possible claimants, a government may 
decide to encourage identity formation in those who have not yet completely broken the 
privacy imposed by the abuser and reinforced by society.
I. Recommendations
Where a government or any institutional organization is committed to entering a non-judicial 
dispute resolution process, space for identity formation should be provided. Survivors o f 
abuse should assert the need to establish the significance o f the abusive acts among 
themselves or among others who have experienced abuse. The emerging sense of identity 
should not be fettered by external agents or by doctrines at this stage. Validation will occur 
later once the interests o f  survivors are asserted against the other party in the public space 
of the dispute resolution arena. Therefore at the preliminary stage when there is a 
commitment on the part o f  institutional authorities or governments to engage in a dispute 
resolution process, the abuse claimants should assert the following:
• the need for assistance to access therapists who can listen to the accounts o f abuse 
as they emerge;
• the need for survivors to meet with each other to arrive at some meaning for their 
experiences;
• allow time before the dispute resolution process is commenced for the abused
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persons to understand what has happened to them; and,
funds to provide for counseling for the period o f time before survivors o f abuse form 
a political body.
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CHAPTER 3 - EMPOWERMENT
The power. We are a natural part of the earth. We are an extension o f the 
earth; we are not separate from it. We are part of it. The earth is our mother. 
The earth is a spirit, and we are an extension of that spirit. We are spirit. We 
are power. They want us to believe that we have to believe in them, that we 
have to assume these consumer identities and these racial identities. They 
want to separate us from our power. They want to separate us from who we
are. Genocide We must not become confused. We must not become
confused and deceived by their illusions.147
The bourgeoisie is interested in power, not in madness, in the system of 
control of infantile sexuality, not in the phenomenon itself. The bourgeoisie 
could not care less about delinquents, about their punishment and 
rehabilitation, which economically have little importance, but it is concerned 
about the complex of mechanisms with which delinquency is controlled, 
pursued, punished and reformed.. . .  148
A. Introduction
In the previous chapter I concluded that judicial process does recognize the need for historic 
child abuse survivors to form an identity and speech separate from their abusers. The only 
problem is that the new speech must first be recognized within a dominant discourse and 
then it must be accepted by a third party adjudicator who makes a decision outside the 
control o f the parties. A non-judicial dispute resolution process has the space for identity
I47John Trudell, “Statement of John Trudell, Last National Chairman of the American 
Indian Movement, at the Black Hills International Survival Gathering” in International 
Working Group for Indigenous Affairs, Document 62: Critical Issues in Native North 
America (Copenhagen: Ward Churchill International Secretariat, 1989) at ii.
148Supra note 54 at 102.
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formation within the parameters o f an alternative process. It allows the parties to have 
control over the development o f identity and to assert their sense o f what is significant 
without obtaining the approval o f a third party. However, with the freedom to assert identity 
without first obtaining third party recognition, there is a risk that the survivors of abuse will 
be overpowered by the other party. There is also the risk that pre-existing notions within 
dominant discourses will overwhelm the new identity of the survivors which is based on the 
meaning they attribute to the abusive experiences. In addition, the new knowledge of 
survivors is at risk of being subjugated by other forms o f knowledge that are considered to 
be more legitimate within dominant discourses.149 Although dominant discourses can 
empower survivors by providing an initial recognition o f  experiences, survivors must be 
aware of the possibility that survivor speech will relent to the normalizing pressures of the 
status quo. Testimonials of abuse are never easy to listen to and they are frequently 
accompanied by and evoke emotions that are difficult to manage. People who accept 
dominant knowledge about abuse and discourse derive stability from the relationships that 
reinforce that understanding; these people are less likely to want to hear about abuse150.
Public speech or testimony is necessary in order for parties in a dispute resolution 
relationship to articulate their interests and goals. In this chapter I argue that once speech
149Recall that when M. disclosed to the second psychotherapist that she had been a 
victim o f incest, the therapists’ theoretical knowledge overwhelmed M .’s own sense o f the 
importance of the incest. His expert knowledge about her experience was considered more 
legitimate than her sense of the impact o f the abuse on her life.
IS0Again, recall M.’s mother who could not or would not listen to M ’s claim that she 
had been sexually abused by her father. As noted before, if the mother listened to M. then 
she would have allowed the disruption o f her relationship with her husband.
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enters into the public space it falls within a particular category o f  testimony, depending upon 
the identity of the listener and depending upon its purpose. The speaker loses a degree of 
control over the testimony and must contend with the power o f other stakeholders in the 
testimonial arena. I will describe the disciplinary categories o f testimony that are used in the 
context of a judicial process and within the context o f a non-judicial process. Each form of 
testimony requires a different level of validation in order to be considered legitimate within 
the environment in which it is given. I will note that in the Nova Scotia Program, testimonial 
purpose changed in a way that perhaps reflected a change in the goals o f the Program 
itself.151
Also, I will suggest that if  survivors of abuse form a group that can assert common interests 
based upon their identity, they will be better able to assert the power required to resist 
pressure from other parties and other discourses to normalize or negate the speech o f their 
members. They will also be able to develop a consistent purpose152 or interests with the 
knowledge that if these interests are to be met, a certain level o f validation must be achieved.
I51In this paper I am not concerned with the ability o f the institutional authority to 
develop a consistent purpose. However, all parties in a process benefit from consolidating 
goals and interests before entering the process. Before any government action is taken, there 
are many internal stakeholders to be consulted and many different policy choices to be made. 
Like private parties, before coming to the negotiating table, governments and other 
organizations should be clear on their legal parameters and their most significant interests.
152Although the individual claimants in Nova Scotia may have had very strong 
advocates who could promote certain interests, these advocates could not claim to be 
promoting the collective interests o f a single group as there was no single group; there were 
only a number of individuals bringing similar claims. If  they had joined together to 
determine and assert claims as a group, then they might have been able to establish a new 
form of knowledge that is internally validated by the group members.
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If  the survivors have the power to assert the interests o f  its members on its own behalf, any 
government dealing with claims may have be more able to assert its interests and define the 
limitations o f possible remedies.
I argue that the formation o f a group o f people who have experienced institutional abuse and 
who can develop a common purpose, will be better able to articulate interests in a non­
judicial process than if  each member acts alone. I will argue that in order for the subjective 
aspect of speech to be protected, the survivor should affiliate himself with others who have 
common goals before engaging with the other party in a process to develop remedies. If this 
does not happen, the individual may not be able to resist the pressure from status quo 
advocates who wish to resist the potency of the new speech. If  a political group is formed, 
it can create the space for the assertion of individual testimony in the public arena. It can 
also provide the structure for the development of interests to be asserted in the negotiation 
arena. Depending upon the goals of the survivors and their ability to assert the importance 
o f  their interests, a method o f validation for testimony can be agreed upon by the parties in 
the negotiation.
The problem arises o f how this group can assert itself politically against the status quo while 
maintaining the subjective core and integrity o f the testimony. That is, how can a political 
group assert its legitimacy without having to obtain approval from those status quo actors 
who are challenged by the testimony arising from the group of abuse survivors? The 
problem with popular political testimony is that it can easily be undermined and invalidated 
by experts within disciplines whose knowledge has higher ranking in the hierarchy of
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knowledge and discourse. For example later in this chapter I will explore how David Stoll, 
a social scientist,153 has attempted to invalidate the testimony o f Rigoberta Menchu, a popular 
political leader of the Indigenous movement in Guatamala. I will argue that legitimation of 
political speech should receive validation from within the political group. Popular political 
knowledge should not require external validation when other discursive forms o f knowledge 
are validated from within their respective disciplines154. I will argue that internal political 
invalidation is not likely to be any less effective than external political validation. Further 
it will not allow for upholders o f the status quo to resist or normalize the popular knowledge
153I would be interested in exploring the question of whether pure science can truly 
claim to be distinct in character from arts. Although I cannot pursue this question within the 
scope of this thesis, I find Thomas Kuhn’s “Comments on the Relations o f Science to Art” 
at page 341 in T. Kuhn, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and 
Change (Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press, 1977) interesting and on point. In the 
hierarchy o f knowledge, scientific claims have more power than political ones because of the 
assumption of objectivity. In asserting that the study of social phenomena is scientific and 
rooted in objectivity, the social scientist places his legitimacy closer to that of the pure 
scientist who is assumed to be relatively free from subjective bias, and consequently higher 
on the hierarchy of knowledge. Thus, the social scientist asserts truth claims that will 
subjugate claims derived from lower knowledge forms such as those rooted in physical 
experience. Stoll’s claim to legitimacy rests upon his qualifications as a social scientist who 
is able to objectively view a political situation. What he does not acknowledge is the 
political content of his so-called scientific assertions.
154 For each type o f truth claim, there is an internal method o f validation established 
within the discipline. The strength o f scientific discourse is provided by its apparent 
openness to new truth and the ability of the scientist to shift from a status quo position. 
Science seeks to challenge existing understandings of the world whereas other disciplines 
examine pre-existing ideas. However, in claiming to be scientists, other disciplines seek to 
establish that they can objectify their area of study for the purpose of establishing truth apart 
from their pre-conceptions and political stance. See M. Foucault, “Discipline and Punish”in 
P. Rabinow, ed., The Foucault Reader (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984) at 237: N. 
Tomes, “Feminist Histories of Psychiatry” in M. Micale and R. Porter, eds. Discovering the 
History o f  Psychiatry (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
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o f  the group o f abused persons through invalidation o f its membership. Only in being able 
to resist normalization by maintaining the integrity o f  this speech will the formerly 
disenfranchised group be able to take a place within the discursive arena and manifest its 
power. Beyond the political purpose o f speech, however, external validation will become 
relevant.
B. Pre-testimony survivor speech
Lugones states:
. . .merely remembering ourselves in other worlds and coming to 
understanding ourselves as multiplicitous is not enough for liberation: 
collective struggle in the reconstruction and transformation o f structures is 
fundamental.155
By itself, having the strength to speak about one’s experiences does not ensure that the words 
will be accepted and absorbed into common knowledge. Before her words are accepted, a 
survivor of abuse o f power may go through several instances o f describing the event o f abuse 
where she is disbelieved, discounted, ignored or even silenced. These are methods that 
effectively keep the subjective experiences of the survivor internal and invisible to those 
around her and to those who operate within the dominant discourse156.
lssSupra note 70 at 507.
156In their article previously mentioned, Alcoff and Gray applied a Foucaultian 
analysis to modern-day uses o f confessions and experts in talk-shows. They describe the 
situation of survivors o f trauma who confess their experiences in a talk-show format with the
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As mentioned in the previous chapter, the privacy barrier of abuse is only overcome once 
someone listens in a loving or empathetic way to the abused person. As a bridge forms 
through the interaction o f the speaker and the empathetic listener, the speech o f the abused 
person enters an external safe space that is outside the safety of silence. This listener may 
not fully comprehend the meaning o f the abuse, but he is prepared to hear the account and 
provide encouragement and support for the purpose of acknowledging the inherent 
legitimacy of the subjective experience. Slowly, the abused person is taking steps to fully 
enter the public realm where political action and negotiation can take place. Once a person 
breaks the privacy of the abusive relationship, it may take years o f  establishing a safe 
personal space with sympathetic, non-judgmental listeners before he is willing or ready to 
enter a dispute resolution process for the purpose of obtaining a remedy from those 
responsible for the abuse. As noted in the previous chapter, establishing the truth o f speech 
is not important at this stage. It is only when speech enters the public realm for a particular 
purpose that truth and validation become important. Even then, the level o f validation will 
depend upon the purpose o f the speech and the truth-claim being asserted.
The safety in speaking to an empathetic listener comes from the control that the abused 
person has over the fate of the speech. Although this new personal space is not private, it is
later involvement of an expert at the end of the show. The expert is in the dominant position 
and has the power to validate or invalidate the survivor’s testimony or confession. The 
expert is the gate-keeper who determines whether or not the survivor’s speech is absorbed 
into the hegemonic dominant discourse. The expert transforms the survivor’s testimony 
from a subjective, experiential description to an objectified exhibition that serves to reinforce 
their power as an expert: supra note 83 at 275. Speech, as Foucault has said, is itself the site 
and object of conflict and power struggles Ibid. at 260.
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not yet entirely public either. Although not completely assured o f confidentiality, the 
empathetic listener generally gains their position of trust through compliance with conditions 
set out by the speaker. Thus, the speech to an empathetic listener is not truly in the public 
arena. In order to assert one’s interests - based on one’s sense o f what is meaningful - it is 
necessary to speak in the public realm.
But it is not enough to speak. In order to break the silence about abuse in the public arena 
it is necessary to be heard. Power is required in order to be heard in an environment where 
pre-existing meaning dominates discourse. However, if an abused person decides to speak 
outside this personal space, she loses a sense of control over the fate o f the speech. Once in 
the public realm, the intent of the listener and the intent of the speaker determine the type 
of testimony and the disciplinary framework that will guide its path.
(a) Normalization o f survivor speech
In “Survivor Discourse: Transgression or Recuperation?”157 Gray and Alcoff inquire whether 
survivor discourse158 is co-opted and used in a manner that diminishes its subversive impact. 
By subversive, the authors are referring to the assertion of a non-dominant discourse that
157Supra note 83.
158By survivor speech the authors are referring to the discourse of those who have 
survived rape, incest, and sexual assault: Ibid. at 261.
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dismantles constructions that exist within dominant discourse.159 Alcoff and Gray assert that 
the empowering capabilities of speaking o f  abusive experiences can be co-opted, subverted 
or recuperated by the dominant discourse through subj ugation of the disruptive aspect of the 
testimony. According to the authors, one way in which disruptive speech is neutralized is 
by experts who legitimate or ignore those aspects o f speech which do not fit well within the 
existing discursive framework.160 That is, experts define the language and conceptual 
framework that are available for providing meaning for abusive experiences. Alcoff and
l59For example, in D. D. the Court considered the expert evidence of a psychologist 
who testified that a child’s delay in alleging sexual abuse does not support an inference o f 
falsehood. The Supreme Court did not see the need for the dismantling of a myth because 
they felt that the myth about late disclosure had already been dismantled in legal discursive 
arenas. But this dismantling only occurred because experts, who themselves are entrenched 
within a dominant discourse within their own professions, used their voices to legitimate the 
experience of alleged abuse victims. This case describes the test that is used to determine 
when experts are to be called upon to assist the court. It outlines that experts are required 
when there is new accepted knowledge within their discourse; they are not required to 
confirm existing knowledge. The Court does not go so far as to say that experts are not 
required where the testimony of the abuse victim challenges status quo knowledge. It 
appears that in those cases, experts entrenched within a dominant discourse are required to 
legitimate the new speech of the survivor. Although the expert in D. D. was not dominating, 
the test outlined by the Supreme Court does not recognize the ability o f survivor testimony 
to stand alone when it challenges existing conceptions of abuse: supra note 138.
160Alcoff and Gray describe the confessional format used by television talk show 
hosts. They describe an actual interview with a rape survivor who was attempting to 
emphasize a particular aspect of the experience that had meaning for her. Her goal was to 
focus on the normality of the situation prior to the assault and to say something useful for 
other women who may not know what to do in a similar situation. The host of the show 
wanted to focus on the act o f rape itself and wanted to know if she had provoked the rapist. 
The survivor attempted to refocus her response to focus on men’s responsibility for rape but 
again the host o f the show emphasized women’s responsibility to avoid rape. At this point 
an expert on ‘rape prevention counseling’ was brought in to re-iterate the host’s focus on 
female responsibility for male violence. In this case, the speech of the rape survivor was too 
disruptive for the television host who wanted to maintain pre-existing concepts about rape. 
The survivor was circumvented and the expert legitimated existing discursive frameworks: 
supra note 83 at 275-6.
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Gray do not deny the usefulness o f theoretical knowledge that is held by experts. Their main 
concern is with theoretical experts who override and undermine the words o f those who have 
undergone the traumatic experience. Ideally, those who help the abused person find meaning 
are those people who have experienced abuse and who have theoretical knowledge of the 
phenomena surrounding the trauma.
I would argue, therefore, that when listening to new speech at the identity-formation stage, 
the listener161 should not judge or validate the emerging speech. Their purpose at this stage 
is to simply act as a loving person, thereby re-orienting the abused person within a new 
relationship matrix. At this point, the speech is not public, it exists within a personal space 
between two people.
However, when the abused person seeks to find meaning for their experiences, they will most 
easily be able to do so within a matrix of people who have also experienced abuse. Other 
abused persons will know what has been experienced and will best be able to help find the 
concepts that accurately reflect the experience o f abuse. At this stage, the membership of the 
group o f survivors will be determined by whether or not the members can identify with each 
other. This type of group is akin to the incest survivor self-help group that M. joined in her 
search to bring some meaning to her experiences o f incest. Through her connection with her 
group, she was able to speak to others who could provide her with a sense o f a new world 
or construct defined by survivors.
I61The listener could be a counselor, a friend, a close relative, a lover or any other 
person who can allow the abused person to speak.
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This type of group only exists insofar as the members share experiences and meaning. It will 
cease to exist as a group o f survivors if its members have no commonality of experience and 
meaning. At this point, the primary purpose o f the group is to assist its members find 
meaning. It does not have a further political goal of asserting this meaning in the world 
outside o f the one it has constructed. When a group forms in order to assert meaning in the 
world for the purpose o f achieving a goal, the speech of its members will be subject to some 
level o f validation, depending upon the goal of the group. The goal could be simply to assert 
their understanding of abuse in dominant discursive arenas. In asserting a sense of what 
happened according to them, there is no need to validate their claims. It is clearly based upon 
a subjective understanding o f their experiences and is only asserted with that understanding.
When the group asserts interests and justifies the legitimacy o f those interests with claims 
o f truth, then there will be a need for some form o f validation, as agreed upon by the parties. 
The level of validation required depends upon the interests affected by the claims. For 
example, if they are seeking remedies based on injury, then the validation standard agreed 
upon by the parties may more closely approximate legal validation methods, if both parties 
agree that the interests o f the alleged abuser are important. Because validation methods are 
agreed to by the parties, as the testimony o f the claimants moves towards affecting the 
interests of others, the ability o f the group to assert the importance of its claims becomes 
more important If  the survivor’s group is able to assert the importance o f its interests in the 
negotiation arena where other interests are represented, then it will more able to agree upon 
a validation method that recognizes the significance of its members’ claims.
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C. Political empowerment
Foucault defines the relationship between power and discourse:
in a society such as ours, but basically in any society, there are manifold 
relations o f power which permeate, characterise and constitute the social 
body, and these relations o f power cannot themselves be established, 
consolidated nor implemented without the production, accumulation, 
circulation and functioning of a discourse.162
Further he advises that we must study power at the point “where it installs itself and produces 
its real effects”163.
In a dispute concerning institutional abuse, power manifests in two ways: it forms the subject 
matter o f the conflict as it was exercised abusively against residents o f institutions who are 
now seeking redress, and it operates in the negotiation to perpetuate an existing discourse 
that excludes the abused persons or maintains them in a position of subjugation. In order to 
re-configure the power relationship in the dispute resolution environment so that the initial 
abuse can be addressed and so that the existing power imbalance does not perpetuate itself, 
it is essential that the abuse survivor be able to assert a voice and contribute to discourse. 
Silence only perpetuates isolation within a space defined by the abuser.164 Testimony, or
162Supra note 54 at 93.
163 Ibid. at 97.
164If the abused person has enough strength to detach from the relationship without 
using detachment for communicating the effect o f the abuse upon her, then she has much 
strength but not much political power. In her act of detachment, she is not communicating 
her interests for the purpose of achieving a goal such as the re-configuration o f her
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public speech, is an important way through which a person conveys her sense o f what is 
important to the rest o f the world.
By political power I do not mean to imply the involvement o f formal political organizations 
in the negotiation process. It means the power that a group has to bring their experiences165 
into the public realm.166 Further, it means the power to assert the meaning o f those 
experiences, and the material interests that flow from these experiences, in the domain o f the 
negotiation process. Speaking about one’s experiences to another person or to a group of 
people who have had the same experience creates a form o f consciousness o f commonality. 
If the members o f the group derive similar meaning from their experiences, then that group 
has an identity. If  the group wishes to act together to achieve a common goal, then the group 
has a political aspect. Speech that is intended to further its goals, as they arise from their 
common experience, is political testimony.
relationship with the abuser. Rather, she is disengaging from the relationship entirely. This 
may be entirely appropriate and it may contribute to the eventual political power o f the 
survivor. However it is not material for the purposes o f  discussing the re-configuration o f 
power relationships that is possible when a dispute resolution process is engaged.
I65The act o f bringing experiences into the public realm can also be seen as an act of 
self-assertion. At any given moment, a person may identify themselves with a particular 
experience. In bringing an experience into the public consciousness, the person creates a 
particular socially constructed identity based on the experience. For example, the experience 
o f pain may be constructed as a particular culturally constructed syndrome in order for the 
person to identify with their bodily experience in a socially accepted way: see supra note 
82.
l66Section 715.1 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 formally recognizes the 
difficulty experienced by victims or survivors of abuse who are required to testify in court. 
This section facilitates the emergence o f  a private experience into the public realm. This 
section is discussed in L.(D.O.), infra note 169.
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In a non-judicial dispute resolution process, the operation o f  political testimony is not 
restricted within the parameters of the explicit process set out by the parties or the remedies 
sought by the parties. If  the parties are politically organized, political testimony operates 
before the negotiation takes place: it permeates the negotiation process itself, and it operates 
after the negotiation and remedies are concluded. As long as there is an identifiable group 
whose members share a common experience, political testimony has a role. Insofar as a 
negotiation process leads to the development of the group, the negotiation itself is part o f the 
empowerment process. Empowerment, however, is a much broader and more dynamic event 
than the particular negotiation process that may have served as a catalyst.
D. Types of testimony
In a dispute, testimony serves a variety of purposes for the speaker: it is a form of 
communication for therapeutic assistance before and during the process; it is the tool 
through which the group can articulate the interests o f its members to the other parties in a 
negotiation; it provides a record of the events that occurred; and in a judicial proceeding it 
allows the speaker to present his account of the abuse before a decision-maker. However, 
these various fora for testimony are not simply for the speaker; they are also designed to 
achieve particular disciplinary goals.
Within disciplines, testimony has different meanings and is used for different purposes.
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T estimony167 is a term o f art for legal practitioners; the use of testimony in legal proceedings 
is bound by statutory and common law rules o f evidence. Its purpose in the legal arena is 
to assist the decision-maker with establishing as true a picture as possible in order to reach 
a just decision.
(a) Testimony in a judicial proceeding
Within the courtroom testimony serves the purposes of the justice system. The fundamental 
goals of the law of evidence are the search for truth, efficiency in the trial process, and 
fairness in the trial process.168 Common law rules have developed incrementally over the 
years to produce fundamental values o f justice. Evidentiary rules however, can be applied 
in a flexible, principled way to accommodate the particularities of each case.
In theSupreme Court of Canada case R. v. L. (D.O.), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 419 [hereinafter 
“Z.(Z>.0./’]169, Justice L’Heureux-Dube considered the rules of evidence regarding the
l67For the purposes o f this thesis, I will use the term “legal testimony” to refer to the 
act of providing sworn testimony in a court of law. I will use the term “testimonial 
statement” and “testimony” to refer to the act of speaking of one’s experiences to another 
person for non-legal, as well as legal, purposes.
168J. Sopinka, S. Lederman, A. Bryant, eds., Law o f  Evidence in Canada (Toronto: 
Butterworths, 1999) at 3-5.
169Although this case deals with the criminal law, it is being used to outline the basic 
rules of evidence in adversarial, judicial proceedings. The author recognizes that criminal 
rules o f evidence operate within a context where the court is seeking to find guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt for allegations of public wrongdoing, and that civil actions engage in fact­
finding for the purpose of assessing pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages for private 
wrongs. However, in the context o f discussing the nature of legal testimony in judicial
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testimony o f children in child sexual abuse cases. She examined section 715.1 o f the 
Criminal Code which is designed to accommodate the needs o f  young victims o f sexual 
abuse. In particular, the section provides that early videotaped evidence can be adduced in 
court so that trauma is reduced for adolescent complainants while at the same time 
maintaining the integrity of evidence. L’Heureux-Dube J. considered the accused’s 
arguments that the admission of videotaped evidence offends the right of the accused to a fair 
trial because it limits the right to cross-examination and admits hearsay evidence. The main 
argument in support o f this position was stated by the judge at the Manitoba Court o f Appeal 
in the decision below:
Section715.1 clearly offends the common law evidentiary rule that precludes 
the admission in evidence of previous consistent statements. . . . The 
legislation ignores two fundamental elements o f the criminal trial process 
which have developed in our judicial system over the centuries:
1) the general principle that evidence must be presented in a 
public courtroom, in the presence o f the accused, 
accompanied by some formality; and
2) the right o f a accused to be present when evidence is 
presented or recorded in order to have the opportunity to test 
the evidence by cross-examination o f  the witness.170
L’Heureux-Dube J,. for the majority, found that section 715.1 did not offend these long­
proceedings as opposed to non-judicial proceedings, the difference between civil and 
criminal evidentiary rules is not material.
170 Ibid. at 433-434
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standing common law rules because “truth cannot be attained in a vacuum”171. Rather, she 
advocated a contextual approach. Particularly she found that “the innate power imbalance 
between the numerous young women and girls who are the victims o f sexual abuse at the 
hands o f almost exclusively male perpetrators cannot be underestimated when ‘truth’ is being 
sought before a male-defined criminal justice system”172. She aptly quoted another legal 
scholar who stated, “(t)he fundamental question remains: how can ‘truth’ be an outcome of 
a process which restricts and actively denies the experiences o f one o f the major players?” 173 
L’Heureux-Dube found that section 715.1 preserves evidence in such a way as to assist in 
the discovery o f truth in the trial process by allowing for the inclusion of the evidence of a 
crucial party.
In this case, the Supreme Court gave serious consideration to changing the rules of 
testimonial evidence in order to facilitate truth determination while recognizing the need for 
contextuality. Goals o f legal testimony remain intact to ensure that the court can determine 
the legitimacy of truth-claims made by the parties. Fact-finding, and the pursuit o f  truth 
regarding a series o f  past events remain at the core o f the judicial process. Experts from 
within the dominant discourse were relied upon by the Supreme Court in a manner which 
enabled the speech o f a non-dominant actor to be heard. The rules o f legal discourse proved 
to be flexible enough to accommodate the influence o f another dominant discourse.
l7'lbid. at 446.
172Ibid. at 441.
™Ibid. at 444.
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(b) Non-legal forms o f  testimony
In an historical174 setting, the giving o f  testimony is for the purpose o f establishing an 
accurate record o f events, according to the personal experiences o f the people who witnessed 
or were involved in the events. Historians175 and other social scientists insist upon
174Given the historic nature of institutional abuse, I wonder if historians may have the 
appropriate skills and methodology to determine the facts around events that would have 
occurred between 10 and 60 years ago. However, with historic testimony there is the same 
problem o f particular discourses dominating over others. For example, written 
documentation often provides historians with the factual foundation. However those with 
oral traditions or who do not have access to records will be excluded from the historical 
account. Although in R. v. Delgamuu/cw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 the Supreme Court of 
Canada recognizes that oral histories are admissible for the purposes of determining the 
intentions o f Aboriginal treaties, Canadian courts would not necessarily recognize the oral 
history o f parties with no cultural or traditional practice o f establishing an oral history. Also, 
those who dominate often control the historical account provided for posterity. As stated by 
Edward Said “the power to narrate, or to block other narratives from forming and emerging, 
is very important to culture and imperialism, and constitutes one of the main connections 
between them”: E. Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf: 1994) atxiii. 
O f further interest, a researcher for the United Church has done an historical study of Indian 
residential schools and asserts that the schools were not as detrimental as claimed by many 
Aboriginal people. In effect he is using historical validation methods to delegitimate the 
claims made by former residents of the schools. Quaere whether his historical method and 
research was geared towards reaching his conclusion or whether it was open to discovering 
the opposite conclusion: see R. Foot, “Researcher Defends Residential Schools” The 
National Post (17 March 2001).
175With respect to historical testimony, the Reconciliation agreement between the 
primary victims o f George Epoch and the Jesuit Fathers o f Upper Canada provided for a 
recorders report o f the abusive events. The recorder states that the purpose o f the report is 
the following:
to ‘outline the relevant history of the Epoch abuse’. It is to make known 
people’s ‘ observations of the impact o f Epoch’s abuse, upon the victims 
themselves and upon the community as a whole’.
The provision o f a recorder serves a therapeutic and historic function. It is therapeutic
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verifiability in order to lend credibility to the stories provided through testimonies.176 In the 
psychoanalytic environment, testimony o f trauma given by the analysand and heard by the 
analyst enable the analysand to re-extemalize the event and thus commence to therapeutic 
process.177 In this arena there is an acknowledgment of the highly subjective nature of the 
testimony. Unlike where testimony is given for historical purposes, in a therapeutic setting 
the fact of the testimony itself is significant as opposed to the verifiability of the facts 
represented by the testimony.178 The health professional is not placed to doubt the patient’s 
account of events but rather to deal with sequelae that arise from the subject’s reaction or 
involvement in the reported events179. In the political environment, testimony is used for 
political mobilization and consciousness raising to establish a common group identity and 
group cohesion. A person who recounts a significant personal experience can, in the act of 
sharing it with others, contribute to political conviction and activism. Again, external
because the act of testifying about one’s own trauma before a witness for the purpose of 
making it public allows for the significant personal experience of abuse to be acknowledged 
and legitimated by broader society. It is historic in that is establishes a record of a significant 
societal event in the words of the survivors: see Marion L. Mussell, “Recorder’s Report 
Written for the Survivors: ‘In the Spirit o f Healing’” (Reconciliation Implementation 
Committee: October 1995) at 1.
176S. Felman and D. Laub, Testimony: Crisis o f  Witnessing in Literature, 
Psychoanalysis and History (New York: Routledge, 1992) at 61.
117Ibid. at 69.
ll8Ibid. 62.
179Although Shengold states the following: “ I believe patient and analyst must strive 
for both narrative and historical truth - falling back on narrative when the historical recedes, 
but a narrative supplied whenever possible by the patient, not the analyst”: supra note 78 at 
35.
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verifiability180 is not essential as it is within the legal or historical arenas because the 
subjective experience and its relevance to the collective reality of a group is what lends 
legitimacy and force to political empowerment181.
E. Conflicting Testimonial Purposes
So far, I have tracked survivor speech from its emergence from the imposed privacy of the 
abuser, through the safe, non-judgmental, personal space of the listener, to its eventual 
development into a form o f testimony. I have argued that once a group has a purpose, it 
becomes political in nature. The speech o f the group and its members is political testimony. 
I have argued that all forms o f public speech or testimony require some degree of validation, 
depending upon its purpose. Political speech that is for the purpose o f the establishment of 
the group requires validation from within the group. This form of testimony is necessary for 
defining group identity before the assertion o f interests in a negotiation to develop remedies 
for abuse. If  the testimony o f group members is asserted outside the group for the purpose 
o f obtaining a remedy, then the level o f validation may be different, depending upon the 
other interests of other parties who are affected by the claims. I have examined the treatment 
o f testimony in the legal arena and the ability of the court to change its rules while still
180By external verifiability, I mean the verification ofpolitical testimony from outside 
the group which is represented by the testimony. Political testimony requires verification 
from within the group but not beyond it.
181bell hooks, Talking back, thinking feminist, thinking black (Toronto: Between the 
Lines, 1988). hooks notes that confession and memory enable men and women to talk about 
personal experience as part o f a process of politicization. She notes the importance of 
theorizing personal experience so as to place it within the context o f a collective reality.
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maintaining justice goals. I have also set out the various testimonial types depending upon 
the purposes of the listener and the speaker. In the next section, I will explore some of the 
difficulties that can occur when there are two purposes for the same testimony.
(a) Therapeutic and Historical Testimony
Different testimonial purposes operating in the same space sometimes conflict in a manner 
that creates doubt about the legitimacy of the testimony. For example, a witness of 
Holocaust events whose testimony is viewed by historians and psychoanalysts creates 
completely different impressions upon these two types o f professionals. Psychoanalyst Dori 
Laub describes a Holocaust witness testifying about a prisoner revolt at Auschwitz.182 The 
witness recalled a significant event where prisoners had blown up part of the Auschwitz 
prison camp. In her testimony she stated that four chimney stacks had been blown up when 
in fact only one had been blown up. The historians who reviewed the case felt that the 
discrepancy made her eye-witness account hopelessly incomplete - in other words, 
unreliable. A psychoanalyst who reviewed the case felt that the woman was testifying to a 
more radical event - the reality of the unimaginable event o f a prisoners’ revolt that broke 
the status quo framework o f life at Auschwitz. The exaggeration or mistake in her testimony 
did not invalidate her testimony. Rather,the discovery o f the knowledge of the patient was 
an event in its own right. As Laub states, it was “the very process of her bearing witness to
lilSupra note 176 at 59-63.
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the trauma she had lived through, that helped her now come to know the event” 183. The 
difference between disciplinary approaches and norms is noticeable in this instance. Where 
actors in one discipline discounted the testimony, actors in another discipline accepted and 
legitimated her account.
(b) Therapeutic and legal testimonies in non-judicial processes
This type o f conflict about the meaning and import of testimony will likely arise in dispute 
resolution arenas where there is lack o f clarity about the purpose of the process. In a judicial 
decision-making process, only legal testimony is admissible for the purposes o f resolving the 
dispute. The legal decision relies on the judge’s determination of the appropriate legal 
doctrine or standard to be applied and the correct application of that doctrine given the 
specific circumstances o f the case. In a negotiation process, however, there is room for the 
parties to have goals other than the achievement o f justice. Persons can “testify” about their 
experiences for a variety of purposes. As negotiation processes may be specifically agreed 
upon by the parties for the particular dispute at hand, the use and meaning of testimony can 
be tailored to the needs o f the parties.
In a negotiation, justice is not the only goal and may not be paramount over other goals such 
as healing or the establishment o f a record o f events. The various parties seek an agreement 
that is advantageous to their interests. In a non-judicial conflict resolution setting, both the
m Ibid. at 62.
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rules for admission o f evidence to support truth-claims, facts, and the norms used to reach 
agreement are potentially much more varied and less rule-bound. Precedents do not bind the 
parties as the rules have been previously agreed upon by the parties for the specific program. 
Conflict resolution programs potentially also allow for the interplay and involvement of 
various disciplinary discourses184 in a manner agreed to by the parties.185 Thus, the 
contribution o f psychotherapists or social historians can have a broader impact on the 
program than would be the case within judicial proceedings where their information would 
have to meet the strict requirements o f  expert testimony in order to be admissible.
Before the Compensation Program was negotiated, complainants had a chance to tell their 
stories o f abuse to Justice Stratton and his investigators. One o f the stated purposes of the 
Stratton Inquiry was to investigate incidents of sexual or physical abuse o f residents of 
provincial institutions.186 Stratton states that he and his investigators had very little 
opportunity to test the credibility of what was being told, testimony was not sworn, there was 
little corroborative evidence and the investigators did not use adversarial methods of cross- 
examination. Nevertheless he was prepared to generally accept the reliability o f what he was
184As Foucault states “disciplines have their own discourse. They engender . . . 
apparatuses for knowledge (savoir) and a multiplicity o f new domains of understanding” : 
supra note 54 at 106.
I85The conflict between a system o f dispute resolution that is highly rule bound by 
normative rules versus a system that allows for rules to be developed and based on 
sociological fact is discussed at a philosophical level by Jurgen Habermas in Between Facts 
and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory o f  Law and Democracy, trans. William 
Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).
186iSupra note 11 at iv.
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we adopted the practice o f  taking down in long-hand and in their own words, 
the statement o f those who came forward to speak to us....residents should 
feel encouraged to tell fully their stories ...in their own words...without 
intimidation and without any fear that we would try to shape or colour that 
which they wished to report.188
In addition, he states later in the Report that he wants the complainants to know that, “we 
have listened with care to their stories and have sympathy for them”189. Further, in order to 
encourage the complainants to speak, they were promised that their stories would be kept 
confidential and their names not disclosed. Thus, there was some privacy or personal space 
for the complainant and the testimonial statements provided at this stage were not fully 
public.
The amount of control over the statement-taking process, the lack o f challenge or verification 
o f testimony, and the promise o f privacy point to the conclusion that Justice Stratton was 
closer to being a sympathetic listener than an evaluator of testimony. This may have been 
appropriate at this state given that the government wanted complainants to come forward so 
the possible extent of the abuse could be determined.
Once the Compensation Program was set up, the same investigators who had assisted Justice
181 Ibid. at at 100.
l88Ibid. at 99.
imIbid. at 103.
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Stratton were hired to take statements for the Compensation Program. Initially the Program 
seemed geared toward providing the abuse claimants with an opportunity to heal. In one o f 
the first press releases the Minister stated the following:
The ADR process has been carefully chosen because it is designed to protect 
the privacy of the victim. The process is an alternative to civil litigation. It is 
driven by a victims' advocacy group190. It empowers survivors by giving them 
control~an essential component o f the healing process~by giving them an 
opportunity for input into the negotiation of the framework agreement.191
In addition, one of the MOU’s stated goals was “to assist the Survivors, in a tangible way, 
with the healing process”192. This is consistent with the head o f the Victims’ Services office 
o f the Department o f Justice being responsible for running the Program. As further evidence 
o f  recognition within the Program for the need for therapeutic healing, the government 
provided interim counseling awards to enable claimants to obtain therapy before their claims 
were assessed and the government provided a set counseling amount over and above the 
amount o f the compensation award, depending upon the category of the compensation193. 
The Program itself, though, arose within the parameters of the civil tort system.
190Although the initial intention as stated by this press release was to have a single 
advocacy group, in actuality the negotiations were between the lawyers retained by 
individual claimants, and government officials. Although the claimants’ lawyers may have 
worked together, the claimants themselves did not form a single advocacy group.
m Supra note 28.
I92See the preamble section o f the MOU: supra note 30.
193Please see, schedule A o f the MOU for the counseling amounts that were provided 
once the claims were assessed: supra note 30.
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After being in operation for six months, the Program was suspended by the Minister of 
Justice on October 31, 1996194. When the Program resumed195 several changes had been 
made unilaterally and announced by the government. Of particular interest the following 
changes were outlined in the press release:
• the internal investigation unit (UU) was to expand its investigation from discipline 
of current employees to investigation of compensation claims;
• a statement protocol was to be developed between the RCMP, IIU and Facts Probe 
Inc. (the independent investigation firm hired to obtain statements from victims for 
the Stratton Report). All three organizations were to share information, and 
investigations were to be coordinated, recognizing the independence o f police 
investigations; and,
• victims were now to be advised that all statements provided for the purpose of 
compensation would be used for investigative purposes (whether criminal or 
disciplinary) or the Child Abuse Registry.196
The Minister stated in his press release that “(w)e understand it has been difficult for people 
to come forward, and their wish for confidentiality, but we have a moral and legal obligation
w  Supra note 23.
195Supra note 31.
l96Supra note 31.
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After December 6, 1996 the primary goal was no longer therapeutic. It seems that justice 
goals became paramount and the method for taking claimant statements changed to 
accommodate the new goals. Also, the testimonial audience changed from being the Stratton 
investigators to now being the RCMP and the Internal Investigation Unit officials. The 
problem, of course, is that the claimants themselves may not have foreseen the shift in 
approaches at the time o f  the initial negotiation. Earlier testimony was taken for therapeutic 
purposes, and hence the interviewer may not have challenged or tested the testimony against 
the accounts of those who were alleged to have committed the abuse. They also may not 
have taken the testimony in accordance with the methodology of legal investigators. That 
is, the original statement would not have been subject to the validation required for a 
statement in a legal or quasi-Iegal process. The change in testimonial purpose would lead 
the later testimonial audience to wonder whether their need to establish the reliability of the 
statements was addressed by the original statement-taker.
If  there had been a bifurcation o f the therapeutic aspect o f the program from the other forms 
o f redress, then the different levels of validation required at each stage would have been 
understood at the outset. If  the survivors had known that their claims would be subjected to 
higher scrutiny as they affected the interests o f others, then the parties would not have
191 Ibid.
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confused the validation required at different stages in the process. Beyond that, if  the 
claimants’ had formed a group that could have asserted the importance of their interests with 
a sufficient degree o f political power, the government may have been more able to assert its 
own interests and limitations at the outset. The validation method for assessing testimony 
could therefore have more accurately reflected the real interests o f the parties.198
As it is, there is still controversy over the design and implementation of the Program, as 
evidenced by the establishment of the Institutional Abuse Response Inquiry. Perhaps the 
confusion around the validation method and the purposes of testimony contributed to the 
existing controversy and questions about the legitimacy o f the Program..
In the Grandview Agreement in Ontario, the survivors did form a group which attended the 
negotiations. The agreement to compensate was ratified by 80% of the group’s 
membership.199 A validation method that served the interests of all parties was included in 
the agreement. This agreement and the resulting program did not seem to create the same 
degree of controversy with the parties or the public as the Compensation Program did in 
Nova Scotia. Although there are probably many reasons for this, I would suggest that the
198In any process where the government is a party, it is important for the government 
to clearly articulate the full extent of limitations upon its ability to negotiate. For example, 
there is some argument to be made that any compensation program administered by a 
government automatically falls within the parameters o f administrative law. Therefore the 
government is not like a private party who is free to negotiate a legal contract; rather there 
are public law considerations to be taken into account.
199Supra note 5 at 129-130.
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formation o f apolitical group that had significant input into the design of the process played 
a role in developing an enduring solution through a process that was clear and consistent for 
all the parties involved.
I further suggest that if the claimants in Nova Scotia had formed a political group before the 
negotiations and had been given a chance to develop political testimony, they may have been 
able to establish their interests and negotiate the requisite level o f validation required to 
assert these interests in the public, negotiation arena. For example, if  they wanted to pursue 
a purely therapeutic goal in the negotiation with the government, they could assert a 
relatively low validation level commensurate with that goal. This level o f validation may 
more easily be accepted by the other party as the subjective nature o f the claims affect them 
less than legal claims. If they wanted to seek monetary compensation, then they may have 
faced a validation level proposed by the other party that establishes a level o f truth 
commensurate with their interests. If they wanted to develop a restorative process or 
establish quasi-criminal guilt, then a higher level of validation may result from the fact that 
criminal sanctions are considered to seriously affect the interests of alleged abusers. As the 
goal affects the interests of others in more invasive ways, the level of validation increases. 
In consistently promoting the formation of a political group that could define its own 
interests, it would be easier for any government to consolidate and represent its own interests 
and limitations.
(c) Summary
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Public speech about one’s experiences is characterized by the intent or purpose of the speech, 
the type of process and the nature of the listener. Testimony in the legal arena is for one 
particular purpose, it is heard within the bound o f specific rules and is verified through 
established procedures. Other forms of testimony may be admitted, but only within the 
bounds of legal rules that ensure that the goal o f justice remain paramount. In a negotiation 
environment, there is room for other forms of testimony depending upon the goals articulated 
by the parties. However, if  these goals are not clearly articulated, the parties will be 
confused about the type o f testimony that is being provided. The speaker may intend for 
testimony to be closer to therapeutic testimony. However, since the process still exists 
within the legal discourse, the testimonial form within the process may become more legal. 
Therefore, confusion about the goals of the process can have the negative effect of confusing 
or invalidating the testimony provided by claimants once they are in the process.
In the legal arena, at least the parameters that limit testimony are clear from the outset. In a 
non-judicial dispute resolution process designed by the parties, it is easier for survivor speech 
to be shut down if  the goals o f the process are not clear, and the limitations inherent in the 
process are also not clear. Although it is not always possible to prevent a unilateral shift in 
the goals o f a particular process200, the parties should at least ensure that their goals are 
clearly defined before they design the process.
200Lawyers for the claimants did bring a mandamus application to compel the Nova 
Scotia government to comply with the terms of the original MOU. This application was 
dropped before going to court. See: D.K.A. et al v. The Minister ofJustice fo r  the Province 
o f Nova Scotia (April, 1997), Halifax S.H. 137031(N.S.S.C.).
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In a case like the one in Nova Scotia, where there were many individual claimants, the 
formation of a group that can develop common interests before the negotiation may be the 
only way to effectively assert survivor speech and validation methods against dominant 
discourses. It is therefore important that the survivor speech be articulated in a public forum 
where its subjective nature is legitimated by others who share the same purpose. This form 
o f speech is political testimony.
F. Pre-negotiation testimony
Throughout my thesis, my concern is primarily with the events around an actual dispute 
resolution process - both the preparation for the process and the conceptualization o f  the 
remedy. In the previous section of this chapter, I described some o f the ways in which the 
Nova Scotia Program operated. I did so for the purpose o f illustrating the importance of 
having clear goals for the process so that the testimony o f  the claimants is not undermined. 
For a previously disenfranchised group, testifying about traumatic experiences may result 
in a window o f opportunity that allows for the exercise o f political power.
However this window is created among the long-standing and pre-existing knowledge o f the 
dominant discourse. Society may only be willing to listen to parts o f the group’s experience; 
only certain voices will be acceptable and only certain testimony will be understood. Within 
this small window o f opportunity, a disenfranchised group is faced with the daunting task 
o f exercising power in such a way that it is preserved. If the power o f the group is preserved,
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the interests o f the group can be asserted so that their collective experiences can enter the 
knowledge base of society. Thus, the previously disenfranchised group can contribute a 
popular form ofknowledge to the already accepted forms ofknowledge within the discursive 
arena.
G. Political testimony
The problem of asserting political testimony is described by Foucault’s description of 
popular or disqualified, low-ranking knowledge which is incapable of unanimity and which 
“owes its force only to the harshness with which it is opposed by everything surrounding 
it”201. He places the local knowledge of psychiatric patients, delinquents and others in this 
category of disqualified knowledges. Foucault argues that in establishing an historical record 
o f these subjugated knowledges he does the following:
entertain(s) the claims to attention of local, discontinuous, disqualified, 
illegitimate knowledges against the claims of a unitary body of theory which 
would filter, hierarchise and order them in the name o f some true knowledge 
and some arbitrary idea of what constitutes a science and its objects.202
Foucault is questioning the tendency o f non-scientific knowledge forms to absorb subjugated 
knowledges and then characterize themselves as scientific or pseudo-scientific203 in order to
m Supra note 54 at 82.
202Supra note 54 at 83.
203In “Feminist Histories o f Psychiatry”, Nancy Tomes states the following: “to 
justify this process o f expulsion (removal of the disturbing presence of the mentally ill from
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The physical knowledge o f persons who have been abused in institutions is precisely a form 
of subjugated knowledge which potentially becomes suppressed by disciplinary discourses 
that use scientific method to objectify and re-interpret the experiences o f abuse. In order for 
abused persons to assert a new knowledge form based on theirphysical experiences o f abuse, 
it is important that they do not become lost under the objectifying discourses of experts. 
That is, their knowledge o f what occurred should not be overridden by the theoretical 
knowledge of experts who ignore those who have experienced abuse. Where the abuser once 
took control o f the abused person and imposed meaning within a false private space, it is 
within the capacity o f experts to use a dominating discourse to maintain the privacy of the 
abusive experience by not hearing the speech o f the abused person. Experts who do not 
recognize the validity o f experience can perpetuate a form of subjugation upon abused 
persons who are attempting to create new meaning for their experiences.
For example, recall the psychologist to whom M. first disclosed her incestuous relationship 
with her father. His disciplinary training either prevented him from hearing the significance 
of her speech or from understanding the new meaning that she was trying to convey. If he
the community) psychiatry has obligingly provided a “medical model” o f insanity, which 
gave its practitioners tremendous power and social rewards. But, in fact, as the labeling 
theorists were determined to show, the psychiatric ‘science’ o f diagnosing and treating 
mental illness was a thinly disguised form of social control.”: see N. Tomes, supra note 154 
at 354. This statement affirms Foucault’s view o f the dominating effect o f scientific 
discourse.
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had been able to recognize, prima facie , that as someone who had experienced incest, she 
was an expert with respect to the effects of the abuse on her physical and emotional self, then 
he might have been able to hear the import o f her speech. As it was, his lack of attention to 
the significance o f her speech served to acquiesce to her father’s re-imposition o f privacy 
around the abusive relationship.
(a) Nova Scotia
In the Nova Scotia Program, the testimonials of abuse provided to the Stratton Inquiry, along 
with the criminal and civil cases that had already been concluded, opened up a brief window 
or space in the web o f dominant knowledge about institutions in Nova Scotia. During the 
period when testimonies were heard, the claimants negotiated with the government to 
develop a compensation scheme. As noted earlier in this paper, the employees who were 
affected by the allegations of abuse made claims in the media that the level of validation was 
not sufficient to protect their interests. At this point in time, there is great uncertainty about 
both the legitimacy o f  the testimonials and the legitimacy o f the employees’ protests of 
innocence.
As seen in the Nova Scotia Program, new disruptive speech, coming from a disenfranchised 
person who is speaking about the conditions of disenfranchisement, is almost certainly going 
to produce some form o f resistance from those who are entrenched in a social world steeped 
in dominant discourse. The claimants’ stories seem to have been initially accepted as being
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true. The existing fabric o f  knowledge in the world was initially unsettled by new 
knowledge with the latent political power that exists in proportion to the degree to which it 
was repressed. When former employees asserted that there was no possibility that the abuse 
was as widespread as alleged, public opinion seemed to shift toward believing the claims of 
hard-working counselors and former counselors who had been care-givers for sometimes 
difficult children. Both claims are as yet unsubstantiated or validated according to a 
mutually accepted standard.
If the disruptive claims o f abuse survivors are asserted through a political group, then there 
is at least some political power to provide the space for the assertion o f the new speech. 
However, even with the protection of a group, there is still the risk that the group itself will 
be challenged as to its validity. That is, in its attempt to achieve social empowerment by re­
configuring the relationship o f the group to other groups in society, a political group will face 
pressure to conform to the pre-existing situation o f powerlessness. How can a political group 
deal with pressure from status quo actors who carry pre-existing legitimacy?
H. Validate political testimony
The difficulty in asserting a popular political form of testimony against the status quo may 
be explored through the controversy surrounding Rigoberta Menchu’s testimonial account 
o f her political struggles and the efforts to invalidate her testimony by social anthropologist, 
David Stoll.
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Menchu won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1992 for raising awareness o f human rights abuses 
in Guatamala. In 1983, when Menchu was 23 years old, she dictated her experiences to a 
writer who transcribed the tapes into the book, IRigoberta Menchu204. The book chronicled 
her life from a very young age and described a series o f tragic events in her life such as the 
murder o f her brother, father and mother. The testimonial nature of the account in her book 
contributed to her political cause and also gave her a political profile that enabled her to 
become a candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize. In 1999 an American anthropologist by the 
name of David Stoll published a book outlining the results o f his investigation into the 
veracity o f the testimony in I, Rigoberta Menchu. Stoll claims that although the extent of 
abuse by the Guatamalan regime is very real, some crucial personal accounts provided by 
Menchu are not. Stoll believes that Menchu’s book carries more authority than is warranted 
on the issues of why the killings began and the nature of the popular struggle in Guatamala. 
As he states:
(I)n 1982 she presented herself as an eyewitness to the mobilization of her 
people. There is not a stronger claim to authority. . . . Rigoberta told her 
story well enough that it became invested with all the authority that a story 
o f terrible suffering can assume. From the unquestionable atrocities of the 
Guatamalan army, her credibility stretched farther than it should have, into 
the murkier background question o f why the violence occurred. The result 
was to mystify the conditions facing peasants, what they thought their 
problems were, how the killing started, and how they reacted to it.
(The problem).. .  .also extends into the international apparatus for reporting 
human rights violations, reacting to them, and interpreting their implications 
for the future...(H)ow do the gatekeepers of communication deal with the
204R. Menchu, E.Burgos-Debray, I  Rigoberta Menchu: An Indian Woman in 
Guatamala, trans. Ann Wright (London: Verso, 1984).
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mixture o f truth and falsehood in any movement’s portrayal o f  itself, 
including those we feel morally obliged to support?205
Stoll cannot easily be dismissed as a reactionary with a racist agenda. He is a serious scholar 
who is grappling with his role as a social scientist in the face of post-modern skepticism 
about the possibility of objective knowledge206. He understands the effect o f colonialist 
thought upon peoples who are studied by anthropologists and sees the reasoning behind 
deferring to the perspective of those same peoples. What Stoll is trying to wrestle with is 
how to defer to the perspective o f subordinate peoples without mythologizing particular 
voices at the expense of others. He questions the role of academics who choose to privilege 
voices that are more compelling and attractive than the voices of others which, although 
genuine, lose the battle for the academic or popular stage.
He relies on the empirical and scientific method located within his social-scientific discourse 
to bolster his version of the truth. He plays the role o f the legitimating expert who objectifies 
the experience o f survivors o f trauma. He has the authority o f credentials that are rooted in 
a dominant discourse to back his claims. But Stoll’s critique is based on the assumption that 
Menchu is attempting to represent the truth through an objective discourse when she is in 
fact representing her subjective experiences as a member o f a group.207 The key supporting
205D. Stoll, Rigoberta Menchu and the story o f  all poor Guatamalans (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1999) at x.
206Ibid. at 12.
207This is not to say that her subjective account is not truthful; only that she is 
claiming validity based on her actual experiences and the experiences o f  her people as
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This is my testimony. I didn’t learn it from a book and I didn’t leam it alone.
I’d like to stress that it’s not only my life, it’s also the testimony of my 
people. It’s hard for me to remember everything that’s happened to me in my 
life since there have been many very bad times but yes, moments o f joy as 
well. The important thing is that what has happened to me has happened to 
many other people too: My story is the story of all poor Guatamalans. My 
personal experience is the reality o f a whole people.208
Her method o f speech brings more focus upon the intent o f the speaker as opposed to the 
intent of the listener. Menchu establishes in this statement that through her speech, she is 
representing the experiences o f many other people in her group.
Not only does he claim that Menchu’s version of events is untrue. He also claims that she 
misrepresented the political concerns o f her people. According to Stoll, peasants saw 
guerillas and soldiers as enemies whereas Menchu characterizes guerillas as freedom fighters 
who had the support o f peasants. He asserts that the prewar conditions described by Menchu 
were not the same as the conditions described by the peasants. According to Stoll, leftist 
guerillas were responsible for igniting violence against the peasants209. In other words, he 
claims that Menchu distorted her testimony in order to gain the political stage.
opposed to relying upon the external validation provided by external corroboration.
208Supra note 204 at 1.
209Supra note 205 at 9.
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Stoll does not recognize the inherently political nature o f the testimonies that he collects to 
challenge Menchu’s story. Menchu and her group were asserting their subjective account 
o f what occurred in Guatamala against the existing knowledge, or lack of knowledge, o f the 
impact o f the government’s action upon her people. Their knowledge, based upon physical 
experiences o f oppression, cannot automatically be negated by another group whose truth- 
claims have no higher source than physical experience.
But Stoll does interview other Guatamalans who claim that Menchu’s account o f her 
physical experiences were not accurate. It is not clear, however, why he assumes that the 
“peasants” that he interviews have no political affiliation and do not benefit from 
propogating a particular version of events. Stoll sought out testimonies of people who, even 
if they had no political agenda, had only one perspective within the group. Why does he 
believe that their political perspective on the cause o f violence and the nature o f the enemy 
has more credence than Menchu? Stoll’s position as a social scientist illustrates my earlier 
point about non-scientific disciplines that adopt the trappings of scientific discourse to 
validate their truth-claims. I would argue that Stoll’s claim to political neutrality is false as 
his action have the political impact o f validating status quo understandings o f the limited 
legitimacy of popular political groups.
Stoll is attempting to undermine Menchu’s political legitimacy from outside the political 
group. His words have the effect o f exerting pressure from the arena of dominant discourse 
upon the political group that supports Menchu. I would argue that Stoll is a member of a 
dominant group, not only by virtue o f the fact that he is a North American and thereby
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economically and politically privileged, but also by virtue o f his academic credentials and 
position. His academic peer group and his collective group have helped to establish his 
legitimacy as a scholar. Perhaps he would not easily accept attacks on his expertise easily 
from people outside of his peer group or his cultural milieu.
If Menchu truly does not reflect the experiences or the identity of the group, then it is up to 
the group to invalidate her speech. Claims that Menchu’s testimony does not reflect the 
genuine experience o f the people she says she represents can only really be made by the 
people themselves. They are the only ones who truly know the significance and meaning of 
their own experience and whether it is reflected by the individual speaker. I argue that it is 
up to the group to decide whether Menchu accurately portrayed the collective experience of 
the group with her political testimony. It is not up to some from an external group, who may 
have dominant status, to decide whether or not her testimony is legitimate. Popular 
knowledge should not be subject to external validation when academic disciplines such as 
anthropology do not require external legitimation. The knowledge derived from the physical 
experience of having lived through oppression in Guatamala should be recognized as a form 
of expertise for the purpose of validating the testimony of a member or leader of the group. 
I would suggest that it is more daunting to make false claims o f oppression where one must 
receive validation from people who have experienced abuse o f power than it is to make false 
claims to someone who has not.
Menchu and the Auschwitz survivor were recounting subjective accounts of significant 
events; these acts of oppression happened. For the Auschwitz survivor, the meaning of the
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experience was very personal; the act of giving therapeutic testimony was important in itself 
for the purpose of survival210 and did not require verification. For Menchu, speaking of her 
experiences of abuse by the Guatamalan regime brought significant personal events into the 
collective psyche for the survival o f the political group. Her political testimony requires 
verification, but only within the group that she represents. Speaking o f her personal 
experiences o f trauma brings them into the collective psyche and demands recognition within 
the dominant discourse. Within the political arena, an intentional liar will only discredit the 
legitimacy o f the political group insofar as it is unrepresentative of the experiences o f the 
collective.211 Presumably if  the group does not have members who derive meaning from a 
common experience, then the group will have no cohesion.
I. Conclusions
2l0Supra note 176 at 78.
21 ‘The problem inherent in validating political speech is the fact that internal political 
struggles will influence which speakers will be privileged with the right to represent the 
group. I would suggest that i f  the speaker who represents the group does not adequately 
represent the political interests o f the individual, then that individual will have to assess 
whether it is worth trying to form another group that more closely reflects the meaning of her 
experiences. The downside o f course is the weakening o f political power through 
fragmentation of the group. Stoll seems to be doubting the extent o f  Menchu’s support 
within her group. I would still assert, however, that it is up to the group members to extract 
themselves from the political group rather than having an outsider correct the power base and 
membership. In the Scotia situation, the group o f claimants was not homogeneous. Both 
males and females claimed abuse, claimants came from various geographic communities as 
well as racial groups, there were claimants with disabilities, and claimants who had resided 
in different institutions. Although they may have had different experiences, various 
claimants could still have formed groups to assert their respective interests. See J. Packer, 
“On the Content of Minority Rights” in J. Raikka, ed., Do We Need Minority Rights? 
(Netherlands: Kluwer Law Int’l, 1996).
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Once an abused person decides to bring her experiences into the public realm, she will lose 
some control over the fate o f  her testimony. Her speech will fall within a particular 
disciplinary realm where the rules and methods of the listener will attribute meaning to her 
speech. The meaning that the speaker intends, will be mediated by the listener’s disciplinary 
filter. For example, in the legal arena, testimony has meaning only insofar as it furthers the 
purposes of the justice system. Although courts may be willing to accommodate the needs 
o f the witness, as legitimated through another disciplinary discourse, the goals and principles 
o f justice remain paramount and testimony must exist within those parameters. In a non­
judicial dispute resolution process, there may be a multiplicity o f goals that are related to 
different disciplines.
One problem with having various goals within one process is that there is a risk that the 
nature o f the testimony and the required level of validation will not be clear. To illustrate 
this assertion, I examined the shift in statement-taking protocols and purposes in the Nova 
Scotia Compensation Program as described by the government in its press releases. I suggest 
that lack of clarity in the program design jeopardized its legitimacy. The lack o f legitimacy 
o f the process also leads to loss o f legitimacy of the testimony in the process. So conflicting 
purposes in a process can lead to challenges to the testimony o f claimants.
In order to protect survivor speech, there needs to be a new form o f validating discourse that 
can retain the subjective nature o f speech. The best way for this to be done is through a 
group of survivors where the members validate the testimony through their own “expertise”. 
Once in the more public space o f the dispute resolution process, different validation levels
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will reflect the relative importance of the interests forwarded by the parties. The ability of 
the parties to assert the importance of their interests will influence the degree to which they 
can assert a validation method for their testimony. A group o f survivors that can create space 
for individual testimony and that can use the power of the group to assert the importance of 
testimony will be better able to contribute to the determination of validation methods in the 
negotiation arena.
However, even when a group forms and asserts its voice, its popular political nature will be 
challenged by disciplines which are more highly situated in the hierarchy of knowledge than 
the subjugated group within the dominant discourse. To illustrate this point, I examined the 
controversy surrounding the legitimacy of Rigoberta Menchu’s testimonial account of 
oppression in Guatamala. Stoll, an anthropologist, situated in a discourse with its own 
methodology and validation techniques, questions the legitimacy of Menchu’s account of her 
experiences. He also doubts her political legitimacy within her group. I argue that Menchu’s 
legitimacy as a political speaker should not be determined by experts from a discourse 
external to her own. In the same way that Stoll gained legitimacy as an anthropologist from 
others within his discipline, so too should Menchu be able to gain legitimacy from within her 
own group of “experts”. Only in this way will the group retain legitimacy and integrity with 
its membership. In maintaining connection to the subjective experiences o f the individuals 
in the group, the group itself will be able to protect survivor speech while resisting pressure 
from dominating discourses.
J. Recommendations
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1) When the person has been able to reach beyond the imposed privacy o f the abusive 
relationship and is speaking to a loving or sympathetic listener about the experience o f abuse, 
the role o f the listener is to listen and not to judge.
• The best way to ensure that the abused person’s account o f his experience is provided 
with non-dominant meaning is for the listener to have survived abuse herself. This 
way, there will be greater likelihood of the abused person being able to establish a 
non-dominant and disruptive meaning that closely corresponds to his experience.
• After an abused person has entered into the public arena for the purpose of seeking 
a remedy for abuse, her testimony should be heard within a group o f fellow survivors 
who share the common purpose of seeking a remedy. At the point before there is 
engagement with the other party in the dispute resolution arena, her testimony should 
be validated by her peers within the group to see if she has had similar experiences 
and has derived similar meaning from them. If there is groups cohesion based on 
common experience and meaning, then the members o f the group can together 
develop the interests that they will pursue in the dispute resolution arena. These 
interests will be derived from the needs arising from the individual experiences of 
abuse within the group.
• In the dispute resolution arena, the parties should assert the importance of their 
testimony and negotiate a validation method that reflect that importance. Although 
a survivor group may have to recognize the interests o f  other parties and have
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testimony subjected to a higher level of validation, at least they will have articulated 
the significance o f  their experiences in the negotiation arena. Where the other party 
is powerful, it is in that party’s political interests to face an empowered opponent. 
In facing a party who has enough power to assert their interests effectively, a 
government benefits from greater political approval and legitimacy when it asserts 
its interests in the negotiation. In other words, a government will not look like a 
bully when it puts forward its legitimate interests and expectations against the 
interests o f a powerful group.
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CHAPTER 4 - MONETARY COMPENSATION
. . .  is power always in a subordinate position relative to the economy? Is 
it always in the service of, and ultimately answerable to, the economy? Is its 
essential end and purpose to serve the economy? Is it destined to realise, 
consolidate, maintain and reproduce the relations appropriate to the economy 
and essential to its functioning? . . .  is power modelled upon the 
economy?212
A. Introduction
Institutional abuse cases involve significant personal injuries both at the psychological level 
and at the physical level. These cases are difficult to address through a judicial process or 
a negotiated process because any remedy must try to respond to injuries that are highly 
personal and not easily commodifiable for the purposes of awarding monetary damages213. 
As I have argued in the previous chapters, the preparation before a process plays a vital role 
in empowering a survivors o f abuse so that they can assert their identity in the negotiation 
process. In developing a sense of who they are, and what is significant to them, survivors 
can enter a dispute resolution process knowing what they want to achieve. In many cases, 
monetary compensation is a significant remedy for the survivors o f  abuse. In this chapter 
I will assert that the actual significance of monetary remedies must be articulated by the 
survivors of abuse. In the absence o f such articulation, the existing conception of monetary
2i2Supra note 54 at 89.
213They are also difficult cases because there are usually a large number of injured 
persons as well as a significant period o f time between the act or acts that caused the injury 
and the claim for damages.
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compensation is heavily influenced by an economic paradigm in both judicial decisions and 
negotiated compensation programs. A conception o f compensation that relies upon 
commodification of all aspects o f  human personality threatens to become the only way we 
understand compensation, especially where no alternative conception is provided. Further, 
a conception o f compensation that relies upon commodification runs the risk of fragmenting 
the identity of abuse victims. This can be especially problematic for institutional abuse cases 
where the fragmentation o f identity is one result of the injuries suffered by the survivor of 
abuse. Dispute resolution o f deep personal injuries requires congruence in the process as 
well as the outcome o f the process. Where the process is designed to remedy the 
fragmentation and injury suffered by survivors of abuse, the compensation awarded should 
also be conceived such that fragmentation of personal identity is not perpetrated upon the 
survivors.
In this chapter I intend to explore some of difficulties that arise when an overarching and 
highly commodified view o f compensation is used to address the injuries of persons who 
have suffered from institutional abuse. In exploring compensation for abuse, I will highlight 
a fundamental inconsistency that exists within a conception o f personhood that is overly 
objectifying. Briefly, this inconsistency lies in the fact that radical commodification results 
in every aspect o f personhood being alienated and defined by monetary values. This narrows 
the scope of self-definition to the limited meanings attached to money. So instead of creating 
freedom for self-actualization, commodification results in a narrowing of the meanings that 
can possibly be attributed to the self.
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First I will provide a brief summary o f the points from previous chapters that will be relevant 
to this analysis. I will describe the difficulty in awarding monetary compensation for 
subjective personal harms such as the psychological injury that results from institutional 
abuse. I will then describe how institutional abuse has been remedied by the courts by 
examining Muir. v. Alberta2'4, a case involving a woman who had been sterilized by the 
Alberta Eugenics Board. I will also examine how the Nova Scotia Compensation Program 
distributed its monetary awards through a grid or scalar system. After evaluating how the 
two systems deal with monetary damages, I will make some recommendations for 
overcoming the hegemonic effect of commodification when monetary awards are used to 
address damages arising from institutional abuse.
B. Summary - identity and empowerment
In the second chapter, I established that one of the key harms inflicted upon a person when 
he is physically or sexually abused, is a fragmented sense o f identity and loss o f control over 
identity formation. That is, the abuser imposes his own physical needs upon the person; this 
imposition subdues the abused person’s sense of having control over his body. The abuser 
also affects the meaning o f the experiences. The abused person may believe that the abuse 
is an expression of love, or he may not be able to attribute any meaning to random acts of 
violence or sexual predation. Thus, his sense of identity is controlled by the abuser. Abuse 
fragments a person’s will or agency from his body. Things are being done to him that he
2l4(1996), 132 D.L.R. (4th) 695 [hereinafter “Muir"].
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cannot control. Survival o f  his psyche may rely upon his ability to separate himself from his 
body. In the chapter on identity I argued that a dispute resolution process must provide space 
for identity formation to be initiated by the abused person. Only when a person can connect 
with others who can provide him with a loving relationship matrix can he begin to assert an 
integrated sense o f self that is not defined by the abuser.
In the chapter on empowerment, I asserted that this new identity and sense o f  the signi ficance 
o f the abuse must be protected against the resistant force and dominating tendencies of 
dominant discourses. Otherwise the new speech will be subjugated by existing knowledge. 
I argued that the way to do this is to promote the development o f a political group of 
survivors who will internally legitimate the experiences o f its members. In doing this, the 
survivor speech can be validated without having to lose the subjective nature of the 
testimony and without having to resort to external legitimation from dominant discourses. 
The group also acts as a vehicle for the assertion of interests in the negotiation environment.
Throughout the previous chapters o f this thesis, the focus has been on asserting a survivor- 
focused subjective identity through an empowering dispute resolution process. Presuming 
that the interests of the abused person are articulated in the dispute resolution process, and 
that the process results in a remedy, how is that remedy to be conceptualized? In a judicial 
setting, civil institutional abuse cases result in a monetary award. Apology, access to 
specialized counseling, creation of an historic record and other forms of remedy that are not
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
130
in monetary form215 are not available to the court. A non-judicial dispute resolution process 
may provide for these types o f remedies should the parties so choose. Monetary 
compensation, however, often is still the core remedy for survivors o f abuse in a non-judicial 
process. In this chapter, I would like to examine some o f the problems with existing 
conceptualizations of monetary awards. If an award objectifies the injury and does not 
recognize the subjective nature o f the harm, does it perpetuate a sense of fragmentation of 
identity? After establishing and preserving a non-dominant sense o f identity throughout the 
process, it would defeat the purpose of the process if  the remedy re-objectified the 
experiences of the abused person.
C. The difficulty with monetary compensation
With the advent of a large number o f institutional abuse cases, governments have been and 
continue to be faced with a prime opportunity to develop non-court based processes that can 
meet the interests of the parties in an efficient manner. Although these cases are an 
opportunity for process reform, they also present a significant challenge at the substantive 
level. Both the decision-maker in a judicial process and the parties in a non-judicial conflict 
resolution processes have to determine how to compensate persons whose injuries affect the 
core of their being and identity in a very personal, and sometimes collective way.
2i5A court can award a monetary amount for counseling but cannot provide a 
counselor for the abuse survivor. In A. (C.) v. C. (J.W.) (1997), 35 B.C.L.R. (3d) 234 at 300 
the court awarded survivors of institutional abuse amounts for future counseling. For further 
details on the extent o f remedies available to civil litigants, please see: J. Berryman et al, 
Remedies: Cases and Materials, 2nd ed., (Toronto:Emond Montgomery, 1992).
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A process that does not explicitly use conceptual language that creates space for the 
subjective self may end up inappropriately objectifying facets o f the victims’ identity. In the 
absence o f any alternative definition, compensation itself will tend to be conceptualized in 
terms o f some form o f economic analysis. This will happen for two reasons. First, the main 
tool for awarding compensation is money. Money is also the prime tool used to exchange 
goods on the marketplace and signifies that goods are fungible and that their value is 
transferable. Prima facie, money indicates the existence of a marketplace and 
commodification o f objects. Where money is used to compensate, it is easy to conceptualize 
damages as things which are exchanged for money. The second reason is the fact that 
resolution in both the civil litigation system and a non-judicial compensation program can 
be reached by way o f a negotiated agreement. Negotiations and other private mechanisms 
of dispute resolution rely on the parties to raise and recognize non-commodifiable values in 
the negotiation process. However, it can be difficult for the parties to recognize subjective 
harm in the first place, let alone find a way to acknowledge it in a negotiation where money 
is often the prime universalizing negotiating tool. Where the negotiation involves 
reparations or compensation for serious wrongs such as physical and sexual abuse it is easy 
to lose sight of the subjective quality of the harm in the attempt to achieve agreement with 
the other side.216 In attempting to reach a workable agreement for both sides, the subtleties
2l6For an insightful discussion on the public nature o f serious wrongs, see supra note 
34 .For a discussion on the incompatibility between the ideology o f mediation, which is a 
variation on negotiation, and the culture o f  battering in domestic violence cases, see supra 
note 116. In this article, Fischer, Vidmar and Ellis explore the difficulty of using a process 
that is geared towards achieving agreement and maintaining relationships when agreement 
and continuing relations may be antithetical, and even extremely dangerous, for the victim 
of battering.
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o f how compensation for abuse should be conceptualized can be lost among the more 
prominent targets of achieving a monetary solution. And so, even with these tailored and 
negotiated processes, parties and the public are in danger o f falling into the same type of 
objectifying discourse that the alternative processes are supposedly designed to avoid. In 
fact, without the explicit recognition o f subjective needs that is sometimes contained in 
judicial decisions, survivors o f abuse can feel that they have simply been paid off and that 
somehow yet again, the other party and society have missed the point o f their loss.217
D. An alternative conception of monetary compensation
Margaret Radin in her analysis o f the hegemonic properties of market-based economic 
discourse, asserts that a rhetoric that commodifies personal attributes has a culture-shaping 
function. Radin argues that law is a powerful rhetorical and discursive force which has the 
ability to shape culture and our understanding o f the world. As she states:
when we live in a world in which many or most things people need and want 
are routinely traded as commodities, and when we see dollars systematically 
being paid to people after they are injured, and in some way “for” or “on 
account o f’ the injury, we are likely to come to conceive o f freedom from 
injury as another commodity bearing exchange value, even if  we do not now 
conceive of it that way.218
217R. Abel asserts that compensation has the effect of commodifying love. Also, 
instead o f evoking compassion for victims, it has the result of evoking envy: see R. Abel, 
“Torts” in D. Kairys, ed. The Politics o f  Law: A Progressive Critique (New York: Basic 
Books Inc. 1998) at 456.
218M. Radin, Contested Commodities (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996)
at 203.
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To illustrate, Radin considers a topic frequently debated among law and economic theorists: 
does simply speaking o f  babies in terms of market rhetoric have a real effect on culture 
despite the fact that baby-selling is not a widely sanctioned practice in our culture? She 
argues that a widespread conceptual scheme that has effectively infiltrated our discourse will 
in fact shape the nature o f  our relationships with our children. So, although we may feel that 
children have an intrinsic value that is incommensurable with dollars, a hegemonic market- 
based conceptual scheme that hypothetically allows for trade of children for dollars will 
infiltrate our understanding such that it is possible to conceive of children as commodities 
for various purposes. If  we apply Radin’s theory of the culture-shaping function of legal 
rhetoric to the situation of compensation for institutional abuse cases, we can perhaps 
understand why abuse claimants may have felt that the money they received was “blood 
money
Radin’s analysis focuses on the limitations of a Posnerian economic analysis that uses dollar 
value as its base and that reduces all human choices to market choices between 
commodities.220 The traditional law and economics approach to compensation does not 
easily lend itself to a compassionate view o f the law that recognizes the subjective and 
personal nature of harm.221 Economics, as we have come to understand it, is associated with
219Supra note 2 at 19.
220Supra note 218 at 2-4.
21x[bid. at 184.
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
134
classical liberal theory, extreme individualism, and wealth maximization. This particular 
understanding o f economics requires a high degree of objectification so that wealth 
maximizing choices can be made between comparable, or commensurable objects.222 
Without de-subjectifying goods, it is impossible to alienate them to the extent required by 
the market-place. In seeing the law through this particular economic lens, one is tempted as 
Judge Posner has been, to discuss all characteristics of humanness as if they are 
commensurable and fungible.223
E. Dilemma of liberal economic theory
Ironically, though the liberal conception o f the person envisages the attainment of maximum 
autonomy and expression o f self, in the economic arena the opposite can occur. The self is 
expressed through the physical being and the physical world. If  the physical being and the 
physical world is completely alienable, and if all alienable things are defined in monetary 
terms, then self-expression becomes limited to monetary terms. Thus, radical alienation has 
a limiting effect on self-expression.
Without specific clarification of the meaning o f compensation for abuse survivors, a process 
that uses the tools of the market and a structure that indicates commodification of personal 
injury will absorb the hegemonic analysis of a reductionist classical economic theory. The
n2Ibid. at 8.
122Ibid. at 2-15.
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discourse o f  classical economic theory requires a radical degree of objectification. When this 
objectification is applied to the realm of our identity, then the resulting alienation creates a 
dilemma for liberal theorists. Although the conception o f personhood in liberal theory 
envisions a high degree of autonomy and personal power, in objectifying all aspects of 
human personality, liberal economic theory in fact destroys the physical integrity o f identity 
that is required for the manifestation o f empowerment.
This analysis o f the liberal dilemma presupposes a conception of personhood where identity 
is fundamental to well-being and alienation o f fundamental aspects of identity through 
commodification is inimical to well-being. For instance, in this view, placing a woman’s 
reproductive capacity in the marketplace strips her o f an important aspect o f her identity as 
a woman; it does not represent her ultimate expression o f will.
(a) Avoiding the dilemma
But perhaps it is not necessary to entirely reject economic analysis if it proves flexible 
enough to embrace a more holistic, subject-oriented focus. Economics is not necessarily 
only about wealth maximization. It can be more generally about well-being, sustainability 
and needs fulfillment224. If an economic model is expanded so that it recognizes these values 
that relate directly to human personality as opposed to the indirect and abstract value of
224M. Morris, Measuring the Condition o f  the World's Poor: The Physical Quality 
o f  Life Index (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979) at 94. In this book the author explores the 
possibility o f moving away from measuring growth and production and moving toward 
measuring social welfare and needs-fulfillment in macro-economic analysis.
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wealth-maximization, then the nature o f the economic inquiry changes fundamentally. It 
becomes more focused on the subjective experiences o f economic agents and less upon the 
choices that they should, theoretically be able to make. It re-orients the focus o f economic 
activity such that the subject’s role is not only to decide between an artificial array of 
economic choices; the economic actor also has a contextual content that is affected by and 
affects economic decision-making. The liberal model, on the other hand, depends heavily on 
an abstract and highly stylized concept o f human personhood.
An economic focus on needs and well-being provides the opportunity to incorporate the 
realities o f persons instead of relying upon theoretical abstractions. An economic model that 
relies upon well-being and well-fare o f groups and individuals can more easily recognize 
values that are denied by Posnerians and raised as problematic by Radin. Amartya Sen 
succinctly points out the limits o f a narrow economic theory in the following way:
It is not my purpose to argue that simplification can never be justified. 
Economics - indeed any empirical discipline - would be impossible if 
simplifications were to be ruled out. The point concerns the need to 
recognize distinctions which are important for the purpose of the study at 
hand. What is objectionable in the economic theorizing that identifies widely 
different concepts o f self-interest, motivations, etc., is not the fact of 
simplification itself, but the particular simplification chosen, which has the 
effect of taking a very narrow view of human beings (and their feelings, ideas 
and actions), thereby significantly impoverishing the scope and reach of 
economic theory.225
And so, it is not necessarily that an economic analysis of the law of compensation is
225A.Sen, Commodities and Capabilities - Lectures in Economics: Theory, 
Institutions, Policy (Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.: Amsterdam, 1985) at 4.
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inadequate but rather that an economic analysis based solely on market maximization and 
capital growth will lead to a conceptualization o f human personality and choice which is 
overly narrow. Instead, economic analysis can perhaps recognize incommensurable values 
as having value, although not capable o f being traded on the market.
F. Compensation in the Courts
Institutional abuse involves the objectification of the person through the initial abusive acts. 
This proposition can be illustrated through a specific case involving the decision of the 
Eugenics Board in Alberta to sterilize a woman who was resident in a provincial institution. 
The practices and policies of the Alberta Eugenics Board and the effect that it had on certain 
groups of people provides a particularly poignant and sad example of the relevance of 
identity. In Muir v. Alberta, the plaintiff became a resident of the Provincial Training School 
for Mental Defectives. Ms Muir was placed in the institution, notwithstanding evidence that 
she had behavioural problems and was not “defective” as her mother had the institutional 
authorities believe.226 Despite the fact that some officials doubted whether or not Muir had 
a mental deficiency, she was labeled as a mental defective and a moron. She became
226Supra note 214 at 705. Shortly after being admitted a psychiatrist examined Muir 
and found that she had behavioural problems and there was doubt about whether or not she 
had a primal mental deficiency. Muir had a very difficult relationship with her mother who 
showed little interest in taking care of her child. There is evidence to the effect that Muir’s 
mother appears to have told the authorities that Muir was older than she really was. Thus her 
psychometric tests would indicate that she was mentally deficient and she would be admitted 
to the school. There is also evidence that Muir had been neglected at home. At one point, 
Muir was considered abandoned by her family as they moved out of province without 
notifying her.
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identified as a moron and as recognized by the trial judge in her lawsuit against the Province 
o f  Alberta, this had a severe lifelong impact on her sense o f self and her abilities. Muir 
herself believed that she was deficient and suffered psychological damage because o f this 
particular form of objectification. In fact, Ms Muir is exemplar o f how we all incorporate 
external and socially constructed concepts o f identity into our ideas o f  selfhood. If  Muir had 
been in an environment where her mental abilities or lack thereof were not the prime focus 
o f  her social identity, then perhaps she would have had a broader, more forgiving and 
positive vision of herself. However, not only did labeling have a severe impact on her self- 
image but the Eugenics Board focused and relied on this particular, imposed identifying 
characteristic of Ms Muir, and sexually sterilized her against her knowledge and without her 
consent227. Her identity as a moron not only objectified her as being primarily defined by her 
mental acuity, but it also identified her to those in authority as a less worthy person who 
must be stopped from procreating.
Identity is relevant in a second very important way in Muir. There is some evidence to 
support the fact that the eugenics movement was also influenced by the desire of certain 
policy makers to maintain the purity o f the dominant racial group in Alberta and in British 
Columbia. So not only was Muir’s personal subjective identity affected by the objectifying 
labeling o f the Eugenics Board, so too was the identity of the group to which she belonged. 
An expert witness in the case, Professor Robertson, testified that eugenics practices in the
227Under the Sexual Sterilization Act S. A. 1928, c. 37 as am. by S. A. 1937, c. 47 no 
consent was required for the sterilization of mental defectives: see T. Caulfield and G. 
Robertson, “Eugenics Policies in Alberta: from the Systematic to the Systemic?” (1996) 35 
Alta. L. Rev. 59.
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early 20th century were geared toward establishing racial purity and breeding out mental 
defectives. The prevalent beliefs among the middle class contributed to the popularity of 
eugenics. There was a belief that feeblemindedness is a menace to society and contributes 
to crime, prostitution, drunkenness and other social problems228. At the same time, racist 
beliefs were rampant and there was a high degree o f suspicion of immigrants from Southern 
Europe, Eastern Europe and the Orient.229 Claims were made that foreigners were 
responsible for the (perceived) high degree of crime. Fear of non-British, non-White, and 
non-Protestant immigration led such stellar political characters as Emily Murphy, Nellie 
McClung and J.S. Woodsworth (who later recanted these beliefs) to advocate eugenics 
practices.230 In addition to the popular social climate in the early part o f  the century, 
scientists were disseminating theories linking feeblemindness to crime.231 Belief in scientific 
method and the advent of modernity bolstered questionable theorems about large groups of 
people. Articles were written by doctors such as Dr. Morris Siegel in 1934 who claimed that 
“the female morons grow up to be irresponsible women, falling deeply into the abyss of 
prostitution, alcoholism and addiction to narcotic drugs”232. The authority of these 
statements from prominent medical practitioners and scientists fueled middle-class fears and 
justified the objectification o f  certain classes of people as less than worthy of the same
228T. Caulfield, ibid. at at 69.
229Ibid. at 69.
220Ibid. at 61.
231 Ibid. at 67-68.
232Ibid. at 67
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privileges as the dominant classes.
At the height o f the eugenics movement in Alberta society, the Sexual Sterilization Act was 
passed. The Act established a board which was empowered to authorize the sexual 
sterilization o f individuals about to be discharged from a mental hospital to prevent the 
procreation o f people with disabilities. After amendments in 1937, the powers of the board 
were expanded to allow the sterilization o f people with neurosyphilis, epilepsy with 
psychosis or mental deterioration, and Huntington’s Chorea. Consent was only required for 
psychotic persons and was not required for the sterilization of so-called mental defectives. 
During the forty-four years of its operation, the Eugenics Board sterilized 2,822 people.233 
Studies show that the Act was administered in such a way that it had disproportionate impact 
on females, the unemployed, people of minority ethnic backgrounds and the poor.234
The dominant group in society, British immigrants, sought to maintain control of their vision 
of the ideal citizen by limiting the population and power of those who did not reflect their 
cultural image. The eugenics belief that criminality was caused by an inherited feeble­
mindedness that could be remedied through sterilization allowed the powerful middle-class 
to ignore possible structural economic causes o f social ills.235 The explicit purpose of the
233Supra note 214 at 745.
234Supra note 227 at 61.
235A. McLaren, Our Own Master Race: Eugenics in Canada, 1885-1945 (Toronto: 
McLelland and Stewart, 1990) at 37.
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Sexual Sterilization Act236 was to limit the reproductive capacity and sexuality - both being 
fundamental, defining characteristics o f humans - o f particular groups o f people. It allowed 
for social engineering that could change the face o f Alberta society so that it reflected the so- 
called desirable visage projected by dominant members of society. Thus the dominant, 
objectifying group benefitted from the chauvinistic isolation that it imposed. Members of 
the dominant class held the reigns of control and maintained a distinct group identity237 that 
had exclusive access to social privileges simply because of membership in the group. This 
articulation of desirability is one of the most arrogant and blatant238 examples of a dominant 
class wielding power to maintain the subjugation of groups that are excluded from setting 
the terms of the dominant discourse.
2ze> Sexual Sterilization Act, supra note 227.
237The social construction of racial identity has reinforced the disenfranchisement o f 
various oppressed groups. People have been categorized as Black, Jewish-Semitic, etc for 
the purpose of imposing different levels o f privilege for those who are in the categories and 
those who are in the dominant categories. For an in-depth examination o f the social 
construction of racial identity, with specific reference to Jewish people, please see: L. 
Nochlin & Tamar Garb eds., The Jew in the Text: Modernity and the Construction o f Identity 
(London: Thames and Hudson Ltd., 1995).
238In its imposition on the physical well-being of particular group, the eugenics 
movement is an obvious and easily recognizable oppressive force. What are more insidious, 
however, are the more subtle mechanisms for social control that today re-inforce the same 
exclusivity underlying the eugenics movement of the early 20th century. As an example, 
please note the widespread use of Ritalin for controlling the behaviour o f children: see A. 
Brown, “Mind-Control Drug Threat for Children” The Guardian Unlimited (27 
F e b r u a r y 2 0 0 0 )
online:<http://www.guardian.co.uk/Distribution/Redirect_Artifact/0,4678,0-141145,00.ht 
ml> (date accessed: 20 March 2001); and,
“Drug to control children’s behaviour ‘overused’” BBC Online Network (23 February 1999) 
online:<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/health/newsid_284000/284466.stm> (date accessed: 
20 March 2001).
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A third way that the Eugenics Board affected Ms Muir’s sense of self was the impact that its 
decisions had upon her physical integrity. This caused specific effects on her psyche and 
identity as a woman. The attack on her physical se lf is not the same as the socially and 
institutionally constructed labeling mentioned above. The act of sterilization was an 
insidious form o f assault that undermined her sense of physical being. This fundamental 
type o f interference with personhood is qualitatively different from the psychological damage 
inflicted upon her through labeling. This is not to say that there is a hierarchy of damage; 
however, her body, as a foundational source of her being, was invaded and altered. One 
could say that her body was the last frontier that fell under the onslaught o f the Eugenics 
Board and by extension, the dominant society in Alberta.
Although we know that there are varying degrees o f control that we have over our social 
identity and labels that are attached to us throughout life, we at least think that we have 
control over the imposition o f acts against our bodies. Our laws give us protection against 
non-consensual touching and medical procedures precisely because as a society, we consider 
physical integrity to be of prime importance. And yet, the Sexual Sterilization Act allowed 
for a breach o f physical integrity that goes to a core aspect of our physicality - the ability to 
reproduce. The sterilization imposed a severe physical limitation upon a core aspect of 
Muir’s physical being. In the act o f irreversibly affecting her body without the concurrence 
o f her will, the Eugenics Board created distance between Ms Muir’s sense o f self and her 
reproductive capacity. When we will our hands to type something out, the act is a seamless 
manifestation o f our will to do so; we do not notice that our hands are separate from 
ourselves. When, however, someone takes control o f our hands without our will, we are
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aware o f our hands at some distance from our will and selfhood. In this way, Muir’s sexual 
capacity, something taken for granted by many, was separated from her, both physically and 
psychologically.
After years of searching for answers about the procedures that were performed upon her, Ms 
Muir brought her case before the courts. After determining liability, the judge was faced 
with the daunting task o f addressing Ms Muir’s loss o f reproductive capacity and the injuries 
that she suffered. Ms Muir’s loss was not easily equated to dollar values. She did not lose 
a car or even wages, to a significant degree. The bulk o f her losses related to the loss o f part 
of herself. How a court characterizes this loss239 depends heavily on how compensation is 
conceptualized.
(a) Summary
In examining Muir one can better understand that institutional abuse affects personal and 
collective identity by forcefully fragmenting foundational aspects of personhood and taking 
control of them. Ms. Muir was artificially categorized as a “moron” by the Eugenics Board. 
She did not have control over the social construction o f her identity; the Eugenics Board did. 
Ms Muir came from an economically disadvantaged Eastern European family; the Eugenics 
Board systemically targeted persons from this group for the purpose of limiting their power
239As stated by R. Abel, “the commodity form has been extended from goods, labor 
and care to all forms o f  human experience - everything can (and increasingly must) be 
bought”: supra note 217 at 448.
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in society. Dominant society was composed o f persons with particular characteristics such 
as place o f origin, religion and gender; these attributes were used to identify groups who 
were the targets o f eugenics policies. Fragmentation of her social identity was bolstered by 
theories that criminality was more prevalent among certain groups. Thus persons in Alberta 
society were objectified and sterilized based on the fragmentation o f their social identity into 
categories o f race, religion and gender. Finally, Ms Muir’s physical integrity was 
fragmented by the act of sterilization itself. Sterilization without consent created a distance 
between Ms Muir and her personal sovereignty over her body and her reproductive capacity. 
Her ability to reproduce was objectified by the Board when they decided to sterilize her 
against her will.
(b) The meaning o f  compensation in torts
Radin recognizes that we have some difficulty reconciling the incommensurability of market 
rhetoric that is sometimes associated with compensation for the very subjective pain and 
suffering o f a plaintiff. She explores how market rhetoric impacts on our culture and 
understanding o f identity and she proposes that there are some aspects o f tort injuries that 
we consider incommensurable with commodification. Some injuries are closer to our sense 
o f self and thus are less easily placed on par with commodities on the market place. Other 
aspects o f  ourselves may be more easily objectified, or put at a distance from our subjective 
selves, and are consequently easier to commodify and place in the marketplace for exchange. 
As Radin notes, compensation for personal injury is one area where the contested meanings
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o f market commodification can most easily be examined.240 Specifically in personal injury 
cases, the use of dollars to remedy both pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses can create 
confusion around the meaning o f  compensation.
In a pure deterrence model of commodified compensation241, an economically rational 
tortfeasor would implement safety features if these safety features cost less than paying 
damages for accidents. For example in Muir, the government would evaluate the damages 
that might be payable to Muir and then decide whether or not to sterilize her. The Muir case 
demonstrates many problems with the pure deterrence model. First, perfect knowledge of 
the potential costs o f their action is required for the government to make an accurate 
judgement of whether or not to sterilize Muir. Second, the tortfeasor must understand that 
their acts are actually inflicting an injury upon someone. At the time that the government 
enacted the Sexual Sterilization Act, there was no understanding that their actions were 
harmful or were in fact inflicting damages upon Muir.
Radin points out that many who are sympathetic to economic reasoning do not adopt a pure 
version of the deterrence model. Rather, although economic efficiency is a goal, rights 
associated with bodily integrity are also recognized. This mixed view also engages a 
commodified conception o f compensation as the payment o f  damages is in exchange for the 
rights that were violated. Ideally compensation makes the victim whole again. Thus, injury
240Supra note 218 at 184.
241 Ibid. at 186.
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and the payment o f damages are treated exactly as if  the victim sold a commodity that she 
owns.242 In the Muir case, for example, this view would hold that the plaintiff had accepted 
damages in exchange for the loss o f her reproductive capacity. In this conception of 
compensation she is deemed to have owned her capacity to have children and because it was 
taken away from her, she is entitled to receive money in exchange for it. In order to 
compensate her, the court would have had to assessed the worth of her loss by evaluating 
the value o f her right to reproduce and then ordered government to pay for taking it away 
from her. As Radin states, in this view the damage award makes the victim whole again as 
she is indifferent with respect to being harmed and getting the payment o f damages.243 
In the Muir case, someone who is sympathetic to this kind of analysis might perceive that 
the Alberta government paid a sum of money for Ms Muir’s reproductive capacity. 
However, because the judge clearly delineated his intention to recognize her non-pecuniary 
losses, there is less opportunity o f her monetary award being attributed to commodified 
injuries. The judge in Muir clearly states that “(m)oney will not allow Ms Muir to conceive; 
it can only provide succour for the pain that she has suffered during these past decades.”244. 
Succour is a response to Ms Muir’s emotional needs and pain; this is something that the 
judge recognizes, in accordance to our society’s understanding o f this type o f pain, as being 
incommensurable with a market economic analysis. In this instance, money symbolizes 
recognition of pain; it does not signify an exchange of goods.
242Ibid. at 187.
243Ibid. at 186-187.
244Supra note 214 at 193.
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Radin categorizes this understanding of compensation as a non-commodified conception of 
compensation that attempts to provide solace to the plaintiff. She argues that within the 
judicial system we have a non-commodified understanding o f  compensation that allows for 
the centrality of other values beside dollars and markets.245 For example, principles of 
corrective justice seek to restore the moral balance between the parties. Thus, right and 
wrong, concepts that are incommensurable with market values, are used for determining 
compensation in the form o f punitive damages.246 Radin argues that compensation for injury 
should be viewed as redress of the harm done to the victim and as recognition o f the fault of 
the defendant. Money, should be a symbolic, but not empty gesture of recognition. As she 
states, “redress means showing the victim that her rights are taken seriously. It is 
accomplished by affirming that some action is required to symbolize public respect for the 
existence of certain rights.247”.
I would suggest that Radin’s understanding of compensation can also be interpreted in terms 
o f the relational nature o f identity, as discussed in chapter two. In providing compensation 
that is a symbol of respect and is for the purpose of re-establishing moral balance between 
the parties, there is a recognition of the re-configuration o f the relationship. The tortfeasor
145 Supra note 218 at 189.
246This point is raised by R. Abel who states that “tort law has turned to the language 
of economics, replacing moral fault with the efficient allocation of resources, a concept that 
appears scientific and apolitical.” Abel points out that although cloaked in the guise of 
neutrality, economic discourse itself has an inherent normative point of reference - namely 
efficiency: supra note 217 at 451.
247Supra note 218 at 188.
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acknowledges the harm inflicted upon the plaintiff and in doing so contributes to the new 
construction o f the plaintiff’s identity as a respected person. The relationship matrix has 
been slightly altered and power has been shifted within the matrix.
These examples of Radin’s taxonomy of compensation reveal that our understanding o f 
compensation is informed by various conceptual paradigms. She also asserts that in some 
instances, the values that are recognized by the courts are incommensurable with an 
economic rhetoric that assumes commodification and fungibility o f all aspects o f 
personhood. Compensation can mean many things. Alongside our economic 
conceptualization are bubbles o f incommensurable values which must be acknowledged 
through compensation, but not reduced to commodities that are alienable from the person. 
In describing both the commodified and non-commodified versions of compensation, Radin 
is exposing our conflicting ideas o f the meaning of compensation. We recognize that 
something o f value has been lost or damaged but we have differing ideas of how the address 
the loss.248 Some prefer a simple, overarching economic conceptualization. Others see that 
there is complexity associated with different types of harms, complexity which cannot be 
addressed by one single conceptualization based on economic theory.
248Note that I do not deal with the possibility o f  not compensating injured parties 
where their injury is imcommensurable with commodification. In my view, recognition of 
value must be at least symbolized through money because society recognizes money as being 
valuable. In her book, Radin does discuss the possibility o f not compensating injured parties. 
She notes that if  one recognizes the incommensurability of pain with compensation, it 
becomes easier to argue that pain should not be compensated at all. Radin notes that this 
argument is used in the context o f tort insurers who wish to limit the discretion that juries 
have to make awards at their expense. Radin argues that proponents o f this argument often 
do not go so far as to argue against all damage recovery but use it in a limited way. For a 
further discussion of this issue, see ibid. at 195-200.
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Up to this point, an examination o f the Muir case has revealed that the abuse o f power in an 
institutional setting had an objectifying effect upon key aspects o f Ms. Muir’s identity. 
Further, we have examined how economic theory tends to have a hegemonic culture-shaping 
effect that leads us to a commodified conception of compensation. In institutional abuse 
cases like Muir it was crucial for the judge to recognize the incommensurability between 
Muir’s loss of reproductive capacity and a market-based conception o f compensation. He 
recognized that monetary damages for non-pecuniary loss have the symbolic effect o f 
providing succour for Ms Muir’s loss. In making this distinction in his decision, the judge 
has explicitly refused to objectify an aspect o f Ms Muir’s subjective loss.
G. Non-judicial compensation programs and institutional abuse
Where there is a compensation program in place and no explicit explanation of how 
compensation is to be conceived, there is a danger that compensation will be understood in 
a way that further objectifies people who have already been objectified through the 
institutional abuse. Many governments and institutions across Canada saw the emergence 
of these potentially expensive and difficult cases as a prime opportunity to implement 
formalized alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. Governments could use non-judicial 
processes to reduce the transaction costs, such as time and expense, that all parties would 
incur to their mutual detriment through the civil litigation process. Lengthy civil 
proceedings have severe cost implications cost for both parties; the claimant often bears a
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greater relative burden because of a lack of initial resources for the payment for legal fees. 
Governments could also address the stresses o f litigation on claimants by implementing a 
mechanism that does not force claimants to face their abusers. If  an alternative process is 
designed well, the abused person who has already experienced psychological trauma will not 
be re-victimized by the process. Further, dispute resolution mechanisms can provide a 
process that is geared toward healing the victim as opposed to simply determining causal 
damage and recognizing loss through monetary awards. Alternative mechanisms can also 
allow for a greater range o f solutions than is available through formal legal proceedings. It 
is possible for the parties to negotiate for monetary compensation, apologies, non-monetary 
awards for psychological therapy and other treatments, an opportunity to establish a record 
o f  the stories told by victims, public education about abuse, support for families o f  victims, 
career counseling, and interim awards to assist claimants.249 Thus, a negotiated solution can 
be more easily tailored to suit the subjective needs o f the parties involved in the negotiation 
and the process itself can deal with the specific relationship between the parties.
The Nova Scotia Compensation Program provided non-monetary remedies that are not 
available through a judicial process. There were provisions for an apology letter from the 
Minister o f Justice, interim and long-term counseling, a list o f government services available 
to the claimants, an independent recorder of a public report o f Survivor’s testimonials, and 
payment o f legal fees and disbursements.250 The most significant and contested remedy,
249Supra note 2 at 30.
250See clauses 28-63 and 66 of the MOU: supra note 30.
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
however, was the monetary compensation paid out to claimants.
151
Various mechanisms have been used across the country to provide monetary compensation 
for people who had been abused while residents o f provincial and federal institutions. In 
Kingsclear, the government o f New Brunswick provided compensation up to $120,000 for 
sexual abuse suffered at the New Brunswick Training School at Kingsclear.251 
Compensation was paid for pain and suffering, educational benefits, loss o f past earning s and 
the loss o f future opportunity.252 In Ontario, the Helpline Reconciliation Agreement 
provided compensation up to $25,000 for pain and suffering, with additional amounts of 
$3,000 for medical needs and vocational rehabilitation, and $5,000 for counseling.253 
Compensation was provided to eligible persons who suffered acts that met the definition of 
injury in the Compensation fo r  Victims o f  Crime Act254. In the Grandview Agreement, 
monetary compensation was provided for both physical and sexual abuse depending upon 
the category o f the abusive act.255 The maximum amount that could be received was $60,000 
for acts falling within the most serious category plus individual and group benefits for 
counseling, educational upgrading, tattoo removal and other needs.
251 Supra note 5 at 142.
252Ibid.
253Ibid. at 137.
254Compensation fo r  Victims o f  Crime Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 24, s. 1. This section 
defines injury as “actual bodily harm”.
255Supra note 5 at 130-1.
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The Nova Scotia Compensation Program set out a grid or scalar format similar to the one 
used in the Grandview Agreement.256 However the maximum award in Nova Scotia was 
higher and the grid had more categories. In the Nova Scotia Program, there were twelve 
categories ranging from the most serious “Severe Sexual Abuse and Severe Physical Abuse” 
category to the least serious “Minor Physical and/or Sexual Interference”257. If a claimant’s 
statement alleged acts that fell within the most serious category, he could receive $ 120,000 
plus a $10,000 counseling allotment. Guidelines were provided to assist Compensation 
Program assessors with categorizing the claims o f abuse. For example, the category “severe 
sexual abuse” includes anal intercourse, vaginal intercourse and oral intercourse that was 
repeated and persistent such that it could be characterized as chronic. Severe physical abuse 
was abuse that resulted in broken bones or other physical trauma with evidence of 
hospitalization or permanent disability. The assessor also had to consider aggravating factors 
such as verbal abuse or racial acts when determining the appropriate level of 
compensation.
Whereas the Kingsclear model and the Helpline Reconciliation Agreement focused on pain 
and suffering, the Nova Scotia scalar model placed emphasis on the act instead of the 
subjective effect o f the act. The problem is that the categories in the grid may have no 
definite correlation to the actual damage suffered by the claimant. Institutional abuse is
256Supra note 30 at Schedule “B”. 
151 Ibid.
25SIbid. at Schedule “C”.
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experienced in a very subjective way. As has been argued herein, the injury in abuse cases 
are a result o f the imposition o f power over the will o f  the abused child; consequently the 
claimant suffers from significant psychological damage. Psychological literature does not 
support the assertion that injury from abuse can be purely correlated to the number of 
occurrences or the severity o f the act.259 The physical damage is important but the 
psychological damage contains a significant subjective aspect that has a quality that cannot 
be evaluated by objective means. Loss of power and destruction o f identity are not things 
that can be quantified because the nature of the damage is holographic; it cannot be excised 
and valued because it affects all aspects of personhood. Although these aspects of damage 
can be addressed through empowering features o f the process as discussed in previous 
chapters, they should also be recognized, but not quantified, through a substantive remedy.
Where money, a concept which is very closely related to commodification, is distributed 
through a grid or scalar model, it is easy to conceptualize the compensation as commodifying 
the actual injury. Because commodification is likely to dominate out understanding of 
compensation, it will provide meaning, especially where there is no alternate understanding 
of why compensation is being awarded. Where the structure of the distribution mechanism 
in itself indicates that the injuries have been objectified, there will be even more reason to 
believe that the subjective aspect o f harm has not been recognized. Sadly, the lack of an 
articulated statement about the meaning of compensation can be crucial where a program 
has been developed to address the specific well-being o f the claimants. In order to achieve
259Supra note 2 at 38.
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a healing result, an ADR mechanism and remedy should explicitly recognize the specifically 
subjective nature o f abuse. There is no statement in the MOU that the monetary 
compensation is for pain and suffering. There is no indication o f recognition o f subjective 
harm in the awarding o f money amounts. In the absence of any statement to the contrary, 
the grid and the guidelines themselves lead me to believe that the scalar model of 
compensation employs an objective standard for the award of damages. In doing so, the 
model reinforces the commodification o f sexual and physical abuse. A claim o f chronic anal 
intercourse is more valuable than a claim o f repeated instances o f oral intercourse, no matter 
what the subjective effect was for the particular victim. In effect, the government is 
evaluating the worth of the objective act and not valuing the subjective harm.
In a survey done of various survivors o f institutional abuse in Canada, the following was 
stated:
While most women appreciated the financial award and felt that it was very 
important, others said that it felt like ‘blood money’. Several women added 
that there was no amount o f money that could make up for what they 
experienced at Grandview;260
From this quote it is apparent that monetary compensation has multiple meanings for 
survivors of abuse. At one level it is appreciated, at another it is resented. This ambivalent 
relationship with money appears in another survey done by the same authors:
Several respondents expressed the view that financial compensation should 
have been tied to claimants’ participation in education and upgrading, job
260Supra note 2 at Appendix 1, p. 19.
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skills and life skills training ‘so they could improve their lives’. Others were 
adamant that survivors of institutional abuse deserve direct financial 
compensation for the abuse, harm and suffering they endured.261
There is some evidence that the meaning o f compensation is partially derived from the 
process used to determine the level of compensation to be awarded to various members of 
the group that was abused. Again, in reference to the survey of survivors:
any objected to the use o f categories to define and rate their childhood abuse 
experiences.. . .  ‘its like they were labeling b e e f262
This statement points to the crux of the problem o f trying to achieve a healing result with the 
use o f money. The survivors o f abuse, who have already faced fragmentation through the 
acts o f abuse perpetrated on them by persons in authority, again face objectification through 
the process that was supposedly designed to create some wholeness and provide redress for 
their experiences.263 A person who has been sexually abused by a person in authority has had 
their sexual autonomy forcibly overridden. He has become aware that some aspect of his 
sexuality and body is being used by another. Sexuality and the body is an object for 
someone else’s will. When being compensated, the aspects of selfhood that were originally 
objectified during the abuse, are compensated through the grid; the core o f the subjective 
experience is left unrecognized. So despite the provision of apologies and other non­
monetary awards, the manner in which the compensation is determined, explained, and
261 Ibid. at Appendix 1, p. 12.
262Ibid.
263Supra note 30.
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processed can lead to commodification, in the same way that beef is prepared for sale. In 
other words, the worth o f their subjective injury is simply being derived through a process 
with little reference to their understanding of their pain. Because the compensation process 
itself seems to commodify the injuries, and because no explanation was given to the contrary, 
the hegemony of market rhetoric creates the impression among claimants that they were 
“labeled like beef’ and were receiving “blood money”. The reactions o f the claimants 
indicates the degree to which market rhetoric permeates our understanding of economics. 
The abuse that they went through is again somehow separate from them while at the same 
time reflecting on their value as a person.
(a) Evaluation o f  non-judicial treatment o f  compensation
In negotiating a remedy for institutional abuse the parties can address a broad range of issues 
including the development o f a process that contributes to their health and well-being. 
Unfortunately, if no thought is given to the meaning of compensation, the meaning attributed 
to the compensation by the parties and the public may achieve opposite results from the 
original healing goals envisioned in the alternative dispute resolution process. Although not 
perfect, judges can at least refer to jurisprudence on non-pecuniary damages in order to 
provide a non-commodified meaning to compensation. This at least gives the claimant 
recognition o f a form o f subjectivity that is beyond the reach o f the market place. The 
judicial decision264 that provides a non-objectifying explanation o f damages has the potential
264The author recognizes that the judicial process itself can be daunting and damaging 
to the psychological well-being o f the plaintiff. This chapter, however, focuses on the
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Non-judicial programs that do not articulate the meaning o f compensation cannot rely on 
some precedential meaning to fill the gaps. The beauty with non-judicial processes is that 
it is possible for the parties to design a process that is tailored to the needs of the parties. The 
problem is that the parties have the responsibility to articulate the meaning of remedies in 
order to ensure that their intentions are clear in the agreement and throughout the 
administration of the program.
For example, in the Nova Scotia Compensation Program, the purpose of monetary 
compensation is not outlined in the agreement. This was a shortcoming of the dispute 
resolution process because it failed to explicitly recognize the subjective aspect of injuries 
arising from abuse. In the absence of any other articulation, the grid format used for 
distributing compensation indicates that claimants were compensated based upon the acts of 
abuse and not upon the subjectively-felt effects of abuse such as pain and suffering. The grid 
format suggests that the party responsible for the abuse is using an objectifying gaze and not 
recognizing the subjective nature o f the abused person. This effectively denies the abused
necessity o f providing meaning for compensation once liability has been determined.
265Although I have focused on the Muir case, there are other cases where the judge 
has explicitly recognized the nature o f non-pecuniary compensation. For example, please 
see S.M.A.B. v. J. N., [1991] B.C.J. no. 3940, online: QL (CJ) where the Thackray J. stated 
the following in awarding compensation for child sexual abuse: “no amount o f money can 
replace the lost years. No amount o f money can totally overcome the damage that has been 
done.... The money is designed to try and give solace to the victim and to try in some way 
to compensate for what has been lost.”
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person an opportunity to receive recognition of her whole person, as opposed to simply a 
recognition o f the act o f abuse. Any attempts to develop identity and empowerment through 
the process will be diminished if the meaning o f the remedy does not reflect the re­
configuration of the abuser/abused relationship.
H. Conclusions
Claims o f institutional abuse have been dealt with in a variety of ways. Damages have been 
awarded by courts for personal injury inflicted by institutional authorities. Where there are 
many cases o f abuse in one jurisdiction, compensation programs and other alternatives have 
been developed by governments to pay awards to abuse claimants. These programs have the 
potential for satisfying the various needs of the parties in institutional abuse cases. 
Negotiations conducted by parties who are aware o f their needs can assert that the agreement 
must include a healing component and must recognize the integrity of the participants. 
These all too human needs must not be lost in the negotiations when money become the 
prime discursive tool for achieving agreement. Although monetary compensation is often 
the core component of the agreement, integrity and healing can still be incorporated into the 
meaning o f the compensation that is awarded. However because of the hegemonic nature 
o f  commodification in our discourse, parties must actively provide an alternative conception 
o f  compensation that recognizes aspects of human personality that cannot be objectified from 
one’s sense of self. Compensation must be conceptualized and articulated in a way that 
recognizes the subjective content and integrity of human personality.
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I. Recommendations
Although the remedy itself must emerge from the expressed goals and interests articulated 
in the dispute resolution process, I would suggest that the parties involved in designing a 
non-judicial compensation program should consider articulating the meaning of 
compensation. Such an articulation might contain the following:
• monetary compensation is symbolic recognition of the pain and suffering inflicted 
upon the person;
• monetary compensation is acknowledgment that those responsible for the abuse have 
listened to testimonials about the impact o f abuse; and,
• monetary compensation acknowledges the shift in power and the ability of abused 
persons to contribute their understanding o f abuse in social discourses.
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CHAPTER 5 - CONCLUSIONS
(the) self is both autonomous and socially dependent, vulnerable enough to 
be undone by violence and yet resilient enough to be reconstructed with the 
help o f empathic others.266
I can go anywhere and do anything I like. Nobody controls me. I can be who 
I really am. People helped me find that freedom, and nobody can ever take 
it away again. I am truly, truly free.267
The purpose of this thesis has been to discern ways for people who have been socially 
alienated to contribute their understanding o f their experiences in the broader world. To 
discuss this, I have examined the situation o f persons who have been abused as children in 
institutions and the dispute resolution processes used to address their injuries. I have chosen 
this group because abused persons have experienced radical disenfranchisement through the 
overpowering o f their bodies. Also, their claims have recently been dealt with through the 
judicial system and through ADR processes.
Institutional abuse in Canada has emerged as a significant phenomenon over the past ten 
years. Before that time, there was little recognition of institutional abuse or historic child 
abuse in remedial processes. Over the past decade courts in Canada have come to recognize 
the various facets of the abusive experience. Judges have responded by acknowledging that 
there are bona fide  reasons for delay in reporting o f child abuse, by allowing the rules o f 
testimony to accommodate the needs o f abuse survivors, and by recognizing the subjective
266Supra note 80 at 12.
267Supra note 55 atI69.
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aspect of the injuries resulting from abuse. However, regardless o f the ability o f the courts 
to recognize certain aspects of abusive experiences, the sheer number of cases that has arisen 
has prompted institutional defendants to move toward developing alternative dispute 
resolution processes.
In this thesis I have argued that the move toward ADR provides the opportunity for abuse 
survivors to achieve a relational remedy. Harms to identity inflicted through the relationship 
with the abuser can be remedied through healthy identity formation in the dispute resolution 
process. The abuser’s act o f rendering the survivor powerless in the abusive relationship can 
be remedied through a non-judicial process by a re-configuration o f the power relationship. 
The substantive remedy o f monetary compensation can be conceptualized in such a way as 
to recognize the subjective nature of the harm and the abuse survivor’s new power to assert 
himself in the world.
In undertaking this project I first explored the nature of identity. I found that a post­
modernist conception o f identity fails to provide the abused person with the agency to 
exercise control in the remedial process. A liberal conception o f identity, however, fails to 
appreciate the relationships of power that give rise to socially constructed identities. The 
most accurate description o f identity that recognizes both our social nature and the ability to 
exercise volition arises from a relational notion of identity. In exploring theories of 
relational identity, I found that Lugones’ understanding of the plurality o f existence and her 
notion of a thin, limnal self, provided a useful description o f identity. However, I did not 
discard post-modernist notions of power and in fact I relied upon Foucault’s description of
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the inter-relationship between power, knowledge and discourse to fill out my analysis.
My next task in this project was to describe abuse and the various effects o f  abuse. I 
concluded that abuse fragments a person’s sense o f connection with her body, supplants her 
understanding of who she is, and overcomes her sense o f volition or will. For institutionally 
abused persons, these harms can be addressed through a process where they can exercise 
agency to recuperate these lost faculties. An ADR process where there is the possibility of 
exercising power directly with the other party provides such forum.
The problem that arose was that in order for the abused person to exercise his will in the 
negotiation to develop an ADR process, he must first face the daunting task o f  overcoming 
the privacy initially imposed by the abuser. In order for this to occur, the abused person 
must have the opportunity to re-orient himself so that he can access a loving listener. This 
is the first step on the journey before seeking a remedy in the public arena.
The second task was to find a way for the person to find meaning for the abusive experiences 
that is distinct from the meaning imposed by the abuser. By speaking to others who have 
experienced abuse, the survivor will more easily find meaning that corresponds to her 
subjective experience of abuse. Once this has been accomplished, the survivor has a 
foundation for selfhood that is grounded in a ‘world’ or relational matrix that is loving and 
non-abusive. In this personal space, the abuse survivor can gather the strength to speak in 
the public arena about the abusive events.
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When a person speaks publicly, the nature of the testimony will be defined by the purpose 
o f the speaker and the listener. I described legal testimony, therapeutic testimony, historic 
testimony, and political testimony. I examined the situation where different testimonial 
purposes have been attributed to the same speech. I have determined that one o f the 
problems that arises where there are different or unclear testimonial purposes is that the 
resulting confusion may lead to the invalidation of survivor speech.
In order to protect survivor speech, a group that has an identity stemming from common 
experiences of abuse must be able to assert the subjective knowledge o f the survivors’ 
abusive experiences. In asserting this common goal beyond the group, the group develops 
a political aspect. With respect to validation of speech, the validation method chosen in a 
negotiation will reflect the importance o f the various parties’ interests. If survivors wish to 
seek a form of remedy from the government, they should assert the importance o f their 
understanding of abuse for the purpose of determining a validation method. If they have the 
power to assert the significance o f their experiences in the negotiation arena, then ideally a 
validation method will emerge that will recognize the interests o f all parties affected by the 
allegations of abuse.
Depending upon the interests developed by the parties, the actual dispute resolution process 
may take many forms. Parties may develop a restorative process, a public inquiry, a 
compensation program or some permutation of an existing process. If they choose to 
develop a compensation scheme that provides a monetary remedy, there must be some 
articulation of the meaning o f monetary compensation so that abuse survivors are not re­
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
164
objectified by the remedy. Forjudges, the process dictates that they turn their mind to the 
meaning o f compensation and address it in their decisions. Consequently, judicial decisions 
can expressly recognize the subjective nature o f harm. Although there is the possibility that 
parties in a non-judicial process will articulate the meaning o f compensation, if they fail to 
do so, an objectifying mechanism for distributing compensation may lead one to believe that 
subjective harm has been ignored.
Throughout this thesis, I have come to the conclusion that non-judicial processes can 
encompass and recognize identity formation and political empowerment more readily than 
judicial processes. Because the parameters of judicial processes are not as flexible as non­
judicial ones and because a third party provides the ultimate decision, there is less ability to 
accommodate innovative mechanisms for advancing the subjugated knowledge of the abuse 
survivors.
However, with the higher degree of control in non-judicial process comes an increase in the 
level o f responsibility for the parties. They must actively design a process that protects the 
subjective aspects abuse and recovery, lest they be overtaken by dominating discourses. If 
no attention is paid to developing process mechanisms to achieve a particular purpose, then 
that purpose will not necessarily be achieved. If  the parties want to have a process that will 
heal the abuse survivors, on collective and individual levels, the process must be able to 
create a space within existing discourses for this goal to be achieved. On the issue o f  the 
meaning of compensation, I have concluded that judicial decisions are more likely to 
recognize the subjective nature of the harm inflicted upon abused persons. Unless non­
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judicial processes actively articulate the meaning of compensation, there is a risk that the 
method of distribution will provide a commodifying meaning to the monetary award.
In working through my analysis various themes have emerged. I have focused on abuse as 
being relational and not simply a compilation o f discrete abusive acts. The abusive 
relationship fixes the person in a damaging and unloving environment just at that period in 
a person’s life when she is developing her sense of individuality. The theme o f imposed 
privacy has arisen throughout the thesis. I have looked at privacy that is imposed upon an 
individual and upon groups as being counter-productive to their ability to participate in the 
world. The importance of speech has been emphasized, especially in the assertion of 
interests. Although I recognize the power of detachment and disengagement, in this thesis 
I have been primarily concerned with the achievement of a remedy through the re­
engagement o f  a relationship between abuse survivors and the governmental authorities 
responsible for institutional abuse.
In this thesis I have focused on the potential for a process to achieve substantive remedies 
such as empowerment and identity formation. I have asserted that the process governing the 
re-engagement o f the relationship itself can remedy the damage initially caused by the 
abusive relationship. I have emphasized the subjective understanding of the experience of 
abuse as opposed to potentially objectifying expert knowledge. Throughout the thesis, there 
has been an emphasis on physical experience and the emotional harm that results from 
damages to the physical self. We do not exist without our bodies; our sense of self is 
affected by abuse to our bodies. As a source o f our understanding of the world, we cannot
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lose sight of our physicality in asserting meaning and interests in the world around us. 
Consequently, I have tried to shift the focus from the intentions o f the listener to the 
intentions of the speaker when an abused person is speaking about her experiences. I have 
focused on the physical experiences o f abuse and their immediate meaning to the abused 
person instead o f focusing on abstractions. Further, I have asserted that love and loving 
relationships are the fundamental force in the recovery process o f abused persons.
I have made these efforts in order to try to address the alienation that results from physical 
forms of abuse. Abuse alienates a person from her own body. It alienates her from her 
immediate social environment. It alienates her from the world. The nucleus of a return to 
the world begins with an abused person coming to an understanding o f physical existence 
that does not depend upon the abuser. From there, barriers to participation can be overcome, 
however it is not an easy journey. In clarifying the nature o f the barriers, I have attempted 
to locate places in dispute resolution processes where there are possibilities for the 
emergence of identity and power.
A. Further Inquiry
I leave the task of designing an appropriate process to the parties and to other theorists. They 
will be better able to define the parties’ interests and to explore the potential of restorative 
justice, public inquiries, special counsel and other such processes to meet their needs.
The question o f the subjugation o f intra-group minorities must be addressed in order to
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perfect the sustainability o f this model o f empowerment. Specifically questions surrounding 
the relationship between individual self-actualization and collective empowerment might 
serve as fodder for further graduate studies in law, philosophy, politics, or any other 
discipline where this is relevant.
Hopefully this paper has clarified some of the pitfalls that may stand in the way of an abused 
person who is trying to bring her experiences and the meaning of those experiences into the 
public realm. As more people enter well-designed processes, it will be easier for them to 
find a sense of self and overcome alienation in the world and worlds that non-abused persons 
take for granted.
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MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
REGARDING
COMPENSATION FOR SURVIVORS OF INSTITUTIONAL ABUSE
PREAMBLE
WHEREAS the Province o f Nova Scotia operated the Nova Scotia School for Boys 
(Shelburne Youth Centre) from 1947 to date, and the Nova Scotia School for Girls (Nova Scotia 
Residential Centre) from 1967 to date; and the Nova Scotia Youth Training Centre from 1927 
to date;
AND WHEREAS individual Survivors have come forward at various times disclosing the 
Sexual and Physical Abuse that was perpetrated against them and other residents at the 
Institutions;
AND WHEREAS the efforts of individual Survivors to bring their abusers to justice have 
led to internal disciplinary and police investigations concerning abuse at the Institutions, which 
investigations are continuing;
AND WHEREAS the Minister became aware of allegations of Sexual and other Physical 
Abuse at the Institutions;
AND WHEREAS the Minister recommended a process whereby an independent 
investigation into the events that took place would be ordered to determine what had happened, 
who was involved, who knew what was happening and what actions were taken in response by 
those in authority; and further, that if such investigation revealed that Abuse had occurred, an 
alternate dispute resolution mechanism was to be put in place to determine appropriate 
compensation for the Survivors o f the Abuse;
AND WHEREAS pursuant to the recommendation o f the Minister and the direction o f  
the Executive Council o f the Province, the Honourable Stuart G. Stratton, Q.C, was appointed 
to carry out an investigation, the terms of his reference for engagement being to:
(a) investigate the incidents of Sexual and other Physical Abuse of residents that 
occurred or are alleged to have occurred at the Institutions;
(b) investigate and determine the practices and procedures in place at the Institutions 
that either permitted or hindered the detection of Abuse of residents;
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(c) investigate and determine whether any employees in the Institutions or any public 
officials were aware o f  abusive behaviour of staff toward residents; and
(d) investigate and determine what steps, if any, were taken by employees or officials 
in reference to any such Abuse.
AND WHEREAS after conducting the investigation, the Honourable Stuart G. Stratton, 
Q.C., determined, inter alia, that Sexual and Physical Abuse had taken place at the Institutions 
and that staff of the Institutions and officials in the Department of Community Services were 
aware the Abuse was taking place but, at least until the mid-1970s, no positive steps were taken 
to end the Abuse;
AND WHEREAS the Province agreed to employ an alternate dispute resolution 
mechanism to determine compensation for Survivors of Physical and Sexual Abuse and entered 
into discussions with the legal representatives o f Survivors;
AND WHEREAS the Province has agreed to compensate Survivors o f Physical and 
Sexual Abuse through a compensation process that is principled, respectful, timely and consistent 
with the following principles:
THAT the Province recognizes that the Survivors were all minors in the care and custody
of the Province during the periods of time they were committed to the Institutions;
THAT Abuse o f  children can never be condoned and can only be condemned;
THAT the physical and sexual abuse of children by adults in positions o f  power and trust
is a fundamental betrayal that operates to deny a child’s dignity and autonomy;
THAT the fundamental purposes o f this compensation process are:
■ to acknowledge moral responsibility for the Physical and Sexual Abuse 
experienced by the Survivors which was perpetrated, condoned, or directed by 
employees o f the Province during the time the Survivors were resident in the 
Institutions;
■ to affirm the essential worth and dignity of ail o f the Survivors, who were 
residents o f  the Institutions;
■ to assist the Survivors, in a tangible way, with the healing process;
■ to affirm to the Survivors that they were not responsible in any way for the 
Physical and Sexual Abuse perpetrated, condoned, or directed by employees o f the 
Province while the Survivors were resident in the Institutions; and
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to implement financial compensation and other benefits to Survivors in a 
principled, respectful and timely fashion.
DEFINITIONS
1. In this Memorandum of Understanding:
(a) "Demand" means a letter from a Survivor to the Province which states the amount 
of compensation sought by the Survivor in accordance with Schedules "B" and "C" 
and which is accompanied by a Statement;
(b) "Department" means the Department of Justice of the Province o f Nova Scotia, 
unless another Department is specifically named;
(c) "Institutions" means the Nova Scotia School for Boys, the Nova Scotia School for 
Girls and the Nova Scotia Youth Training Centre;
(d) "Minister" means the Minister of Justice of the Province o f Nova Scotia;
(e) "Physical Abuse" means any act of physical assault which was a violation o f the 
provisions o f the Criminal Code, as that legislation existed at the time the act took 
place;
(f) "Province" means the Province of Nova Scotia;
(g) "Racist Acts" means, in the list of aggravating factors contained in Schedule "C", 
acts of discrimination based on race which occurred in connection with Physical 
or Sexual Abuse for which compensation is awarded;
(h) "Response" means the Province’s written response to a Survivor’s Demand 
indicating the Province’s acceptance, rejection, or compromise offer and which, 
in the event of a rejection or compromise offer, shall include written reasons and 
all information or materials in the possession or control o f  the Province upon 
which the Province relied in making its rejection or compromise offer;
(i) "Sexual Abuse" means:
(i) acts o f oral, vaginal or anal intercourse; masturbation; fondling; digital 
penetration; and acts of sexual interference, which may include 
inappropriate watching or staring, comments and sexual intimidation; and 
includes any sexual act which was a violation of the Criminal Code, as that 
legislation existed at the time the act took place; and/or
(ii) attempted acts o f oral, vaginal or anal intercourse, masturbation, fondling, 
or digital penetration, which were a violation of the Criminal Code, as that 
legislation existed at the time the act took place;
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(j) "Statement" means a written statement detailing the Physical and/or Sexual Abuse
experienced by a Survivor, taken by Facts-Probe Inc., the Department’s Internal 
Investigation Unit, or a police agency, and signed by the Survivor;
(k) "Survivor" means an individual who alleges that he or she was a victim o f
Physical and/or Sexual Abuse at one or more of the Institutions from the years 
referred to in the Preamble until the present; and
(1) "Verbal abuse" includes any comments which would be a violation o f the Nova
Scotia Human Rights Act.
PROCESS
General
2. Survivors, through their legal representatives, have resolved a process and parameters for 
compensation for the Physical and Sexual Abuse they experienced while resident in the 
Institutions. It is expressly acknowledged among the parties that neither the terms o f this 
Memorandum nor the process which led to its creation constitute an admission o f liability, 
vicarious or otherwise, on the part o f the Province. For further certainty, the parties agree that 
this Memorandum shall not be introduced as evidence in any existing or future legal proceedings.
3. Survivors whose claims are determined to be valid either through negotiation or file 
review shall be compensated for Sexual Abuse and Physical Abuse perpetrated, condoned, or 
directed by employees o f the Province during the time the Survivors were resident in the 
Institutions.
4. Survivors shall only be eligible for the compensation and other benefits identified in this 
document where it is established, through negotiation or file review, that Physical and/or Sexual 
Abuse occurred.
5. Compensation determined under this Memorandum of Understanding, whether through 
negotiation or file review, shall be determined by reference to Statements and, at the option o f  
either the Survivor or the Province, medical records of any of the Institutions. Reference may 
be made to medical reports prepared for the purpose of establishing Physical Abuse, physical 
injury or physical disability where no other independent records exist No monetary 
compensation shall be made for any psychological consequences of Abuse.
6. Statements given by a Survivor and reduced to writing or recorded on videotape or 
audiotape with a view to validating the Survivor’s claim for compensation shall be used only for 
purposes o f this process and shall not be released to the public without the prior written consent 
of the Survivor.
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7. Survivors shall have access to:
(a) any written statement taken by Facts-Probe Inc. or the Department’s Internal 
Investigation Unit from the Survivor himself or herself or which the giver of the 
statement has consented in writing to release; and
(b) any medical, educational, social work or probation files kept or maintained by the
Institutions in respect of the Survivor personally and not related to others.
8. Any dispute with respect to the truth of the allegations of Abuse or quantum of
compensation shall be resolved either through negotiation between the parties (during which 
corroborative evidence may be introduced) or, if such dispute cannot be so resolved, through the 
file review process established in this Memorandum of Understanding.
MAKING A CLAIM
9. A Survivor who chooses to participate in the process outlined in this Memorandum shall
make a Demand upon the Province.
10. The Province shall provide its Response to the Demand within 45 days after receipt If 
the Demand is accepted by the Province, then payment in full shall be made within 20 days of 
the acceptance, and in any event not later than 65 days from the date of the Demand, upon
I receipt by the Province o f a Release in the form attached as Schedule "D", signed by the
Survivor.
11. If the parties have not concluded an agreement through negotiation within 45 days of the 
j Demand, or such further time as the Survivor may agree, the Survivor may continue negotiation
with the Province or give notice to the Province that the Demand will be submitted to file review 
; in accordance with this Memorandum. Only written materials referred to in this Memorandum
| o f  Understanding, and which have been exchanged by the Survivor and the Province during
negotiations, shall be included in the file as either Demand or Response materials for file review.
I4
FILE REVIEW
i 12. The parties acknowledge that the Survivors have chosen the list of file reviewers attached
as Schedule "A", and the Province has accepted the list
(
1 13. The Survivors (as a group) and the Province shall each select interview statements taken
by Facts-Probe Inc. which, in their opinion, are representative of the categories contained in 
( Schedule "B" (to a maximum of four statements per category for each of the Province and the
 ̂ Survivors). Upon a file reviewer agreeing to conduct a particular file review, that person shall
be provided with the volumes of statements. All names and dates in such statements shall be 
[ blanked out for the purposes of their inclusion in the volumes. No interview statement shall be
included in any volume without the prior consent of the person who gave the statement. The file
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reviewers shall review all o f  the statements so submitted prior to conducting any file reviews 
under this Memorandum.
14. If a Survivor chooses to submit a Demand to file review, the Survivor shall give written 
notice o f file review to the Province, indicating the Survivor’s choice o f file reviewer from the 
list attached as Schedule "A". Concurrent with the notice of file review, the Survivor shall 
execute a Release in the form attached as Schedule "D" and deliver it to the Province. The 
Province shall only reject the Survivor’s choice of file reviewer in the case o f  a conflict of 
interest, and shall provide written confirmation of acceptance or rejection o f  the file reviewer 
within 10 days o f receipt o f  the notice. If necessary, the Survivor shall then have 10 days to 
choose another file reviewer. This process may continue until a file reviewer has been appointed, 
at which time the Survivor shall forward the Demand to the file reviewer and shall at the same 
time provide a copy of the Demand to the Province.
15. File review shall take place within 30 days of the Survivor submitting the Demand to the 
file reviewer. If the file reviewer chosen by the Survivor is not available within the time limits 
prescribed herein, then the Survivor and the Province may agree to waive the time limits for 
purposes of having the matter reviewed by that particular person or, if  both parties are not 
agreeable to waiving the time limits, the Survivor shall choose a person from the list who can 
conduct a review within the time limits described. The file reviewer ultimately chosen shall not 
have the power to adjourn or recess a proceeding beyond the time limits prescribed without the 
consent of both parties.
16. The Province shall have 20 days from the date the Survivor submits the Demand to the 
file reviewer to forward its Response to the file reviewer.
17. Concurrently with the Survivor’s forwarding of the Demand to the file reviewer, the 
Survivor shall be entitled to request an appearance before the file reviewer to support his or her 
Demand. The Province shall be notified in writing by the Survivor at the time such request is 
made. The Survivor shall be entitled to appear before the file reviewer either personally or by 
way o f videotape, audiotape or telephone. The Survivor may appear without counsel, in which 
case the Survivor will be the sole party to appear before the file reviewer. The Survivor may 
appear with counsel to make representations, in which case the Province may also appear and 
make representations.
18. Should the Survivor make allegations which are not already contained in the Statement 
when appearing before the file reviewer, the file reviewer shall explain the following options to 
the Survivor and ask the Survivor to choose one of them:
Immediately adjourn the file review, upon which the Survivor shall be required 
to give a further Statement and make a further Demand upon the Province as 
outlined in paragraph 9; or
Disregard the new allegations when deciding the Survivor’s quantum of  
compensation.
(a)
(b)
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r 19. The Province undertakes to treat ail Survivor information it bolds or receives in respect
o f  a Survivor's claim for compensation pursuant to this Memorandum of Understanding in 
accordance with its obligations under the Freedom o f  Information and Protection o f  Privacy Act.
20. Should the Survivor choose to give a further Statement and submit a further Demand to 
the Province as outlined in paragraph 18(a), the Survivor shall be responsible for his or her legal 
costs incurred from the date of the adjournment.
21. The file reviewer shall render a written decision to the Survivor and the Province within 
30 days o f  the later of the Province’s submission or the appearance before the file reviewer. The 
file reviewer shall be provided with this Memorandum of Understanding and shall issue a 
decision that accords with Schedule "C", having regard to the Statement Volumes provided by 
counsel for the Province and counsel for the' Survivors, and which does not exceed the monetary 
limits set forth in Schedule "B".
r
I 22. Should the file reviewer fail to render a written decision within the time limit outlined in
paragraph 21, $100 shall be deducted from the file reviewer’s fee for every day the decision is 
f late.
I
23. The decision of the file reviewer is final and not subject to appeal or other form o f  
judicial review. The file review is not a submission to arbitration under any legislation, nor is
. it a submission under any other legislative enactment dealing with alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms and providing for some right o f  appeal.
(
COMPENSATION
t
24. Where compensation becomes payable as a result of negotiation or a file reviewer’s
decision, the Province shall pay such amount to the Survivor within 20 days o f the amount being
r decided.
v
25. All compensation awards shall be paid to the lawyer representing the Survivor, in trust,
; and shall only be paid upon the Province’s receipt o f a written direction to pay signed by the
Survivor.
L~ SOCIAL ASSISTANCE WAIVER
: 26. A social assistance waiver will be provided to Survivors who receive compensation
L pursuant to this Memorandum of Understanding, the effect of which will be to deem the amount
o f compensation received by the Survivor not to be income for purposes of the laws of the
I Province o f Nova Scotia. However, any income which a Survivor earns in a year, whether it be
income generated from the compensation amount or otherwise, shall be treated as income and 
 ̂ may disqualify the individual from social assistance in accordance with the applicable standards
I or regulations under the applicable legislation.
L
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27. The Province undertakes to request the other provinces and territories of Canada to enact 
reciprocating policies or legislation to provide similar waivers.
COUNSELLING
Interim
28. Survivors acknowledge that the Province has made interim psychological counselling 
available to them since July 20, 1995, to a maximum of the earlier o f one year’s counselling or 
$5,000 in expenditure for counselling.
29. A Survivor shall be entitled to continue interim counselling until:
(a) compensation becomes payable to the Survivor pursuant to this Memorandum of 
Understanding;
(b) a file reviewer determines that no compensation is payable to the Survivor; or
(c) the Survivor chooses to actively pursue legal action against the Province in respect 
of the alleged Abuse.
Long-term
30. Upon an amount becoming due to a Survivor as compensation pursuant to this 
Memorandum of Understanding, all interim counselling shall be terminated and the Survivor shall 
become entitled to receive counselling in accordance with Schedule "B".
31. The counselling allotment so awarded may be applied to the cost of employment 
counselling, psychological counselling, and/or financial counselling, at the option of the Survivor.
32. A Survivor may transfer any portion o f the value of his or her psychological counselling 
to his or her spousal partner or children, and the cost of such counselling shall be deducted from 
the Survivor’s counselling allotment
33. The Province shall be entitled to require that all counsellors be accredited in accordance 
with the Province’s initial agreement to provide interim counselling in order to qualify for service 
provision to Survivors pursuant to this Memorandum.
OTHER BENEFITS
35. The Province shall provide Survivors and/or their counsel with a list of programs available 
in Nova Scotia through the Drug Dependency Services division o f the Department of Health.
36. The Province shall facilitate and fund the preparation by an independent recorder of a 
public report of Survivors* testimonials.
with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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I.FGAL FEES
37. Legal fees inclined by Survivors shall be paid by the Province in accordance with the 
following Sections.
r 38. Legal fees shall be paid in accordance with the following tariffs:
(a) Senior counsel (10+ years’ practice): their usual hourly rate to a maximum of  
$175 per hour.
t
(b) Intermediate counsel (5 to 9 years’ practice, inclusive): their usual hourly rate to
r a maximum of $150 per hour.
i
<
(c) Junior counsel (less than 5 years’ practice): their usual hourly rate to a maximum
, o f $125 per hour.
>
(d) Articled clerks: their usual hourly rate to a maximum of $75 per hour.
f
39. Time spent by counsel’s office staff shall be considered to be included in the above hourly
rates.
t
1 40. Disbursements shall be charged at the actual rate incurred, and may include the. usual
disbursements paid in relation to the preparation and advancement of a Survivor’s claim (i.e., 
j photocopying, postage, long-distance telephone calls).
4 1 . Counsel’s travel shall be paid, where the distance travelled exceeds 50  kilometers, in
accordance with the following tariffs:
(a) Where travelling is done between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m., counsel’s 
time shall be charged in accordance with the hourly rates established in paragraph 38.
(b) Where travelling is done outside the hours of 8:00 am. and 7:00 p.m., counsel’s 
time shall be charged at one-half the hourly rates established in paragraph 38.
j (c) Airfare shall be paid at the actual amount incurred (receipts required).
I
(d) Mileage, where travel was by car, shall be paid at $0.29 per kilometer.
I (e) Hotel room rates, exclusive o f  room service, shall be paid at the actual amount
incurred (receipts required).
f
I (f) Actual cost o f two meals per day shall be paid, to a maximum of $40.
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Memorandum of Understanding Meeting Fees
42. Counsel may submit an account for legal fees, travel and disbursements incurred, from 
July 20, 1995 to the signing date o f  this Memorandum, in the course of discussions with the 
Province to develop this Memorandum of Understanding, exclusive o f  time, travel and 
disbursements incurred in connection with services provided to a particular client's civil claim.
43. Accounts for legal services rendered in accordance with paragraph 42 may only be 
submitted on or after the signing date o f  this Memorandum of Understanding.
44. The Province shall, within 60 days after receipt of an account for legal services rendered 
in accordance with paragraph 42, respond in writing to the lawyer who submitted the account, 
indicating the Province’s acceptance or rejection o f the account as rendered. If the Province fails 
to respond within 60 days of receiving the account, then the amount set forth in the account shall 
be deemed to be rejected by the Province.
45. Should the Province reject the account as submitted, counsel who submitted the account 
shall either negotiate with the Province to establish, in writing, an account which is mutually 
acceptable to the Province and counsel; or shall notify the Province in writing that the account 
may be submitted to taxation in accordance with paragraphs 59-63.
46. Once the final amount o f the account has been determined through acceptance, negotiation 
or taxation, the amount so determined shall become payable .within 30 days after the 
determination of the amount o f compensation payable to that counsel’s first client to receive 
compensation.
47. Counsel shall not be entitled to submit accounts in respect of any Memorandum of 
Understanding meetings which they did not personally attend.
Litigation Fees
48. Counsel may submit an account for legal fees, disbursements and travel incurred in 
furtherance o f a particular Survivor’s civil case, from the date counsel was retained by the 
particular Survivor to the signing date o f  this Memorandum of Understanding, which account 
shall be exclusive o f time spent: in preparation for, correspondence regarding, or attendance at 
media interviews; and in respect o f  lobbying the Province for a public inquiry.
49. Accounts rendered in accordance with paragraph 48 shall be submitted on or after the date 
o f signing o f  this Memorandum o f  Understanding.
50. The Province shall, within 90 days after receipt of an account for legal services rendered 
in accordance with paragraph 48, respond in writing to the lawyer who submitted the account, 
indicating the Province’s acceptance or rejection o f  the account as rendered. If the Province fails 
to respond within 90 days of receiving the account, then the amount set forth in the account shall 
be deemed to be rejected by the Province.
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5 1. Should the Province reject the account as submitted, counsel who submitted the account 
shall either negotiate with the Province to establish, in writing, an account which is mutually 
acceptable to the Province and counsel; or shall notify the Province in writing that the account 
may be submitted to taxation in accordance with paragraphs 59-63.
52. Once the amount o f the account has been determined through acceptance, negotiation or 
taxation, the amount so determined shall be paid within 30 days of the date of determination of  
the compensation payable to that particular Survivor. For further certainty, if there is a final 
determination that no compensation is payable to the Survivor, then no litigation fees shall be 
payable in respect o f that Survivor.
Process Fees
53. Counsel may, on receipt of compensation funds for a particular Survivor, submit an
r account for legal fees, disbursements and travel incurred on behalf o f that Survivor after the date
of signing of this Memorandum of Understanding.
I" 54. Such account shall not exceed 10 hours’ representation.
j
55. The Province shall, within 30 days after receipt o f an account for legal services rendered 
in accordance with paragraph 53, respond in writing to the lawyer who submitted the account,
i indicating the Province’s acceptance or rejection o f the account as rendered. If the Province fails
to respond within 30 days of receiving the account, then the amount set forth in the account shall
( be deemed to be rejected by the Province.
(
56. Should the Province reject the account as submitted, counsel who submitted the account 
shall either negotiate with the Province to establish, in writing, an account which is mutually 
acceptable to the Province and counsel; or shall notify the Province in writing that the account 
may be submitted to taxation in accordance with paragraphs 59-63.
i
57. Once the final amount of the account has been determined through acceptance, negotiation 
or taxation, the amount so determined shall become payable within 20 days.
Contingency Fees
' 58. The parties agree that once a Survivor has signed a Release in the form attached as
1 Schedule "D" all contingency fee agreements previously entered into between counsel and the
( Survivor shall be revoked, and no further contingency fee arrangements shall be entered into
[ between counsel and the Survivor in respect of compensation payable under this Memorandum
of Understanding.
[ Taxation
f 59. (1) Notwithstanding any provincial legislation respecting taxation of legal accounts for
I services, the parties agree that Robert W. Wright, Q.C., shall act as a taxing master in respect of
any accounts for services rendered in accordance with this Memorandum of Understanding.
L
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(2) Upon receipt of a written request for taxation, Robert W. Wright, Q.C. shall, 
within 30 days o f receipt of the request, set the matter down for a hearing on a date which is 
acceptable to both parties, but in any event the hearing shall be held within 90 days of receipt 
o f  the request.
60. Notwithstanding paragraph 59, counsel and the Province may agree in writing to submit 
an account to the provincial Taxing Master appointed in accordance with provincial legislation, 
where Robert W. Wright, Q.C., is in a conflict of interest position in respect of that counsel or 
a particular Survivor.
61. The decision of Robert W. Wright, Q.C., or the provincial Taxing Master in respect of 
a particular account shall be final and shall not be subject to appeal.
62. Taxation of a particular account may be conducted by telephone conference or in person, 
and counsel whose account is being taxed and the Province shall be entitled to participate in the 
taxation.
63. The Province shall be responsible for payment of the fees of either Robert W. Wright, 
Q.C., or the provincial Taxing Master.
ADDITIONAL
64. The effective date of this Memorandum of Understanding shall be June 17, 1996.
65. After the effective date of this agreement, if a Survivor who has given a Statement and 
is eligible for compensation pursuant to this agreement dies, then the lawful heirs/estate o f the 
Survivor shall be entitled to make a claim for compensation under this Memorandum of 
Understanding.
66. The Minister, on behalf of the Province, shall, within 30 days of the effective date o f this 
agreement, convey a public apology to the Survivors and families of Survivors for the Physical 
and Sexual Abuse the Survivors experienced while resident in the Institutions.
67. Following the conclusion o f  settlement of any individual claim hereunder, the Minister 
shall, by personal letter addressed to the Survivor, convey an apology to the Survivor.
68. A Survivor who is entitled to compensation hereunder may, at the Survivor’s option, have 
all or part o f the compensation paid by way o f structured settlement on such terms and conditions 
as may be agreed upon.
69. To be eligible for compensation hereunder, a Survivor must, within six months o f the 
effective date o f this Memorandum, give written notice o f the Survivor’s intention to make a 
Demand upon the Province, and must submit a Demand within six months o f  giving such notice.
L 70. The parties, by their signatures below, agree that this Memorandum o f  Understanding
constitutes all of the terms discussed among them, and further agree that there are no other
L
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written or verbal terms which have been negotiated outside of this Memorandum of 
Understanding.
71. The parties agree that this Memorandum of Understanding may be executed in 
counterparts, by facsimile signature or otherwise, and that such counterparts shall form part of 
the Memorandum, and shall be as effective as if  the original Memorandum had been signed by 
each party.
CONSENTED TO AS TO FORM as of the 15th day o f May, 1996.
THE PROVINCE OF NOVA SCOTIA COUNSEL FOR SURVIVOR
Per: ______________________________  Per:_________________________.
Per: _______________________________
Per:
r
i
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(
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SCHEDULE "A "
FILE REVIEWERS
(List to be Provided by June 17, 1996)
L
L
1
L
L
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SCHEDULE "B"
COM PENSATION CATEGORIES and COUNSELLING ALLOTMENTS
Description Range of Awards 
(S)
H
Counselling
Allotments
Category 1 Severe Sexual and Severe Physical $100,000 - $120,000
$10,000
Category 2 Severe Sexual and Medium Physical 
Severe Physical and Medium Sexual
$80,000 - $100,000
Category 3 Severe Sexual and Minor Physical 
Severe Physical and Minor Sexual
$60,000 - $80,000
Category 4 Severe Sexual $50,000 - $60,000
Category 5 Severe Physical $25,000 - $60,000
Category 6 Medium Physical and Medium Sexual $50,000 - $60,000
$7,500
Category 7 Minor Sexual and Medium Physical 
Minor Physical and Medium Sexual
$40,000 - $50,000
Category 8 Medium Sexual $30,000 - $50,000
Category 9
■
Minor Sexual and Minor Physical $20,000 - $30,000
$5,000Category 10 Medium Physical $5,000 - $25,000
Category 11 Minor Sexual $5,000 - $30,000
Category 12 Minor Physical and/or Sexual 
Interference
$0 - $5,000
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SCHEDULE "C"
GUIDELINES
The following guidelines are not intended to be exhaustive, but examples o f the type and 
frequency of abuse that would merit inclusion in a particular category. The number of incidents 
may not be determ inative of category, but may offer guidance to d eterm ine  category. Cases shall 
be evaluated in the context o f Statements available for review. After determining which category 
a Survivor shall be placed in, a file reviewer shall consider any aggravating factors present and 
may, on the basis o f the aggravating factors, move the Survivor up within the range o f that 
category. The absence of aggravating factors in any particular situation shall not preclude a  
Survivor from being placed at the top o f a category range.
For purposes o f clarity, any act which constituted sexual assault or attempted sexual assault under 
the Criminal Code, as it existed at the time of the act, as well as sexual interference as outlined 
herein, shall be considered to be Sexual Abuse.
SEVERE SEXUAL: Tvpe o f Abuse:
■ anal intercourse
■ vaginal intercourse
■ oral intercourse
Duration/Number of Incidents:
■ repeated, persistent, characterized as "chronic", "severe"
Aggravating Factors:
■ verbal abuse
■ withholding treatment
■ long-term solitary confinement
■ Racist Acts
■ threats
■ intimidation
SEVERE PHYSICAL: Tvpe o f Abuse:
■ physical assault, with broken bones (i.e., nose, arm, etc.), 
or other serious physical trauma, w ith or without hands 
(i.e., objects), with evidence o f hospitalization/treatment 
or permanent partial disability
Duration/Number of Incidents:
■ repeated, persistent, characterized as "chronic," "severe
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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SEVERE PHYSICAL, cont’d:
Aggravating Factors:
■ verbal abuse
■ withholding treatment
■ Tong-term solitary confinement
■ Racist Acts
■ threats
■ intimidation
MEDIUM SEXUAL: Type o f Abuse:
■ anal intercourse
■ vaginal intercourse
Duration/Number o f Incidents:
■ one or more incidents
■ shorter duration
Type o f Abuse:
■ oral intercourse
■ masturbation/ 
fondling
■ digital penetration
Duration/Number o f  Incidents:
■ numerous incidents
■ repeated, persistent
Aggravating Factors:
■ verbal abuse
■ withholding treatment
■ solitary confinement
■ Racist Acts
■ threats
■ intimidation
MEDIUM PHYSICAL: Type o f Abuse:
■ physical assault, with broken bone or bones (i.e., nose, 
arm, etc.), or other serious physical trauma, with or 
without hands (i.e., objects), with evidence of 
hospitalization/ treatment if available
■ chronic beatings, over significant period of time
Duration/Number o f  Incidents:
■ one or more incidents
1
t
L
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
MEDIUM PHYSICAL, confd :
Aggravating Factors:
■ verbal abuse
■ withholding treatment
■ solitary confinement
■ Racist Acts
■ threats
■ intimidation
MINOR SEXUAL: Type o f Abuse:
■ fondling
■ masturbation
■ oral intercourse
■ digital penetration
i
■ Duration/Number of Incidents:
■ fewer incidents 
; ■ short duration
i
Aggravating Factors:
[ ■ verbal abuse
1 ■ threats
■ intimidation
■ withholding treatment
■ Racist Acts
■ solitary confinement
MINOR PHYSICAL: Type o f Abuse:
■ physical assault, with or without hands (i.e., objects) 
(a.k.a. common assaults)
Duration/Number of Incidents:
■ isolated incidents
■ short duration
Aggravating Factors:
■ verbal abuse
■ threats
■ intimidation
■ Racist Acts
■ solitary confinement[
r
L
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
SEXUAL INTERFERENCE: Type of Abuse (must be of a sexual nature):
■ watching
■ comments
■ intimidation
Duration/Number of Incidents:
■ repeated/persistent
■ numerous incidents
Aggravating Factors:
■ verbal abuse
■ threats
■ intimidation
■ Racist Acts
I
1
(
I
i
I .
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SCHEDULE "D ”
RELEASE
  _______________________________ , called the "releasor," on behalf o f  my heirs,
(PRINT NAME)
ecutors, administrators, successors and assigns, do hereby acknowledge that:
I am a Survivor of physical and/or sexual abuse experienced while I was a minor in the 
re and custody of the Province at one or more of the Institutions, as defined in the Memorandum 
Understanding dated as of the 15th day of May, 1996.
I have received, read and understand the Memorandum of Understanding. I understand that 
i Memorandum of Understanding represents the full range of benefits to which I might be 
titled and sets out the criteria or conditions that I must meet to access those benefits. There are 
written or verbal representations outside of that Memorandum of Understanding that I am 
ying on.
I understand that the purpose o f the process under the Memorandum of Understanding is 
certify my claim and to determine the range o f benefits to which I am entitled and which will 
ovide the most benefit to me under the Memorandum of Understanding, having regard to the
o f the Memorandum o f Understanding.
x
I further agree and understand that provision of any benefit to me under the Memorandum 
Understanding is made without any admission that her Majesty the Queen in Right o f the 
ovince of Nova Scotia or her servants and/or agents were negligent or in breach o f any duty 
wards me or that they were in any way responsible for my injuries or damages and that any 
.bility is denied.
IN CONSIDERATION o f the provision to me of the benefits under the Memorandum of 
iderstanding and in accordance with its terms and by which I now agree to be bound, and subject 
my rights arising under the Memorandum of Understanding:
I hereby release and forever discharge Her Majesty the Queen in Right o f Nova Scotia and 
r present and former servants, agents, employees or officials who were in any way involved in 
e administration of the Institutions, whether involved in direct supervision or management, from 
i manners of action, causes o f  action, claims or demands which as against any of the above I had, 
>w have or may hereafter have for any cause, matter or thing whatsoever arising out of my 
:endance at any of the Institutions, and without limiting the generality o f  the foregoing, by reason 
' any injuries and damages which I experienced as a result of abuse or mistreatment otherwise 
tionable at law while I was a minor in the care and custody of the Province at any or all o f  the 
stitutions;
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